Lois B. Roberts

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from a date with the complainant.

The trial judge found that while the sexual activity began consensually, the complainant withdrew consent when the appellant attempted to record her without permission, and the appellant subsequently forced vaginal intercourse.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework by fragmenting the evidence and provided insufficient reasons regarding credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the evidence, correctly applied the burden of proof, and provided adequate reasons explaining why the complainant's evidence was accepted over the appellant's.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2004, appealed a conditional discharge disposition by the Ontario Review Board.

The Board had concluded he remained a significant threat to public safety due to his historical substance abuse and lack of a formal community treatment plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion unreasonable given the appellant's years of stability, sobriety, medication adherence, and independent living.

The Court ordered an absolute discharge, emphasizing that the threshold for significant threat is onerous and cannot be based on speculative risks or what is merely in the appellant's best medical interests.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, brought a motion under s. 683 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on proposed fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence consisted of recordings in which the complainant allegedly recanted her trial testimony, and a subsequent police statement in which she resiled from that recantation.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing it was an abuse of process because the recordings were obtained in breach of a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that cross-examination could assist the appeal panel in assessing the credibility of the recantation.

The cross-examination was ordered to proceed remotely, subject to strict limits on its scope.

The appellant pleaded guilty to unprovoked aggravated assault against a fellow NCR resident, causing severe life-threatening injuries and permanent serious brain damage.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to further reduce his sentence to reflect the harsh presentence custody conditions he experienced due to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the sentencing judge expressly considered and gave credit for the appellant's mental health difficulties in custody and imposed a sentence at the lower end of the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his two-year sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He introduced fresh evidence detailing exceptionally harsh custodial conditions, including prolonged triple-bunking and extended lockdowns, which exacerbated his mental health vulnerabilities.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence fit but admitted the fresh evidence, concluding that the cumulative impact of the custodial conditions materially increased the punitive effect of the sentence.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was varied to time served followed by a conditional sentence.

The appellant purchasers appealed a judgment enforcing a limitation of liability clause in a pre-construction condominium agreement of purchase and sale that restricted their damages for the respondent developer's breach to the return of deposits with interest.

The appellants argued the clause was unconscionable, contrary to the consumer protections of the Tarion Addendum, and that the respondent should have brought it to their attention.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the appellants were sophisticated purchasers represented by counsel who negotiated significant changes to the agreement, and that the Tercon analysis provided an effective safeguard against abuse of limitation clauses.

Two appellants challenged convictions for possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after searches of two suspected stash houses.

The court held the trial judge erred in denying standing to advance a s. 8 Charter challenge because the prosecution theory itself alleged use and control of the properties, which had to be weighed in the totality of circumstances.

The court nevertheless rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable, finding the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting possession findings for each appellant in relation to White Oak.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing her action for emotional distress and financial deception connected to ownership of the former family home.

The court held that, as against Eberhard Wey, the record raised genuine issues requiring a trial on limitations, res judicata, and abuse of process in light of allegations and evidence of intimate partner violence.

The court found no reversible error in interpreting the 2017 consent order as barring claims against Guenter and Ingrid Wey.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part, with the action against Eberhard remitted for trial and the dismissal against the parents upheld.

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appellant's appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court held that an appeal from a default judgment was outside its jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory and the proper route was a motion to set aside default under r. 19.08.

The panel also noted that a party noted in default is restricted from taking further steps absent leave or consent under r. 19.02(1)(b).

Concluding the appeal was jurisdictionally barred and abusive, the court dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant challenged convictions on three sexual assault counts and the custodial and ancillary sentencing orders.

The court held that the trial reasons adequately applied the reasonable doubt framework, addressed credibility and reliability concerns arising from complainant incapacity, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

It further held that the custodial term was fit, declined to admit fresh evidence concerning family caregiving circumstances, and upheld the 20-year SOIRA order as properly imposed under the governing statutory regime at sentencing.

A constitutional remedy request regarding registration obligations was left to a court of first instance due to an insufficient record.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed for loaded prohibited firearm possession and related offences after a collision, firearm discharge, flight, and disposal of the weapon in a residential area.

The court held the conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit and found a three-year penitentiary sentence would have been fit on the sentencing record, given denunciation and deterrence principles for serious public-safety firearm offending.

The court accepted significant mitigation, including youth, no prior record, rehabilitation, and a serious neurological condition that increased custodial hardship and treatment risk.

Fresh evidence established ongoing rehabilitation and unresolved worsening neurological concerns requiring continued monitoring.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but declined reincarceration and directed continuation of the conditional sentence.

The appellant landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a long-term commercial lease had expired and for ancillary relief on the basis that the tenant was overholding.

The appellant argued that the tenant's failure to obtain timely Planning Act approval brought the lease to an end and precluded further renewals.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's analysis, holding that the tenant had continued to take appropriate steps to obtain the necessary approval and that the renewals were permitted subject to such approval.

Fresh evidence motions were dismissed as irrelevant to the appeal outcome, and leave to appeal the $225,000 costs award was denied.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The moving parties sought to re-open a dismissed appeal more than three years after this court dismissed their appeal from a summary judgment order enforcing four mortgages.

The court considered the motion under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving parties failed to meet the high threshold for re-opening, having raised unsustainable allegations of fraud and misconduct that were or could have been previously advanced.

The motion to re-open was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order and restore their collection action to the trial list.

The Court of Appeal found two reviewable errors: the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondent's lackadaisical conduct in assessing prejudice, and made a palpable and overriding error in finding the appellants showed disinterest in the action despite evidence they had contacted their lawyer multiple times seeking updates.

Considering the matter afresh, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal order, and restored the action to the trial list.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, chambered, prohibited handgun found in his one-bedroom condominium during the execution of a search warrant.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict, contending that his brother or a third party may have placed the firearm in the unit.

The Court of Appeal held these submissions amounted to speculative inferences unsupported by the evidentiary record and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the court found no error in principle in the 20-month custodial sentence, holding it was restrained, consistent with parity, and appropriately reflected the aggravating circumstances of a loaded firearm in a residential building.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement to deliver milk through a numbered company, and disputed the resulting damages award under the OBCA oppression remedy, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the partnership or credibility assessments, and upheld the prejudgment interest calculation as a reasonable exercise of discretion under s. 130(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The allegation of judicial bias was dismissed for failing to meet the high threshold to displace the presumption of impartiality.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, except that further submissions were required on whether income taxes should have been deducted from certain amounts included in the damages calculation.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellants brought an application seeking public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to provide such funding violates their Charter rights.

Ontario successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler v. Ontario definitively resolved the issue.

On appeal, the appellants argued there was a reasonable prospect of revisiting Adler under the Bedford/Carter test due to new evidence of antisemitism and developments in international and constitutional law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proposed new evidence did not fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate in Adler, and that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 remains a comprehensive code for denominational school rights.