Tremblay v. Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et de bureau, section locale 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 627, 2002 SCC 44

Valérie Tremblay Appellant

v.

Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et

de bureau, section locale 57 SIEPB, CTC‑FTQ, and

City of Montréal Respondents

Indexed as: Tremblay v. Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et de bureau, section locale 57

Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 44.

File No.: 27965.

Hearing and judgment: February 13, 2002.

Reasons delivered: April 26, 2002.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec

Labour relations — Collective agreement — Retroactivity clause — Union’s duty of representation — Clause in collective agreement limiting payment of retroactive salary to employees employed by city when agreement was signed — Whether clause violates principle that there can be only one collective agreement by denying employees having resigned from their positions before agreement was signed the benefit of retroactivity — Whether union breached its duty of representation to former employees — Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑27, ss. 47.2, 67.

Civil rights — Right to equality — Equal salary for equivalent work — Clause in collective agreement limiting payment of retroactive salary to employees employed by city when agreement was signed — Whether clause creates unlawful discrimination against employees having resigned from their positions before agreement was signed — Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, ss. 10, 19.

Civil rights — Economic and social rights — Fair and reasonable conditions of employment — Clause in collective agreement limiting payment of retroactive salary to employees employed by city when agreement was signed — Legality of clause contested by employee who resigned from her position before agreement was signed — Whether clause unreasonable — Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, s. 46.

The respondent union was certified to represent a group of lawyers employed by the respondent city. The appellant, a member of the union, resigned from the position she had held as a lawyer with the city while the first collective agreement was being negotiated. The agreement that was ultimately signed between the union and the city provides for retroactive salary adjustments, but Art. 24.08 restricts the application of that clause to employees employed by the city on the date the collective agreement was signed. The appellant brought an action in damages against the respondents alleging that Art. 24.08 violates the Labour Code and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and that the union failed in its duty of representation to her. The Superior Court allowed the action. A majority of the Court of Appeal set aside that decision.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed. The retroactivity clause does not violate the Labour Code or the Charter. The union properly carried out its duty of representation.

The Labour Code does not require that collective agreements be retroactive. Nor does it provide for an implied presumption of retroactivity. Under the Code, the parties are free to negotiate the question of retroactivity, subject to the union’s duty of representation and to the rules relating to public order and to the protection of fundamental rights. In this case the wording in the agreement confirms the parties’ intention to contract for the future. The requirement in s. 67 of the Code that there be only one agreement is satisfied. The agreement, which varies the conditions of employment in some respects, is a single contract that establishes the conditions of employment for the bargaining unit as a whole.

The retroactivity clause does not violate s. 19 of the Charter, which provides that an employer must, without discrimination, grant equal salary for equivalent work. The appellant has not shown that the different treatment is based on a form of discrimination prohibited in s. 10 of the Charter. Nor is the retroactivity clause unreasonable within the meaning of s. 46 of the Charter, since it does not violate the Labour Code, the mandatory provisions of the Charter, any known provision of labour legislation or, even hypothetically, the union’s duty of representation.

In the context of the present collective bargaining, the appellant failed to establish that the union had committed a fault for which it was liable at law by signing a collective agreement that did not entitle former employees to retroactive salary payment. The duty of representation owed by the union as a general rule constitutes an obligation of means. Given the ongoing nature of that duty, an employee’s departure from a bargaining unit does not cancel out all consequences of the manner in which the duty of representation was carried out in respect of that employee. In a situation of collective bargaining the union may therefore have to take the interests of such an employee into account. Here, when the union and the city were trying to decide on a retroactivity clause, the situation of the individuals who had performed work that was covered by the certification but who had resigned from their jobs could have been one of the interests affected by the outcome of the negotiations. Performing such work would not, however, create rights in them that would take precedence over the rights of the members of the bargaining unit who were employed when the agreement was made. The legal framework that applied to the collective bargaining process did not give them any acquired rights in respect of retroactivity. Their temporary presence in the bargaining unit certainly did not impose an obligation of result on the union requiring that it obtain a retroactive salary increase for them.

