SCC 2002

The Surrey School Board passed a resolution declining to approve three books depicting same-sex parented families as supplementary learning resources for Kindergarten and Grade One classrooms.

The appellants challenged the resolution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was unreasonable because it failed to act in accordance with the secular mandate of the School Act.

The Board allowed the religious views of some parents to trump the need for equal respect and tolerance for all family models, and failed to apply the appropriate criteria for approving supplementary learning resources.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the Board.

Ratepayers sued a municipal councillor for defamation arising from remarks made at a televised council meeting criticizing litigation over a municipal tax bylaw and infrastructure costs.

The Court held that wrongful individual acts of elected municipal officials in Quebec are governed by arts. 1376 and 1457 C.C.Q., subject to any prevailing public law principles, and that common law doctrines of qualified privilege and fair comment are not imported directly into Quebec civil law.

Instead, the values underlying those doctrines are considered contextually in assessing civil fault, alongside freedom of expression and reputation.

Applying a deferential appellate standard, the Court found the councillor's speech, viewed as a whole and in context, was made in good faith in the public interest and did not constitute a fault.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a Quebec social assistance regulation that provided a significantly lower base amount of welfare benefits to individuals under the age of 30 compared to those 30 and over, unless they participated in specific training or work experience programs.

The appellant argued that this age-based distinction violated her equality rights under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter, her right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter, and her right to financial assistance under section 45 of the Quebec Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the scheme did not violate section 15(1) because it was designed to ameliorate the situation of young people by encouraging their integration into the workforce, and did not treat them as less worthy of respect.

The majority also found no violation of section 7, concluding that the deprivation of security of the person was not caused by state action implicating the administration of justice, and declined to recognize a positive state obligation to guarantee adequate living standards under section 7.

Finally, the majority held that section 45 of the Quebec Charter did not subject the adequacy of social assistance measures to judicial review.

The parties cohabited for approximately 10 years.

Following separation, the respondent applied for a declaration that the definition of 'spouse' in s. 2(g) of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act was unconstitutional for failing to provide her with the presumption of an equal division of matrimonial property, in violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion of unmarried cohabiting persons of the opposite sex from the Act is not discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15(1).

The distinction does not affect the dignity of these persons and respects the fundamental personal autonomy and choice of individuals who decide not to marry.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the charge, read as a whole, gave rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

A new trial was ordered.

The sole shareholder and directing mind of two corporations altered a cheque payable to one corporation by adding the second corporation as a payee.

He deposited the unendorsed cheque into the second corporation's account at the appellant bank.

The first corporation subsequently went into receivership, and its receiver brought an action in conversion against the bank.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was not liable in conversion because the sole shareholder, as the directing mind of the first corporation, had the authority to direct the bank to deposit the funds into the second corporation's account.

Since the bank acted with the authorization of the rightful owner, there was no wrongful interference.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge did not err in finding the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

Two Indian bands, the Wewaykum (Campbell River) and Wewaikai (Cape Mudge), claimed each other's reserve lands, alleging the federal Crown breached its fiduciary duty during the reserve creation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Both bands sought declarations and equitable compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by acting with loyalty, good faith, and ordinary prudence.

The Court found that both bands had historically acknowledged the other's entitlement to their respective reserves, making equitable relief inappropriate due to laches and acquiescence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the bands' claims were statute-barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The respondent commenced an action in Quebec claiming damages for loss of performance incentives and reputation after a satellite it helped manufacture was damaged during testing.

The appellants, all domiciled in the United States, brought declinatory motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Quebec courts under the Civil Code of Québec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec courts had jurisdiction because the respondent suffered damage to its reputation at its Quebec facility.

The Court further held that the 'real and substantial connection' test is subsumed within the Code's provisions and that the appellants failed to establish that another forum was clearly more appropriate under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The appellants challenged the validity of the respondents' patent for the use of AZT in the treatment and prophylaxis of HIV/AIDS.

The appellants argued that the patent lacked utility at the time of application, claimed more than was invented, and failed to name NIH scientists as co-inventors.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the utility of AZT was established through the doctrine of sound prediction at the time of the patent application.

