Claude G. Leduc

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for extended society care for two children, with access only to each other.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children or placement with a friend or relative.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's history of physical abuse, lack of insight, and failure to engage in programming.

The court granted the motion, ordering extended care for adoption and sibling access, finding it was the only prospect for a safe childhood.

The respondent moved to set aside an order made after an uncontested trial where he had been noted in default.

The court found two reasons to set aside the order: the respondent likely did not receive a letter about the uncontested hearing due to an incorrect address, and the applicant's affidavit for the uncontested trial contained inaccurate information about the respondent's address.

Additionally, the court emphasized the undesirability of making child custody decisions without both parents' participation.

The court set aside the previous order and restraining order, and issued temporary orders regarding child residence, communication, and travel restrictions, inviting the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to participate.

On an appeal concerning a disciplinary investigator’s demand for an insurer’s claim file, the Court considered whether a statutory obligation to produce “any document” abrogates litigation privilege.

The Court held that litigation privilege is a class privilege distinct from solicitor-client privilege but fundamental to the administration of justice and the adversarial process.

It ruled that the privilege may be lifted only by clear, explicit and unequivocal legislative language, not by inference from a general production clause.

Because the governing provision lacked sufficiently specific wording, the insurer was entitled to withhold documents protected by litigation privilege.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Applicant, Michael David Garland, moved for costs following his successful motion to change previous joint custody orders to expand his residence time with the parties' child.

The court found the Applicant had achieved decisive success in the underlying motion.

The Applicant sought full indemnity of $26,700 or partial indemnity of $19,500.

The Respondent, Candace Brouwer, opposed the amount.

The court determined that substantial indemnity was appropriate but reduced the amount to $12,000, considering that a smaller amount would have been reasonably contemplated and that the Respondent should not be responsible for the Applicant's choice of a lawyer who had to travel.

The applicant father sought to vary a joint custody order to expand his residence time with his seven-year-old daughter, whose primary residence was with the respondent mother.

The court first addressed a clause in a prior consent order restricting review until the child reached grade 6, clarifying it did not preclude review upon a material change in circumstances, as required by the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Finding a material change due to both parents establishing stable homes and the child's increased age, the court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework.

The father's proposal for an extra overnight and extended alternate weekends was granted to maximize contact and smooth the schedule, despite the mother's objections regarding disruption and homework assistance.

However, the father's proposals for equal holiday time, including Christmas, were largely rejected to minimize long absences and maintain established traditions.

Summer vacation was expanded to two non-consecutive weeks, becoming consecutive in 2020.

A lawyer challenged a disciplinary reprimand imposed after a private letter to a judge containing abusive personal attacks.

The appeal required the court to determine the proper review framework where discretionary administrative decisions engage Charter expression values.

The court held that judicial review proceeds on reasonableness, with proportional balancing of Charter values and statutory objectives, rather than a full Oakes section 1 analysis.

Applying that framework, the reprimand reflected a proportionate balance between expressive freedom and professional civility obligations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.