Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife, arguing that bad character evidence was improperly admitted and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to it.

The impugned evidence included a 'list of lies' the appellant wrote regarding his affair and an internet bookmark about compulsive lying.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the evidence should not have been admitted, the trial judge's strong limiting instructions prevented any miscarriage of justice.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that trial counsel made reasonable tactical decisions and that the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of planning and deliberation.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order refusing an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in high-conflict family litigation.

The court applied the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act and confirmed intervention is limited to legal error, error in principle, or an unreasonable result.

It held the motion judge applied the correct legal framework, including the best interests of the children as the overarching consideration.

The court found no error in assessing the proposed appeal's limited merit, the five-month delay, and prejudice from continued uncertainty in parenting arrangements.

The review motion was dismissed with costs.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

The moving party sought panel review of an order refusing a further extension of time to perfect an appeal from a Superior Court order.

The court held that review of a motion judge's decision is deferential and not a de novo reconsideration.

The moving party identified no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the motion judge's reasoning on delay and prejudice.

The panel declined to reweigh the factors and dismissed the motion with costs.

The appellant sought to appeal a superior court bail review decision under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after release relief was denied.

The respondent moved to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that no criminal appeal right exists to the court from decisions under ss. 520 or 521, and provincial legislation cannot create an appeal route in criminal matters absent federal statutory authority.

The court also held that asserting Charter issues did not establish jurisdiction where no statutory right of appeal exists.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the fresh-evidence request was left unaddressed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court refusing to order payment into court of a "costs reserve." The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, characterizing the order as interlocutory and akin to an order dismissing a motion for security for costs.

The court directed that an appeal from such an order must be brought to the Divisional Court, with leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the agreed amount of $7,500 all inclusive.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual assault.

The application judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, concluding that net delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the adjournment of the first trial to await the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. J.J. constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was not functus officio after the jury's verdict for purposes of a s. 11(b) application, distinguishing prior authorities.

The court further held that adjourning a trial to await guidance from a higher court in a different proceeding does not constitute a discrete exceptional event under the Jordan framework, but rather is a factor in assessing case complexity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement to deliver milk through a numbered company, and disputed the resulting damages award under the OBCA oppression remedy, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the partnership or credibility assessments, and upheld the prejudgment interest calculation as a reasonable exercise of discretion under s. 130(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The allegation of judicial bias was dismissed for failing to meet the high threshold to displace the presumption of impartiality.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, except that further submissions were required on whether income taxes should have been deducted from certain amounts included in the damages calculation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, break and enter, and two counts of threatening to use a weapon, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed trial counsel usurped his right to elect the mode of trial and his right to testify.

The Court of Appeal rejected the election claim, finding the appellant had not established the factual foundation and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have elected differently.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the right-to-testify ground, finding trial counsel failed to make clear that the decision to testify was the appellant's to make, failed to obtain written instructions, and that the police interview was not a functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

A new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for specific performance of a failed commercial real estate agreement of purchase and sale, the denial of his post-trial motion to amend his pleadings to claim damages, and the trial judge's finding that a 12% mortgage interest rate offended s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to grant specific performance, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the property was not unique and damages would be adequate.

The Court also upheld the refusal to allow a post-trial amendment to claim damages, noting the prejudice to the respondent.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the mortgage, holding that the 12% interest rate commenced prior to default and therefore did not violate s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a 2014 consent dismissal and underlying settlement of a personal injury action.

The settlement was negotiated by their former lawyer, who misappropriated the funds and failed to obtain court approval under Rule 7.08 for the injured plaintiff, who was a party under disability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding she correctly applied the Book factors.

The insurer had acted in good faith without knowledge of the disability, and the settlement itself was not unreasonable.

The court held that the lawyer's fraud did not impugn the reasonableness of the settlement from the perspective of the tort claim.

The appellants challenged summary judgment enforcing a $2.1 million promissory note, arguing procedural unfairness, evidentiary error, and lack of consideration.

The court rejected all grounds and upheld enforceability against both appellants.

The court upheld vacating a certificate of pending litigation and findings that the mortgagee had taken vacant peaceable possession before sale.

It also dismissed the respondent’s motion to quash, holding the appeal was not manifestly abusive.

The appellant challenged admission of drug evidence after a found s. 10(b) breach, arguing exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.