SCC 2002

The respondent was dismissed from his employment after his daughter and wife accused his employer (who was his brother-in-law) of sexual abuse.

The respondent filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of marital and family status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enumerated grounds of marital and family status in the Ontario Human Rights Code are broad enough to encompass discrimination based on the particular identity of a complainant's spouse or family member.

The Court found that the respondent was arbitrarily disadvantaged based on stereotypical assumptions about his familial affiliations, constituting prohibited discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Law Society of Alberta sought to discipline a Crown prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence to the defence in a timely manner.

The prosecutor argued that his actions were protected by prosecutorial discretion and that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while core elements of prosecutorial discretion are immune from review absent flagrant impropriety, the duty to disclose relevant evidence is a legal obligation, not a matter of discretion.

Therefore, the Law Society has the jurisdiction to review a prosecutor's conduct to determine if a failure to disclose was done dishonestly or in bad faith, as this constitutes a breach of professional ethics.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder and denied bail under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the portion of s. 515(10)(c) permitting detention 'on any other just cause being shown' is unconstitutionally vague and violates s. 11(e).

However, the Court severed this phrase and upheld the remainder of the provision, which allows bail to be denied where necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which upheld the dismissal of a third party claim on the basis of abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Goudge J.A. at the Court of Appeal that it was not an abuse of process to allow the appellant to bring the claim or require the realtors to defend it.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was arrested and detained for eight days pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant requested by Germany for extradition purposes.

He sued Germany for damages for personal injuries (mental distress, denial of liberty, damage to reputation) resulting from his arrest.

Germany claimed sovereign immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Germany did not waive its immunity by initiating the extradition process, as the civil action was separate.

Furthermore, the 'personal injury' exception in s. 6(a) of the Act applies only to physical injury, not to the mental distress or loss of liberty claimed by the appellant.

The action against Germany was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard three appeals concerning the constitutionality of s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code, which sets out a procedure for determining claims of solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents seized from a law office under a warrant.

The Court held that s. 488.1 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it more than minimally impairs solicitor-client privilege.

The provision allows privilege to be lost through the inaction of the lawyer, requires the naming of clients, lacks notice to clients, imposes strict time limits without judicial discretion, and permits the Attorney General to inspect documents before privilege is determined.

The Court struck down s. 488.1 and established common law guidelines for law office searches.

The appellant lent the respondent money to purchase a condominium, secured by a hypothec.

The respondent defaulted, and the appellant sought to take the property in payment.

Under art. 2778 of the Civil Code of Québec, a creditor must obtain court authorization to take property in payment if the debtor has discharged one-half or more of the obligation secured by the hypothec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 'obligation secured by the hypothec' includes both capital and interest.

Because the respondent had paid more than half of the combined capital and interest, the appellant was required to obtain judicial authorization.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured motorist.

They entered into a limits agreement with the tortfeasor, agreeing not to pursue damages beyond his policy limits, without notifying their own insurer.

The respondents then sought to recover the remainder of their damages from their insurer under the SEF 44 Endorsement.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the limits agreement interfered with its subrogation rights and meant the respondents were no longer 'legally entitled to recover' from the tortfeasor.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the limits agreement did not preclude the respondents' claim against their insurer, as 'legally entitled to recover' refers to the right of action at the time of the accident, and the insurer's subrogation rights had not yet arisen.

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The respondents, staff lawyers with the federal Department of Justice, sued the federal Crown for breach of contract regarding salary disparities.

During discovery, the government claimed Cabinet confidentiality over certain documents under s. 39 of the Canada Evidence Act, including some previously listed as producible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 39 provides absolute protection once information is validly certified by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and the common law concept of waiver does not apply.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of s. 39, finding it does not impermissibly infringe on the core jurisdiction of superior courts or unwritten constitutional principles.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder.

The jury intended to return a guilty verdict, but due to the foreman's stuttering or coughing, the trial judge and others heard 'not guilty'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty, and the jury and accused were discharged.

Shortly after, a court officer discovered the error.

The trial judge reconvened the jury over the next few days and eventually changed the recorded verdict to guilty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a trial judge has a narrow post-discharge jurisdiction to correct a verdict if it does not require the jury to reconsider its decision, this jurisdiction is lost if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Given the jury's extensive dispersal and potential exposure to media, a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants claimed that lands set aside for the Ross River Band in the Yukon Territory constituted a reserve under the Indian Act, entitling them to a tax exemption.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no reserve was legally created because there was no intention to create a reserve on the part of Crown agents with the authority to bind the Crown.

The Court found that while lands were set aside for the band's use, the statutory framework and royal prerogative require both an act of setting apart and a clear intention to create a reserve, which was absent in this case.

The respondent filed complaints with the Commissioner of Official Languages regarding language rights violations.

During the investigation, witnesses were promised confidentiality.

The respondent later requested access to the personal information in the investigation files under the Privacy Act.

The Commissioner refused to disclose certain interview notes, relying on the exemption in s. 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act for information that could reasonably be expected to be injurious to lawful investigations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the exemption can apply to concluded investigations to protect future ones, the Commissioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of injury in this specific case.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the personal information but denied access to non-personal information.

The Attorney General of Quebec sought leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec Superior Court decisions ordering the state to pay defence counsel's fees at rates exceeding legal aid tariffs.

The Supreme Court held that a direct appeal does not lie, as section 676.1 of the Criminal Code provides for an appeal of costs orders to the provincial court of appeal.

The Court interpreted 'costs' broadly to include future payments for legal services.

The applications for leave to appeal were referred to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed the accused's appeal from his robbery conviction and ordered a new trial based on issues related to hearsay evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff was injured while riding on a paratransit bus and brought an action against the bus company and driver in both tort and contract nearly two years later.

She also sued her former solicitors for failing to bring the claim within the one-year limitation period for 'damages occasioned by a motor vehicle' under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a substantive approach must be taken to determine if the presence of a motor vehicle is the dominant feature of the claim, regardless of whether it is framed in tort or contract.

The Court concluded that the damages were occasioned by a motor vehicle, meaning the action against the bus company and driver was statute-barred, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her negligence claim against her former solicitors.

The Minister of National Revenue appealed a decision holding that accounts receivable factored to a third party were not subject to a deemed trust for unremitted payroll deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the deemed trust under s. 227(4.1) of the Income Tax Act attaches to property acquired by a tax debtor after a default, it does not continue to attach to property once it has been sold to a third-party purchaser for value in the ordinary course of business.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured was covered by two insurance policies, one from Family Insurance and one from Lombard Canada, both containing 'other insurance' clauses declaring their coverage to be excess to any other insurance.

The trial judge found the clauses mutually repugnant and apportioned liability equally.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Family's policy primary based on surrounding circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that where competing policies cannot be read in harmony, the conflicting clauses should be treated as mutually repugnant and inoperative.

Both policies provide primary coverage, and the loss is borne equally by each insurer until the lower policy limit is exhausted.

The respondents were limited partners in a partnership that purchased a mini-warehouse.

The partnership generated losses, which the respondents deducted for income tax purposes.

The Minister reassessed the respondents, disallowing the losses on the basis that the partnership did not carry on business with a reasonable expectation of profit.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying the test from the companion case of Stewart v. Canada, held that the storage park operation was commercial in nature and lacked any personal element.

Therefore, the reasonable expectation of profit test did not apply, and the operation constituted a source of income under s. 9 of the Income Tax Act.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.