Patrick Girard

A forest products company challenged the right of a state-owned electricity distributor to invoke a price adjustment clause in a 1926 power supply contract, arguing that the distributor was not a party to that contract.

The majority held that a 1965 bilateral contract between the distributor and the original contracting party effected a temporally limited assignment of the 1926 contract, with the assigned party's advance consent validly given in the original agreement.

As a result, the distributor was entitled to pass on to the forest products company the taxes and charges levied upon it by provincial legislation as increases in the cost of electricity generated from water power.

The dissent maintained that the trial judge had committed no reviewable error in finding that the 1965 contract created a mandate rather than an assignment, and that the Court of Appeal should not have intervened by analyzing the contract on a theory never advanced at trial.

On an appeal concerning a disciplinary investigator’s demand for an insurer’s claim file, the Court considered whether a statutory obligation to produce “any document” abrogates litigation privilege.

The Court held that litigation privilege is a class privilege distinct from solicitor-client privilege but fundamental to the administration of justice and the adversarial process.

It ruled that the privilege may be lifted only by clear, explicit and unequivocal legislative language, not by inference from a general production clause.

Because the governing provision lacked sufficiently specific wording, the insurer was entitled to withhold documents protected by litigation privilege.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant regulator challenged judgments holding that pension plan clauses could limit employer funding obligations after partial termination.

During appellate proceedings, the legislature enacted declaratory amendments expressly reversing the interpretation adopted below.

The majority held declaratory legislation applies immediately to pending matters and that the dispute remained pending because substantive rights had been remitted for determination.

It concluded the administrative decision-maker had to apply the new provisions since prior appellate directions no longer reflected good law after legislative intervention.

The appeal was allowed, with dissenting reasons concluding appellate finality and res judicata barred reopening the legal issue.

The appellant newspaper appealed orders compelling its journalist to answer questions that could reveal a confidential source, and a publication ban on reporting settlement negotiations in the Sponsorship Scandal litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no class-based constitutional privilege exists for journalists, the common law Wigmore framework applies in Quebec civil proceedings to determine journalist-source privilege on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also quashed the publication ban, finding it was improperly issued without notice and failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as the media was not bound by the parties' confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant sought recognition in Quebec of an English judgment ordering the Republic of Iraq to pay costs arising from litigation over aircraft seized during the invasion of Kuwait.

Iraq claimed state immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Act applies to applications for recognition of foreign judgments, Iraq's conduct in controlling the defence of its state-owned airline in the English commercial litigation fell within the commercial activity exception.

The Court allowed the appeal and permitted the application for recognition to proceed.

Domtar purchased a recovery boiler from C.E. (now ABB and Alstom).

The boiler's superheater developed leaks and cracks due to the use of H-style tie welds.

Domtar replaced the superheater and sued C.E. for latent defects and breach of the duty to inform.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the excessive cracking constituted a latent defect.

As a manufacturer, C.E. was presumed to know of the defect and failed to rebut this presumption, rendering its limitation of liability clause inapplicable.

C.E. was held liable for the replacement costs.

The Court also dismissed the appeals regarding the insurers, finding Chubb liable on its performance bond and Arkwright not liable due to a latent defect exclusion clause.

The appellant resigned from her position as a lawyer with the respondent city while the first collective agreement was being negotiated.

The finalized agreement included a retroactive salary adjustment but restricted it to employees employed on the date the agreement was signed.

The appellant sued the city and the union, arguing the clause violated the Labour Code and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and that the union breached its duty of representation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the retroactivity clause was lawful, did not constitute discrimination under the Charter, and that the union had properly carried out its duty of representation in the context of collective bargaining.