Jonathan Dawe

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order refusing an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in high-conflict family litigation.

The court applied the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act and confirmed intervention is limited to legal error, error in principle, or an unreasonable result.

It held the motion judge applied the correct legal framework, including the best interests of the children as the overarching consideration.

The court found no error in assessing the proposed appeal's limited merit, the five-month delay, and prejudice from continued uncertainty in parenting arrangements.

The review motion was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought panel review of an order refusing a further extension of time to perfect an appeal from a Superior Court order.

The court held that review of a motion judge's decision is deferential and not a de novo reconsideration.

The moving party identified no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the motion judge's reasoning on delay and prejudice.

The panel declined to reweigh the factors and dismissed the motion with costs.

The appellant sought to appeal a superior court bail review decision under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after release relief was denied.

The respondent moved to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that no criminal appeal right exists to the court from decisions under ss. 520 or 521, and provincial legislation cannot create an appeal route in criminal matters absent federal statutory authority.

The court also held that asserting Charter issues did not establish jurisdiction where no statutory right of appeal exists.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the fresh-evidence request was left unaddressed.

The appellant challenged an annual Review Board disposition that maintained a conditional discharge based on a finding of significant threat to public safety.

On appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the court admitted post-hearing psychiatric evidence showing medication discontinuation without decompensation, a revised diagnosis, and a materially lower structured risk assessment.

Applying the interests of justice framework for fresh evidence in NCRMD appeals, the court held the new record required allowing the appeal.

The court found remittal unnecessary because an absolute discharge was the only reasonable disposition on the updated evidence.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two appellants, addicted to fentanyl, set fire to a rowhouse using Molotov cocktails at the direction of their fentanyl dealer, killing three occupants and seriously injuring a fourth.

Both pleaded guilty to three counts of manslaughter and one count of arson causing bodily harm and received sentences of 16 and 17 years respectively, plus $250,000 restitution orders each.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of mitigating factors including addiction and mental health, and held the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court quashed the restitution orders, finding the sentencing judge failed to weigh the appellants' ability to pay and imposed them as a mechanical afterthought.

Fresh evidence of post-sentencing cooperation with authorities was not admitted.

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement to deliver milk through a numbered company, and disputed the resulting damages award under the OBCA oppression remedy, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the partnership or credibility assessments, and upheld the prejudgment interest calculation as a reasonable exercise of discretion under s. 130(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The allegation of judicial bias was dismissed for failing to meet the high threshold to displace the presumption of impartiality.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, except that further submissions were required on whether income taxes should have been deducted from certain amounts included in the damages calculation.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal allowed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appeal challenged Ontario recognition and enforcement of a German default judgment, relying principally on an arbitration-clause public-policy defence.

The court held public policy did not bar recognition where appellants failed to raise the arbitration point in the German proceeding and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged convictions based on admission and use of surreptitious recordings, alleging errors under ss. 31.1 and 31.2 of the Canada Evidence Act and in probative-prejudice analysis.

The court rejected those arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

Following a material change in living circumstances and concession that practical utility of the appeal had dissipated pending the next annual review, the court dismissed the appeal.