Cases Cited

Referred to: Canadian Air Traffic Control Association v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 5595 (FCA), [1985] 2 F.C. 84; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, 2000 SCC 27; Noël v. Société d’énergie de la Baie James, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 207, 2001 SCC 39; Centre hospitalier Régina Ltée v. Labour Court, 1990 CanLII 111 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1330; Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), 1996 CanLII 220 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, ss. 10 [am. 1982, c. 61, s. 3], 13, 16, 19, 46 [am. 1979, c. 63, s. 275], 49.

Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑27, ss. 1(b) “certified association”, 47.2, 53, 59, 62, 67, 72.

Authors Cited

Gagnon, Robert P. Le droit du travail du Québec: pratiques et théories, 4^e éd. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1999.

APPEAL from judgments of the Quebec Court of Appeal, [2000] R.J.Q. 1098, [2000] R.J.D.T. 460, [2000] Q.J. No. 1198 (QL), [2000] Q.J. No. 1223 (QL), setting aside a decision of the Superior Court, [1996] R.J.Q. 1850, [1996] Q.J. No. 1282 (QL). Appeal dismissed.

Suzanne Côté and Patrick Girard, for the appellant.

Pierre Gingras, Serge Cadieux and Maria Cirino, for the respondent Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et de bureau, section locale 57 SIEPB, CTC‑FTQ.

Philippe Berthelet and Benoît Dagenais, for the respondent City of Montréal.

English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by

LeBel J. —

I. Introduction

1 In this appeal, the appellant, a lawyer who worked for the City of Montréal for several years, is challenging the legality of a clause in a collective agreement between the Syndicat des enployées et employés professionnels-les et de bureau, section locale 57 SIEPB, CLC‑FTQ (the “Union”) and the City of Montréal (the “City”) and is seeking damages against the two parties to the agreement. The appellant argued that a provision in that agreement deprived her of the retroactive salary adjustment provided for in the agreement because, like other employees, she had resigned from her job before the collective agreement was signed. The Superior Court allowed her action. A majority of the Court of Appeal set aside that decision and dismissed the action against both respondents in respect of all of the relief sought. For the reasons stated here, I and my colleagues agreed at the end of the hearing that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant, Valérie Tremblay, failed to establish that the retroactivity clause in issue violated the Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑27, or the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12 (the “Charter”). She also failed to show that the Union failed in its duty of representation and was therefore civilly liable to her.

II. Facts

2 The relevant facts in this appeal are not very complex. Ms. Tremblay, a lawyer, began working for the City of Montréal on November 21, 1988. At the time, there was no union representing the lawyers employed by the City, who were subject to the City’s employment regulations. In 1990, the Union was certified to represent the lawyers employed, within the meaning of the Labour Code, in the penal and criminal affairs unit of the City of Montréal’s corporate affairs branch. Ms. Tremblay then became a member of the Union. Collective bargaining began. The Union submitted a draft collective agreement. That draft, which was approved by the Union members at a general meeting, contained a retroactivity clause. Article 25.02 of the draft provides for the agreement to be fully retroactive, effective May 1, 1990.

3 The negotiation of the agreement was difficult. During the bargaining period, Ms. Tremblay resigned from her position with the City of Montréal. In an attempt to break the bargaining deadlock, the Union then called a strike. Ultimately, after intense negotiations, a collective agreement was signed. That agreement provides for retroactive salary adjustments, but Art. 24.08 restricts the application of that clause to employees still employed by the City of Montréal on the date the collective agreement was signed. The employees who resigned from their positions with the City of Montréal, such as Ms. Tremblay and two other lawyers, were not entitled to any retroactive payment. That Article incorporates the City’s administrative policy rule that denies employees no longer in the City’s employ any right to salary adjustments made after they left.

