Attorney General of British Columbia

Three provincial appellants challenged the constitutionality of the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, which established minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency operating as a backstop to provincial pricing systems.

The courts below were divided, with the Saskatchewan and Ontario Courts of Appeal upholding the Act while the Alberta Court of Appeal struck it down.

A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court held that the Act's pith and substance is the establishment of minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and that this matter falls within Parliament's jurisdiction under the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good government power.

The majority further held that the fuel and excess emissions charges are constitutionally valid regulatory charges rather than taxes.

The appeals by the Attorneys General of Saskatchewan and Ontario were dismissed and the appeal by the Attorney General of British Columbia was allowed, with Côté J. dissenting in part and Brown and Rowe JJ. fully dissenting.

In related pan-national class proceedings, the court considered whether supervisory superior court judges may sit together outside their home provinces to hear motions in implementing a settlement.

The court held that, where subject-matter and personal jurisdiction exist and no coercive powers are required, judges may exercise discretionary authority to sit extraprovincially if local law does not prohibit it.

The court concluded this authority is available under the relevant class proceedings statutes and, in any event, aligns with inherent jurisdiction principles.

The court rejected a mandatory video-link condition, while confirming that openness and practical access remain relevant discretionary considerations.

The appeals were allowed and the cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appeal addressed whether retrospective application of expanded sexual-offender prohibition orders in s. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code infringed the right to the lesser punishment under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Court held both amendments constituted punishment and therefore limited s. 11(i) when applied to pre-amendment offences.

Under s. 1, retrospective application of the no-contact condition in s. 161(1)(c) was not justified, but retrospective application of the Internet prohibition in s. 161(1)(d) was justified.

The appeal was allowed in part and the order was varied accordingly.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a bestiality count arising from sexualized conduct involving an animal and a complainant.

The central issue was whether penetration is an essential element of bestiality under s. 160 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the term retained its established legal meaning requiring penetration, and found no clear legislative intent in the 1955 or 1988 amendments to expand the offence.

The Court emphasized that expanding criminal liability is a legislative function, not a judicial one.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding penetration is not required.

The appeal concerned whether Charter damages may be claimed against the provincial Crown for wrongful prosecutorial non-disclosure without pleading malice.

The Court held that malice is not required, but imposed a stringent threshold requiring intentional withholding, actual or imputed knowledge of materiality and likely impairment of full answer and defence, a Charter breach, and causation of legally cognizable harm.

The reasons emphasized good-governance limits to prevent defensive prosecution practices and unmeritorious civil claims, while preserving remedies for serious constitutional violations.

The claimant was permitted to pursue an amended pleading for s. 24(1) damages based on the alleged disclosure failures leading to wrongful convictions and prolonged incarceration.