Gregory Edwin McConnell

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing her action for emotional distress and financial deception connected to ownership of the former family home.

The court held that, as against Eberhard Wey, the record raised genuine issues requiring a trial on limitations, res judicata, and abuse of process in light of allegations and evidence of intimate partner violence.

The court found no reversible error in interpreting the 2017 consent order as barring claims against Guenter and Ingrid Wey.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part, with the action against Eberhard remitted for trial and the dismissal against the parents upheld.

The applicant challenged his father's will and property transfers, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by his sister.

The applicant sought an order for directions to proceed to trial and obtain third-party financial, medical, and legal files.

The court found that the applicant met the minimal evidentiary threshold required to put the will's validity into question, particularly regarding undue influence, citing the father's complaints of control by the respondent, the lawyer's refusal to act on initial instructions, and the malleability of the father's testamentary intentions.

The motion for directions was granted, allowing the case to proceed to discovery and trial.

The applicant, former owner of a property, brought an application to remove a 1984 mortgage from the registered title.

The mortgagee had died in 2011, and documentary evidence showed the mortgage was paid in full in 1985.

The court granted the application, finding that any action to enforce the mortgage was statute-barred and dispensing with service on the deceased mortgagee's estate.

A subcontractor obtained judgment against a corporate officer for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act after the officer’s defence was struck for failing to provide ordered financial disclosure.

Unknown to the creditor, the officer had earlier assigned himself into bankruptcy and later sought to have the creditor’s writ withdrawn following his discharge.

The creditor moved for leave nunc pro tunc under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue the action notwithstanding the bankruptcy, arguing the debt arose from breach of fiduciary trust and would survive discharge under s. 178(1)(d).

The court held that the creditor’s failure to obtain prior leave was merely an irregularity caused by lack of notice of the bankruptcy.

Leave was granted nunc pro tunc and the judgment debt was declared to survive the discharge.

The court issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal from the Small Claims Court.

The respondent/plaintiff was awarded costs fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The court noted that while Rule 49.10 does not apply to appeals, the plaintiff's offer to settle for $6,000 before significant appeal costs were incurred was a very significant factor in determining the quantum of costs to protect the successful plaintiff from a Pyrrhic victory.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable in negligence for failing to adequately warn the respondent about a potential basement leak during a home inspection.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by establishing a standard of care without expert evidence and failing to consider contributory negligence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' own testimony established the standard of care and that contributory negligence was not pleaded at trial.

The trial judge's finding of liability was not a palpable and overriding error.

The plaintiff appealed a motions judge's decision regarding the interpretation of an offer to settle in a Small Claims Court proceeding.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and found no legal error in the motions judge's conclusion.

Despite a slight ambiguity, the offer to settle, when read as a whole and in the context of Rule 14 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court, clearly remained open until one minute after the commencement of trial.

The appeal was dismissed, and the plaintiff was bound by the acceptance of the offer.