Lois B. Roberts

The appellants sought a stay pending appeal from an order striking their statement of defence for non-compliance with documentary disclosure obligations and a prior peremptory order.

The motion judge held the proposed appeal was weak, found no irreparable harm, and concluded the balance of convenience and justice of the case favoured refusal of a stay.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application to remove a construction lien registered by the respondent for sewage backup remediation work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal or if it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The parties agreed that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that decisions made in reliance on the Construction Act, including orders discharging or refusing to discharge a lien, must be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred accordingly.

The Crown appealed a youth sentence for dangerous driving causing death.

The sentencing judge had found that ss. 42(5)(a) and 42(2)(p) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which restrict deferred custody orders, violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions are constitutional when viewed within the YCJA's broader sentencing framework, which provides robust non-custodial alternatives like youth probation.

The sentence was varied to 18 months' probation and 100 hours of community service.

In a criminal appeal involving fraud convictions, the moving party sought additional non-privileged disclosure to support proposed fresh-evidence abuse-of-process claims.

Applying prior case-management directions and existing disclosure rulings, the court found no basis for further compelled production on the issues properly before it and dismissed the motion.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from a family law judgment.

The delay in filing was only one day, but the moving party had a history of unreasonable conduct, delay, and non-compliance with court orders throughout the proceedings.

The motion judge reviewed the merits of the proposed appeal, which challenged the striking of pleadings, occupation rent, and post-separation adjustments, and found them to be completely devoid of merit.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed as it was not in the interests of justice to allow the meritless appeal to proceed.

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to two respondents charged in a massive cross-border drug trafficking investigation.

The application judge had found the delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling and declined to deduct time for joint-trial scheduling or find the case exceptionally complex.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 107 days of joint-trial scheduling delay should have been deducted as a discrete exceptional circumstance.

Furthermore, the overarching complexity of the multi-agency project prosecution, which involved voluminous disclosure, justified the remaining modest delay above the ceiling.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The moving party, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant and prohibited from filing further materials without leave, sought leave to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The underlying action involved allegations of improper disclosure of confidential youth records by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the proposed notice of appeal contained the same fatal flaws as her previous pleadings and failed to raise tenable grounds.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the notice of appeal, finding that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the respondent would suffer prejudice.

The motion for leave to file a notice of appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged property and costs aspects of a family law judgment after an 11-day trial.

The court found only a minor arithmetic error in deducting valuation-date debt, increasing the equalization payment by $4,250.

All remaining grounds, including tracing, exclusions, RESP treatment, post-separation adjustments, and costs, were rejected.

Motion by the appellant for an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order refusing to set aside the striking of the appellant's pleadings in family law proceedings.

The motion was dismissed as contrary to the interests of justice.

The moving party had a long-standing pattern of non-compliance with court orders, including failure to provide financial disclosure and failure to pay substantial costs orders.

The appeal lacked merit as the motion judge's findings were entitled to deference and the appellant's admitted failure to pay costs orders alone was fatal to the appeal.

Substantial indemnity costs awarded to the responding parties.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his application for an extension of time to appeal a speeding conviction under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

He had been convicted in absentia after failing to attend his trial due to illness and his paralegal's failure to appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time to appeal in proceedings under Parts I and II of the Act, as established by binding precedent.

The moving parties sought to quash the responding party's appeal of an order validating service of an application record.

The responding party, a foreign state, argued the order was final because it determined substantive rights regarding state sovereignty and the Hague Convention.

The Court of Appeal held that the order validating service was procedural and interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the dispute or deprive the responding party of substantive defences.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought leave to appeal a $50,000 costs award.

The appellant had made threats to communicate damaging information to the respondent's clients and the Ministry of Transportation if unpaid wage claims were not satisfied.

The motion judge found that the appellant's communications were fundamentally about his employment dispute rather than matters of public interest, and that the respondent would easily prove the statements were false and harmful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis under s. 137.1(3) or s. 137.1(4)(b), and affirmed the costs award.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellants, majority shareholders of Golden Ocean Investment Corporation, appealed the dismissal of their challenge to the validity and enforceability of two mortgages on property owned by the corporation.

The mortgages were authorized by the minority shareholder and sole director, Mr. Huang.

The appellants alleged the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances and that they had been defrauded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the mortgagees were bona fide purchasers for value with no notice of fraud, that Mr. Huang had both ostensible and actual authority to enter into the mortgages, and that there was consideration for the third mortgage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the second mortgagee respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal of a stay order granted under section 9 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, arguing that the stay order was temporary and therefore interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that a stay order under section 9 of the ICAA is generally final in nature for purposes of determining the proper appeal route, as it effectively ends the action before the court.

The court rejected arguments that the stay was temporary merely because the arbitral tribunal might decline jurisdiction, and clarified that statements in cost submissions and the motion judge's characterization of the order do not alter its legal nature for appeal purposes.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal from a May 21, 2024 trial judgment in family law proceedings.

The trial judge had found the appellant engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour, psychological abuse of the child, failure to honour support obligations, and efforts to alienate the child from the respondent.

The appellant failed to comply with a stay order requiring payment of support arrears within 30 days and continued to breach court orders regarding parenting time and support payments.

The Court of Appeal found this to be one of the clearest cases justifying quashing an appeal, citing the appellant's deliberate and unwavering breach of crystal-clear orders, substantial arrears, and pattern of vexatious and frivolous litigation.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision requiring him to pay half of a gross negligence HST penalty pursuant to a supplementary investment agreement with the respondent.

The appellant raised new arguments on appeal that the gross negligence HST penalty did not form part of the HST assessment and arose solely from the respondent's alleged breach of fiduciary duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet the stringent test for entertaining new issues on appeal, as the evidentiary record was insufficient and no miscarriage of justice would result from refusing to entertain the new arguments.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their contempt motion against the respondents for breach of a 2012 judgment.

The 2012 judgment had found that the respondents interfered with water drainage from the appellants' property by damaging a drainage pipe, changing the slope of their driveway, and installing a rubber dam.

The respondents were ordered to restore the flow of water within three months.

The motion judge dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the respondents had complied by replacing the damaged pipe.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge misinterpreted the 2012 judgment, misapprehended the expert evidence, and misapplied the test for civil contempt.

The court ordered the respondents to implement the necessary steps to restore water flow as recommended by the appellants' expert, including installation of two 250mm diameter pipes and removal of the rubber dam.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

A shareholder sought audited financial statements from a corporation spanning multiple years, arguing the corporation had failed to comply with its statutory obligations under the Business Corporations Act.

The respondents contended that the shareholder's demand was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision that the limitation period applies to compliance orders seeking enforcement of statutory obligations that correspond to shareholder rights.

The court rejected the argument that compliance orders are merely enforcement mechanisms without corresponding legal rights, holding instead that statutory obligations to provide audited financial statements create three-term legal relations where shareholders hold enforceable rights against the corporation.