Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, arguing the judge misapprehended evidence regarding the interpretation of a quitclaim deed and its tax consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of the deed was a matter of law and intention, not evidence, and that the motion judge correctly considered the tax consequences without misapprehending the evidence.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondents.

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment after shooting an intruder outside his home.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in leaving manslaughter with the jury, and challenged the jury instructions on self-defence and out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding an air of reality to manslaughter based on the appellant's testimony and upholding the jury instructions.

On the sentence appeal, fresh evidence revealed the trial judge misspoke and intended to impose a six-year sentence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in failing to correct his mistake immediately, and sentenced the appellant afresh to six years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and uttering threats against his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred by engaging in propensity reasoning regarding an audio recording, misapprehending evidence of unconscious collusion between the complainant and her children, and applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the audio recording was properly used to assess credibility, the trial judge reasonably rejected the possibility of unconscious collusion, and the credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a historical sexual assault case.

The application judge had calculated a net delay of 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the application judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to attribute three distinct periods of delay to the defence: delay in setting a preliminary inquiry, delay due to defence unavailability for a judicial pre-trial, and delay caused by the defence being unprepared for the first judicial pre-trial.

Deducting these periods reduced the net delay to 29.4 months, below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats, arguing his right to a fair trial was compromised by his inability to hear the proceedings, that the trial judge erred in assessing a witness's credibility regarding text messages, and that the transcript record was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's hearing but found his claim that he could not hear the trial was not credible, given the accommodations made and his repeated confirmations that he could hear.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluded the transcript deficiencies did not prevent a meaningful appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his domestic partner and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued for a further sentence reduction due to harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the sentence was based on a joint submission by experienced counsel and was entirely fit.

The appellant brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against Mexico, which was dismissed by a three-member arbitration tribunal.

The appellant later discovered that the Mexican-appointed arbitrator had communicated with Mexican officials during the arbitration regarding potential future appointments.

The application judge found a reasonable apprehension of bias but declined to set aside the award, reasoning that the other two arbitrators were impartial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award, holding that a reasonable apprehension of bias concerning one member of a tribunal taints the entire panel and cannot be balanced away as a minor procedural error.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for want of jurisdiction, while the appellant brought a motion to disqualify counsel and compel document production.

The appellant sought to appeal a motion judge's order declining to schedule a motion to stay execution of a judgment from an underlying fee dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that the order declining to schedule the stay motion was interlocutory, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lies with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant's motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a motion judge's decision dismissing his request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for convictions in 2020 and 2022.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, noting the lack of evidence of an intention to appeal within the timeline and the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historical sexual assault against his niece.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by misinterpreting his testimony and overlooking internal inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability.

The applicant, wanted in the United States for identity theft and other offences, was committed for extradition and sought bail pending the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender.

The applicant proposed a release plan involving a surety and electronic monitoring.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet his onus of showing he would surrender into custody, given his history of fleeing the United States, failing to attend court in Canada, and the overwhelming case against him.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or consent analysis.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's s. 11(b) Charter application regarding post-conviction delay.

The court found the delay unreasonable, specifically rejecting the trial judge's characterization of immigration complexity and minor technical issues as exceptional circumstances.

As a remedy for the Charter breach, the conditional sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 20 months, as a conditional discharge was deemed unfit given the serious nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence for two counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by treating a risk assessment as having no value due to the appellant's alleged dishonesty and by classifying the appellant's mental health issues as "neutral" rather than mitigating.

While upholding the application of the intimate partner aggravating factor, the appellate court re-evaluated the sentence, reducing it from six years to five years concurrent.

The applicant sought to set aside an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal who had denied a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the motion judge's reasons and found no error in the application of the legal test for an extension of time.

The court concluded that the motion had no merit and dismissed it, ordering costs to the respondent.

The applicant, Ms. Vaughan, brought a motion to set aside or vary a prior order that had dismissed her motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

The original appeal, concerning an amount less than $50,000, was improperly filed in the Court of Appeal instead of the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed Ms. Vaughan's motion, finding no error in principle in the prior discretionary order.

The court affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction over the original appeal and that, with no live appeal, there was no basis for a transfer order.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence of motive to fabricate and by engaging in improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding motive to fabricate, deeming them adequate when read against the record.

The court also rejected the claim of improper propensity reasoning, clarifying that the trial judge used evidence of controlling behaviour as a contextual factor to assess competing narratives, not as proof of propensity to commit the assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, setting aside a motion judge's order that had granted certiorari with mandamus in aid.

The motion judge had compelled a Justice of the Peace to complete a bail hearing that the Justice of the Peace had aborted due to a proposed surety's misconduct and subsequent false denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by granting prerogative relief in the absence of jurisdictional error, as the Justice of the Peace's decision to abort the hearing was a discretionary exercise based on an assessment of fairness, not a jurisdictional overreach.