III. Judgments Below

A. Quebec Superior Court, [1996] R.J.Q. 1850

4 In the opinion of Tellier J., there was a sound basis for the appellant’s action against the two respondents. First, Art. 24.08 of the collective agreement violated s. 46 of the Charter. By denying Ms. Tremblay the benefit of the retroactivity provision, the parties were imposing unfair and unreasonable employment conditions on her, and this invalidated the clause in issue. Second, by agreeing to the non‑retroactivity clause, the Union had breached its duty of representation to its former member. That breach constituted a delictual fault, for which the Union was civilly liable and for which it was ordered to pay $11,176 in damages. Tellier J. also found that the Union, like the City, had committed a fault in signing an agreement that violated the Charter. On that basis, the Superior Court found that the two respondents were solidarily liable. The court ordered them to pay $5,000 in exemplary damages. The respondents appealed that decision.

B. Quebec Court of Appeal, [2000] R.J.Q. 1098

5 For reasons set out in the concurring opinions of Beauregard J.A. and Denis J. (ad hoc), the majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the trial judgment, and dismissed Ms. Tremblay’s action in its entirety. Thibault J.A., dissenting in part, would have affirmed the award of damages against the Union but would have set aside the award of punitive damages.

6 In the opinions of the majority judges, the Article in issue did not violate any of the provisions in the Labour Code or the Charter. In essence, the Article represented the lawful exercise of the parties’ bargaining authority. There was nothing that required that a collective agreement for the benefit of current and previous union members be fully retroactive. Furthermore, the Union had not failed in its duty of representation by agreeing to Art. 24.08. Ms. Tremblay had not proved that additional efforts would have persuaded the City to alter its position on retroactivity. There was nothing to justify awarding damages against the respondents.

7 Thibault J.A. held that the Article in issue was valid. She also agreed that the award of damages against the City should be set aside. In her opinion, however, the Union was civilly liable to Ms. Tremblay: the Union had a duty of representation to Ms. Tremblay throughout her period of employment and it had not acted with reasonable care in carrying out that duty. Although Thibault J.A. acknowledged that the Union did not have an absolute obligation to its members, she found that it had failed to show that it could not have obtained a better result by demanding complete retroactivity, or that further efforts to that end would have prevented an agreement from being signed with the City. Thibault J.A. further observed that the issue of retroactivity for former employees had not even been raised during the negotiations. On a delictual liability basis, she would have upheld the award of damages against the Union equal to the retroactive salary claimed but would have set aside the exemplary damages.

IV. Relevant Statutory and Contractual Provisions

8 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12

10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.

Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.

13. No one may in a juridical act stipulate a clause involving discrimination.

Such a clause is deemed without effect.

16. No one may practise discrimination in respect of the hiring, apprenticeship, duration of the probationary period, vocational training, promotion, transfer, displacement, laying‑off, suspension, dismissal or conditions of employment of a person or in the establishment of categories or classes of employment.

17. Every employer must, without discrimination, grant equal salary or wages to the members of his personnel who perform equivalent work at the same place.

A difference in salary or wages based on experience, seniority, years of service, merit, productivity or overtime is not considered discriminatory if such criteria are common to all members of the personnel.

46. Every person who works has a right, in accordance with the law, to fair and reasonable conditions of employment which have proper regard for his health, safety and physical well‑being.

47. Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom.

In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to exemplary damages.

Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑27

1. In this code, unless the context requires otherwise, the following expressions mean :

(b) “certified association” — the association recognized by decision of the certification agent, the labour commissioner or the Court as the representative of all or some of the employees of an employer;

47.2. A certified association shall not act in bad faith or in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or show serious negligence in respect of employees comprised in a bargaining unit represented by it, whether or not they are members.

59. From the filing of a petition for certification and until the right to lock out is acquired or an arbitration award is handed down, no employer may change the conditions of employment of his employees without the written consent of each petitioning association and, where such is the case, certified association.

60. The collective agreement may contain any provision respecting conditions of employment which is not contrary to public order or prohibited by law.

61. A collective agreement shall be binding upon all the present or future employees contemplated by the certification.

The certified association and the employer shall make only one collective agreement with respect to the group of employees contemplated by the certification.