The Court also found that the prophylactic claims were soundly predicted and that the NIH scientists were not co-inventors because they merely verified the respondents' inventive concept.

The appeal concerned whether a genetically altered non-human mammal created for cancer research fell within the definition of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act.

The Court held, by majority, that the Commissioner’s refusal of the product claims was reviewable for correctness and that the Commissioner had no free-standing discretion under s. 40 to deny a patent on public policy grounds.

Applying modern statutory interpretation, the majority concluded that “manufacture” and “composition of matter” do not extend to higher life forms and that the existing patent regime is ill-suited to address the complex practical, ethical, and policy issues raised by patenting such subject matter.

The appeal was allowed, the Federal Court of Appeal judgment was set aside, and no costs were ordered.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellant taxpayer was audited by revenue officials who obtained documents and statements using their statutory requirement powers.

The file was subsequently transferred to special investigations, and the taxpayer was charged with tax evasion.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from R. v. Jarvis to determine when the audit became an investigation engaging the taxpayer's Charter rights.

The Court concluded that the investigation commenced after a specific meeting, meaning evidence gathered prior to that point was admissible, while evidence gathered afterward using audit powers violated the Charter and was subject to exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The appellant challenged the use in a tax evasion prosecution of information obtained through statutory audit powers under the Income Tax Act.

The Court held that the Act draws a distinction between audit functions aimed at verifying tax liability and investigative functions aimed at determining penal liability.

It adopted a contextual predominant-purpose analysis to identify when the relationship between tax officials and the taxpayer becomes adversarial and full Charter protections apply.

On the facts, the audit did not become a penal investigation until the file was referred to Special Investigations on May 4, 1994, so the April 11 materials and the search warrant were valid.

However, banking records later compelled under s. 231.2(1) after the criminal investigation had commenced violated s. 7 and remained excluded.

The Crown obtained a restraint order and special warrants of seizure against the respondents' real property and motor vehicles, alleging they were proceeds of crime from a stolen car parts operation.

The reviewing judge quashed the orders, finding the underlying search warrants were based on an illegal search by a provincial licensing agency.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal in part, holding that while a restraint order is a seizure under section 8 of the Charter and a reviewing judge can examine underlying warrants, the reviewing judge erred in excluding the agency's information.

The restraint order and warrants were restored, except for 24 vehicles seized without authorization.

The appellant, a journalist, requested access to a document detailing the expenses of Members of the National Assembly.

The request was denied under ss. 34 and 57 of the Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information.

The Commission d’accès à l’information upheld the refusal, finding the document was produced 'for' a Member and that Members are not 'public bodies'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for the Commission's decisions is reasonableness, and that the Commissioner's interpretations of ss. 34 and 57 were reasonable.

The appellant, a paralegal, was convicted of fabricating court documents.

He sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that his lawyers were in a conflict of interest, having advised another client to report his forgery to the police while simultaneously representing him on unrelated criminal charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the law firm breached its duty of loyalty by acting adversely to a current client, a stay of proceedings was not warranted because the conflict did not affect the fairness of the trial or amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the effect of intoxication on the presumption of intent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, endorsing the majority reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The Court held that the trial judge adequately linked the evidence of intoxication to the possible application of the presumption of intent.

Appeal concerning the constitutionality of the federal prisoner voting ban applicable to persons incarcerated in a correctional institution serving sentences of two years or more.

The majority held that the impugned provision infringed the s. 3 Charter right to vote and failed the Oakes proportionality analysis because the government did not establish a rational connection, minimal impairment, or overall proportionality between disenfranchisement and its stated objectives of promoting civic responsibility and enhancing punishment.

The Court emphasized the fundamental nature of voting rights in a constitutional democracy and rejected deference where legislation limits core democratic participation.

The provision was declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At his trial, the Crown cross-examined him extensively on incriminating statements he had made while testifying at his brother's separate trial for the same murder, where he had invoked section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated section 13 of the Charter because there was a realistic danger that the prior testimony could be used to incriminate him, not merely to test his credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.