8 total
Uneven credibility scrutiny found no error; matter remitted to Court of Appeal.
The appellant Crown appealed a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a conviction for sexual assault on the basis that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the credibility of the accused compared to the complainant.
The Supreme Court declined to decide whether uneven scrutiny constitutes an independent ground of appeal or a separate and distinct error of law.
The Court found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment that would have warranted intervention on appeal.
The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of Appeal to address the remaining grounds of appeal not considered by the majority below.
Crown appeal restores sexual assault conviction set aside by Court of Appeal.
The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision setting aside a sexual assault conviction and ordering a new trial.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge's reasons, read in context, clearly established beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not subjectively consent to any sexual activity with the respondent.
The Court found that the circumstantial evidence — including the complainant's emotional state, her attempts to leave, and her reaction upon recovering from memory blackouts — reasonably permitted only one inference: absence of consent.
The majority agreed with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal and restored the conviction.
The sentence appeal was remanded back to the Court of Appeal.
Manslaughter conviction upheld; evidence supported knowledge of impending home invasion.
In a criminal appeal, the appellant challenged a manslaughter conviction entered by the appellate court after setting aside an acquittal on that count at trial.
The central issue was whether the evidence permitted a finding that the accused knew a home invasion was about to occur when driving participants to the residence.
The Court held that the appellate disposition should stand and adopted the reasons of the Chief Justice of the provincial court of appeal.
The conviction for manslaughter was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
First degree murder conviction upheld; unreasonable verdict appeal failed.
The appellant challenged a first degree murder conviction on the basis of unreasonable verdict.
The Court affirmed that the verdict of the trial judge was reasonable and adopted the majority reasons of the provincial appellate court.
The appeal was dismissed from the bench on the hearing date.
The conviction for first degree murder remained in force.
The Supreme Court held that the offence of child abandonment requires subjective fault, upholding the acquittal.
The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of child abandonment under s. 218 of the Criminal Code.
The respondent, unaware of her pregnancy, gave birth in a retail store washroom and left the newborn in the toilet, believing the child was dead.
The majority held that s. 218 requires subjective fault, and the Crown had not proved the respondent knew her conduct risked the child's life or health.
The concurring minority would have applied an objective penal negligence standard but upheld the acquittal on the basis of the respondent's honest and reasonable mistake of fact.
The appeal was dismissed unanimously.
Trial judge not required to hold voir dire on own motion for email apology admitted on consent.
The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.
A confession made to police was ruled inadmissible at trial due to an improper inducement.
However, an e-mail sent by the accused to his former wife containing a second apology was admitted without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.
The accused was convicted.
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge should have held a voir dire on his own motion to determine if the e-mail was a derived confession or made to a person in authority.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion, as the former wife was not a person in authority and there was no obvious connection between the police inducement and the subsequent e-mail to trigger the derived confessions rule, especially given defence counsel's consent to its admission.
Police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples based on erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment.
The appellant was charged with impaired driving and driving 'over 80'.
The arresting officer observed erratic driving and physical signs of impairment, and made a breathalyzer demand.
The trial judge excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the officer lacked objective reasonable grounds for the demand, and acquitted the appellant.
The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the application of the legal standard of reasonable and probable grounds to the facts is a question of law, and that the officer had ample objective evidence to support his subjective belief of impairment.
Self-defence under s. 34(1) is unavailable to combatants in a consensual fist fight.
The appellant was charged with manslaughter after the deceased died from injuries sustained in a fist fight outside a bar.
The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis of self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that self-defence under s. 34(1) is not available to a combatant in a consensual fist fight because neither party can claim to be the innocent victim of an unprovoked assault.
The trial judge erred by failing to determine whether the appellant had consented to the fight and by misinterpreting the limits of consent to assault established in Jobidon.