72. No collective agreement shall take effect until the filing at the office of the labour commissioner-general of five exemplars or copies, true to the original, of such collective agreement and of a true copy of its schedules. The same rule applies to any amendment subsequently made to such collective agreement.

Collective agreement between the City of Montréal and the Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et de bureau, section locale 57 SIEPB, CTC‑FTQ, for the period from May 1, 1990 to April 30, 1993

[translation]

24.08 Retroactive salary resulting from the previous paragraphs shall be paid to each lawyer who is employed by the City on the date the collective agreement is signed within 60 days of that date.

28.01 This agreement shall be in effect from the date it is signed to April 30, 1993.

Union’s draft collective agreement, July 1990

[translation]

25.02 This collective agreement shall be for a 24‑month term, from May 1, 1990 to April 30, 1992. It shall come into effect on the date it is signed and shall have retroactive effect. Each employee shall receive, in addition to the amounts owed, a lump sum of $750.00 payable within 30 days of the date the collective agreement is signed.

V. Analysis

A. Positions of the Parties

9 The parties raised fundamentally conflicting arguments in this Court. As mentioned earlier, Ms. Tremblay argued that there can only be one collective agreement and that the differential treatment of herself in that agreement was unlawful under the Labour Code and the Charter, and that the Union failed in its duty to represent her. Vigorously opposed by the respondents, who countered that the retroactivity clause in the agreement was lawful and, in the case of the Union, that its duty of representation had been properly carried out, this argument cannot be accepted in any of its elements. I will first examine the issue of whether the retroactivity clause (Art. 24.08) is lawful. I will then examine the Union’s duty of representation.

B. The Legality of the Retroactive Clause

10 The appellant argued that the only way that an action could be structured in which relief could be obtained against the City, risky as it may seem, was to challenge the legality of the retroactivity clause not only under the Labour Code but also under the Charter. Otherwise, the entire case would be limited to the problem of whether the Union carried out its duty of representation, which would have involved the employer only indirectly, in the context of collective bargaining, in which it was entitled to act in its own interests.

11 In order to address this argument, we must first properly identify the problem in relation to the relevant facts and the applicable law. As we have seen, the Union had initially been certified for a new bargaining unit. The pre‑existing conditions of employment may be summarized as the conditions that the City applied in its employment rules and policies. The certification and the initiation of the bargaining resulted in those conditions of employment being frozen under s. 59 of the Labour Code. During this indefinite period, which would lead to a labour dispute, or to a negotiated agreement, or to both in succession, the appellant performed her duties under those rules and policies and was entitled to the compensation for which they provided. Changes to that framework constituted one aspect of the collective bargaining at the time. The duration and commencement date of the eventual agreement would necessarily be one subject of the negotiations. There is nothing in the Labour Code that requires that an agreement be retroactive in that situation, where a first agreement is signed, or even, when the agreement is renewed. Under the Labour Code, the parties are free to agree that an agreement will apply only for the future.

12 The wording in the agreement confirms the parties’ intention to contract for the future. The agreement came into effect when it was signed, on April 10, 1992, and was effective until April 30, 1993. Article 24 mitigated that rule to some extent by providing for salary scale adjustments for 1990 to 1992, which would be paid to the employees employed at the time the agreement was signed.

13 The appellant argued that this provision violated the principle that there is only one collective agreement: s. 67 of the Labour Code provides that the employer and the certified association shall make only one collective agreement that will apply to the entire bargaining unit. It was advanced that in denying the employees who had resigned the benefit of retroactive salary payment, the parties made an agreement that breached s. 67, since it allegedly incorporated two different sets of rules for the remuneration payable to employees who performed identical work. This would then have amounted to entering into two different agreements governing the same bargaining unit.

