Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant pleaded guilty to eight counts of armed robbery and a weapons offence, receiving a global sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity, as his co-accused received a lesser sentence for the robberies despite wielding the weapons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 10-year sentence fit and the disparity justified by the appellant's lengthy criminal record, probation status, and poorer prospects for rehabilitation compared to his co-accused.

The appellant, convicted of first degree murder, brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for state-funded counsel for his appeal.

He first requested an adjournment because duty counsel was unavailable, which the court denied as he had prior notice the hearing would proceed regardless.

Applying the Bernardo test, the Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 684 application, finding that the appellant, a former police officer, was capable of effectively presenting his appeal and that the court could properly decide the issues without the assistance of counsel.

The court also directed that the appellant be provided access to legal materials in his cell while in segregation.

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding the elements of conspiracy, that the indictment was deficient for not explicitly invoking s. 465(3) of the Criminal Code, and that trial fairness was compromised by an RCMP officer entering the jury room to fix equipment.

They also appealed their sentences, arguing they should have received credit for time spent in immigration hold.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the jury charge, the indictment, or the trial judge's discretionary refusal to grant pre-trial custody credit for immigration detention.

The appellant sued the respondent, a lawyer who represented the Children's Aid Society in a child protection proceeding, for $7 million alleging conspiracy, fraud, perjury, and breach of trust.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, noting that statements made in court are protected by absolute privilege and perjury is a criminal matter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that absolute privilege applies to statements by counsel and evidence filed in court, and finding the pleadings deficient in material facts.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 1991 motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, triggering a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge should have considered the respondents' materials to rebut the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the respondents' materials were considered, they were inadequate to rebut the presumption of prejudice, particularly regarding the injured appellant's medical condition and income loss.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a consent order that had amended a default judgment against him to include declarations of fraud.

The bank had originally obtained default judgment for a debt based on a personal guarantee, without pleading fraud.

Later, the bank moved under Rule 59.06 to add declarations of fraud, to which the appellant consented based on his solicitor's misunderstanding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the solicitor's mistake and the bank's reliance on the appellant's representations.

The Court also held that Rule 59.06 cannot be used to amend a judgment to grant relief that was never sought in the original pleadings.

The husband appealed the trial judge's calculation of the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that monies advanced by the husband's late mother were not a loan.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in excluding a portion of the wife's jewellery from her net family property, as the wife failed to discharge her onus under s. 4(3) of the Family Law Act to prove the value of the jewellery she claimed was gifted by relatives.

The appeal was allowed in part to include the full value of the jewellery in the wife's assets.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding that two related corporations were privies, and that issue estoppel prevented the second corporation from re-litigating issues decided in a default judgment against the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The companies shared the same controlling mind, business, location, and key employees.

The controlling mind knew the respondent had initially sued the wrong corporate entity but failed to disclose it, and the second corporation was bound by the first's deliberate choice not to defend the action.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of a commercial real estate agreement based on a 50 per cent lost chance of closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, the date of assessment, and the use of a discounted cash flow methodology.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the amortization of capital expenditures and directed a new trial solely on the issue of recovering certain management expenses.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the death of his wife by strychnine poisoning.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to lead reply expert evidence regarding fatal doses of strychnine and homeopathic remedies, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of demeanour in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the reply evidence was admissible to respond to the appellant's unexpected testimony, and the demeanour instruction was adequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding that their solicitors' accounts were interim rather than final.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the determination was a question of fact and the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the accounts were interim based on the evidence.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for violent offences and detained at a mental health centre.

The Ontario Review Board subsequently granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, arguing the decision was unreasonable and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of the respondent's post-discharge deterioration and medication non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal held the Board's initial decision was reasonable on the record before it, but admitted the fresh evidence, which undermined the factual foundation of the Board's disposition.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for a rehearing.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that the respondent Merali was not a 'franchisor's associate' under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge's factual finding that Merali controlled the franchisor rendered him a franchisor's associate.

Consequently, Merali was declared jointly and severally liable with the other respondents for payments owed under s. 6(6) of the Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving (care or control).

The trial judge found that the appellant, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle and had control of the keys, repeatedly asked a passerby for a rope to pull his car back onto the road.

The Court of Appeal held there was adequate evidence to support the finding that the appellant created a risk of putting the car in motion while impaired, thereby creating a danger to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal from an in absentia trial.

The Court of Appeal held that both the trial judge and the summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to consider section 24(2) of the Charter when addressing the Charter issues.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pled guilty to credit card offences and unlawfully being in Canada.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for a 7-month global sentence and imposed an 18-month sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to provide adequate reasons for the significant increase.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the 7-month joint submission inadequate but the 18-month sentence too high, and imposed a global sentence of 9 months net of pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed a seven-year penitentiary sentence for manslaughter arising from a serious driving incident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the seven-year starting point but found the trial judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for 550 days of pre-trial custody following a bail breach.

Given the appellant's youth, prospects for rehabilitation, and lack of evidence that he caused the delay, the Court granted credit at 1.5:1 and reduced the net sentence from five years and three months to four years and three months.

The respondent was charged with trafficking cocaine.

On the trial date, the assigned Crown counsel realized she had previously represented the respondent and eventually disclosed a potential conflict of interest.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings as an abuse of process and awarded costs against the Crown, finding the Crown's conduct placed the respondent in an untenable position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding the Crown could not prove its case and failed to apply the proper legal principles for a stay of proceedings.

The stay and costs orders were set aside.

The appellant purchased a coin car wash business from the respondent and gave a vendor take back mortgage.

The appellant later sued for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding business revenues and breach of warranty regarding a pylon sign.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and allowing the respondent's counterclaim on the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial given the entire agreement clause and the lack of evidence supporting the claims.