Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant, Hydro One Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Financial Services Tribunal order for a partial wind-up of its pension plan under s. 69(1)(d) of the Pension Benefits Act.

Following a corporate merger, the employment of 73 Management Compensation Plan (MCP) employees was terminated.

The Tribunal used a 'subset analysis' to determine that a 'significant number' of plan members had been terminated, comparing the number of terminated MCP employees to the total number of active MCP plan members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 69(1)(d) permits a subset analysis in appropriate circumstances and that the Tribunal's application of this analysis was reasonable given that the merger intentionally targeted senior employees nearing retirement.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order designating them as a special party under section 2(1) of the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's identification of the proper legal test or her conclusion, which was supported by the evidence.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge gave insufficient reasons regarding the common sense inference that people consume alcohol at a normal pace.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge had properly considered the inference but found insufficient evidence to assess its implications based on the Crown expert's report.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order awarding $3,950 in costs to the respondent and making findings on a defamation issue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reducing the costs award to $1,000 to reflect the respondent's limited success on the motion.

The Court also set aside the motion judge's findings on defamation, agreeing with the appellant that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to make such findings on that type of motion.

The young person appealed a conviction for breaking and entering and committing theft.

The sole evidence linking the appellant to the crime was his fingerprints found on window panes removed to gain entry to the building.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence did not reasonably permit the inference that the fingerprints were placed on the windows in connection with the break-in, as opposed to at some other time.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action seeking declarations that the respondent insurer was obliged to defend and indemnify the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) in litigation arising from a construction accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurance certificate and policy only covered the MTO for vicarious liability arising from the contractor's acts, not for the MTO's own negligence.

The court also noted that the appellants' delay of over eight years in advancing the claim prejudiced the respondent.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order striking her fresh amended pleading for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and failing to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleading was fatally deficient and could not be repaired by further amendment.

The Court also declined to admit fresh evidence, applying the Sengmueller test, as the evidence could have been adduced earlier with reasonable diligence and would not have been conclusive.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement amending paragraph 106 of its reasons released November 26, 2009.

The amendment provides that the respondents are awarded costs of the proceeding below in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The aboriginal appellant appealed his sentence of 30 months' imprisonment for breaching the alcohol abstention condition of his long-term supervision order.

The appellant argued the sentence was unfit, the judge misapprehended evidence, denied enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, and failed to adequately consider his aboriginal status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that protection of the public was paramount given the appellant's history of violent offences while intoxicated, and that his aboriginal status did not warrant a reduction in this specific context.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of a firearm, and aggravated assault, as well as his 11-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting his non-videotaped statements to police and photo array identification evidence that did not meet the Sophonow requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the weight of the evidence and affirmed that police should record interviews from the outset.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the gratuitous shooting and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a Norwich order, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to explicitly set aside the underlying December Order.

The Court also determined the costs of the proceedings below.

Departing from the general rule that costs follow the event, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded to any party for the Superior Court proceedings, citing the appellants' shifting legal positions, the unsettled nature of the law regarding Norwich orders, and the underlying conduct of the appellants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay $364,266.92 in an accounting and $50,000 in punitive damages to the respondent, a creditor of a bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellants failed to provide a reliable accounting or preserve necessary documents.

The court also upheld the punitive damages award, noting the appellants operated the bankrupt company's business without authority and charged criminal rates of interest.

The Crown appealed a Divisional Court decision quashing the Ministry of Transportation's award of a highway construction contract to the lowest bidder.

The second-lowest bidder had argued the winning bid was non-compliant because it declared no imported steel, despite design drawings specifying rolled steel beams unavailable in Canada.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Ministry's investigation and subsequent conclusion that the winning bid was compliant—based on the bidder's intention to use Canadian welded steel that met structural standards—was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment declaring his long-term disability insurance policy void for material non-disclosure.

On his insurance application, the appellant failed to disclose past medical complaints regarding his back and hip.

He subsequently became disabled from acute meningitis and sought benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the omitted information was material, as it would have caused the insurer to issue the policy with exclusions for back and hip ailments.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their counterclaim regarding a crop insurance dispute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no agency relationship between the respondents and that the Agriculture Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.

Because the appellants failed to appeal to the Tribunal within the one-year limitation period, their claim was out of time and relief from forfeiture was unavailable as the failure constituted non-compliance rather than imperfect compliance.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the appellant driver was partially liable in negligence for a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge found that the appellant driver failed to slow his vehicle sufficiently after observing the respondents' vehicle enter his lane under icy conditions, which increased the speed of impact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence, as the appellant had put his foot back on the accelerator instead of continuing to slow down.

The appellant sought an adjournment of her appeal, claiming she was not served with the respondent's materials.

The respondent argued the appeal should be quashed because the underlying order was interlocutory, meaning jurisdiction rested with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the order did not finally dispose of the lis between the parties, quashed the appeal, and granted the appellant leave to seek leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a serious fraud, arguing the sentencing judge misapprehended the duration and magnitude of the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension on the record and held that the sentencing judge was justified in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge relied on flawed identification evidence.

The complainant identified the appellant in the holding cells, a procedure the Court of Appeal found seriously flawed despite the appellant's request for it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered as there was other evidence on the record that might sustain a conviction.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for an injunction to prevent the respondents from keeping a locked gate on a private road, and granting the respondents' cross-application to close the road under the Road Access Act.

The application judge found the appellant had alternate road access via a trail on Crown land using four-wheel-drive vehicles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's finding of alternate access was supported by evidence.

The Court further held that once alternate access was established, the appellant had no standing to oppose the road-closing application.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding a condition in the road-closing order was also dismissed.