14 The requirement that there be only one agreement was satisfied. The agreement, which varied the conditions of employment in some respects, was a single contract that established the conditions of employment for the bargaining unit as a whole. It provided for a salary adjustment for the entire bargaining unit based on past service, but payable only to the members who were employed at the time. This provision was not prohibited by the Labour Code. The parties could have chosen not to provide for any adjustments, to maintain a salary freeze, or even to reduce the conditions of employment, as occasionally occurs during economic hard times. Under the Labour Code, the parties are free to negotiate the definition of what is meant by retroactivity, subject to the Union’s duty of representation and to the rules relating to public order and to the protection of fundamental rights.

15 Nor does the Labour Code provide for an implied presumption of retroactivity. That point is subject to bargaining. If the meaning of the relevant provisions of a collective agreement seems unclear, or if they lead to problems in application, the matter will usually be dealt with by the competent specialized authorities, such as arbitrators. The superior courts will normally intervene only in the exercise of the power of judicial review, the standards for which will vary, depending on the nature of the problem in issue. For example, the correctness of the decision would normally be the standard applied when the issue involved in the problem of retroactivity was whether there actually was an agreement, or when it became applicable. In the context of this case, we therefore can neither develop principles for interpreting retroactivity clauses nor approve or criticize the interpretive approaches that have been developed in Canada and that we find expressed in some superior court decisions. (See, for example, Canadian Air Traffic Control Association v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 5595 (FCA), [1985] 2 F.C. 84 (C.A.).) Rather, the issue in this case is whether a provision which seems clear and properly drafted also complies with the Charter and the general principles governing the Union’s duty of representation.

C. Compliance with the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms

16 The appellant’s main argument was that the retroactivity clause violates s. 19 of the Charter by creating an illegal discrimination between employees who perform identical work. That argument was rejected by all of the judges of the Court of Appeal. The Superior Court also rejected it. As that argument was formulated, it would impose a duty of total equality between employees who worked for an employer at the same time. That interpretation fails to consider that s. 19 of the Charter seeks to prevent the types of discrimination provided for in s. 10, such as discrimination based on sex or ethnic origin, or on a handicap, for example. (For a study of the content of the concept of discrimination under the Charter, see Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, 2000 SCC 27.) No evidence that the employees who resigned had been discriminated against was presented in this case. We know only that three employees left the unit during the bargaining period. Except for the appellant, we know nothing about their personal characteristics. It is not argued that the differential treatment of those employees is based on a ground prohibited by the Charter. That argument therefore has no legal basis.

17 The second argument, grounded on s. 46, is also without any basis. We would have to conclude that the condition of employment is unreasonable, although it does not violate the Labour Code, the mandatory provisions of the Charter, any known provision of labour legislation or, even hypothetically, the Union’s duty of representation. In fact, s. 46 would allow a judge hearing an action to reassess, in his or her discretion, the pay agreed to at the time by the parties, based on his or her personal sense of fairness. In the Canadian labour relations system, conditions of employment are still determined by individual or collective bargaining, subject to the requirements relating to public order and the protection of fundamental rights. We need not interpret s. 46 of the Charter, the actual scope of which is still open to debate, in order to find that the approach adopted in this case was not unreasonable.

18 At this stage of the analysis, we find that there is no legal basis that would justify awarding damages against the City. The issue of the Union’s duty of representation remains to be decided.

D. The Duty of Representation

19 The appellant’s final argument may be summarized as an allegation that the Union breached its duty of representation. That conclusion cannot be supported by either the legal nature of that duty or the specific facts of this case.

20 In the Canadian labour relations system, a union’s duty of representation is one of the corollaries of the function of representation, given to the union by the Act, in respect of the bargaining unit and the employees who make up that unit (see Noël v. Société d’énergie de la Baie James, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 207, 2001 SCC 39, at paras. 46‑55; Centre hospitalier Régina Ltée v. Labour Court, 1990 CanLII 111 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1330). The union owes a duty of diligent and competent representation to the bargaining unit as a whole. As a general rule, however, it constitutes an obligation of means, and an applicant who brings an action in damages against the union must prove the breach of the obligation.

21 That duty arises from a legal mandate of representation that applies to an entire bargaining unit, the composition of which necessarily varies over time. Given the ongoing nature of that duty to all of the units, which may be in a constant state of change, it cannot be concluded that an employee’s departure cancels out all consequences of the manner in which the duty of representation was carried out in respect of that employee. A legal situation may have been created such that a union will have to continue working and representing the employee in order to resolve it. It is submitted that it is especially necessary to recognize that duty, which originally derives from the manner in which the duty of representation was carried out, since the union then continues to hold the exclusive power to bargain with the employer and, most often, to control access to the grievance procedure and the conduct of that procedure. The continuation, in this form, of a residual duty to represent employees who cease to work in the undertaking, with respect to problems that arise from their period of employment, is consistent with the overall scheme of this system of exclusive and collective representation. Moreover, when carrying out its duty of representation in collective bargaining, a certified union often has to deal with the consequences of the history and problems of the group it represents. Interests may have been created, legal situations may have crystallized, commitments may have been made. In such a situation, even though the duty of representation is carried out in the present, but from the perspective of the foreseeable future of the agreement to be negotiated, the union will sometimes have to take those interests or rights into account when deciding on the approaches to which the agreement will give form and effect for the future.

22 In a bargaining process in which the parties were trying to decide on a retroactivity clause, the situation of the individuals who had performed work that was covered by the certification but who had resigned from their jobs could have been one of the interests affected by the outcome of the negotiations. Performing work covered by the certification would not, however, create rights in those employees that would take precedence over the rights of the current members of the bargaining unit who were employed when the agreement was made. The legal framework that applied to the collective bargaining process did not give them any acquired rights in respect of retroactivity. Their temporary presence in the bargaining unit during part of the time when the negotiations took place certainly did not impose an obligation of result on the Union requiring that it obtain a retroactive salary increase for them at the end of the negotiations with the City.

23 This kind of extension of a union’s responsibility would be all the more difficult to justify in that it would be imposed in the dynamic, complex, and conflictual context of a collective agreement. Such an agreement involves dialogue and sometimes even confrontation with the employer, the creation of balances of power, and the need to take into account the different interests within the bargaining unit. The employer, which must negotiate in good faith for the purposes of entering into a collective agreement under s. 53 of the Labour Code, has no legal obligation to accept the union’s proposals. (See R. P. Gagnon, Le droit du travail du Québec: pratiques et théories (4th ed. 1999), at pp. 365‑66; Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), 1996 CanLII 220 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R 369, at pp. 396‑97, per Cory J.) It would be difficult for a union to guarantee the outcome of collective bargaining. Sometimes it may have to accept a questionable agreement rather than start or prolong a labour dispute.

24 In the context of this collective bargaining, Ms. Tremblay failed to establish that the Union had committed a fault for which it was liable at law by signing a collective agreement that did not entitle former employees to retroactive salary payment. She, like the trial judge, faulted the Union for having allegedly disregarded her interests. The record does not show that she got in touch with the Union before she left her employ. She also was not involved in the strike the Union was forced to call to break the bargaining deadlock. The bargaining process was clearly difficult. In addition, full retroactivity would have represented a significant change in the City’s employment policies. In a situation such as this, the Union cannot be criticized for making that agreement, which protected the City’s current employees, without prolonging the bargaining process for the sole benefit of a person who had not concerned herself, either directly or indirectly, with the outcome of the bargaining process after she left. Like the majority of the Court of Appeal, I am satisfied that the Union properly carried out its duty of representation in respect of the bargaining unit it represented at the end of the lengthy and difficult process of negotiating a first collective agreement.

VI. Conclusion

25 For these reasons, I agreed that the appeal should be dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Stikeman Elliott, Montréal.

Solicitors for the respondent Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels‑les et de bureau, section locale 57 SIEPB, CTC‑FTQ: Gingras Cadieux Bruneau, Montréal.

Solicitors for the respondent City of Montréal: Jalbert, Séguin, Verdon, Caron, Mahoney, Montréal.