Patrick John Leckey

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a co-worker.

The Crown alleged that the accused kissed and groped the complainant without consent during a lunch break in his pickup truck.

The accused testified that the complainant consented to kissing and that no groping occurred.

The trial judge found the accused's testimony to be contradictory, inconsistent, and illogical, and accepted the complainant's testimony that she did not consent to any sexual touching.

The trial judge also found that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the trial judge had compelling reasons to reject the appellant's evidence, the appeal judge's reasons were sufficient under the Sheppard test, and the proposed fresh evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The young person appealed a conviction for breaking and entering and committing theft.

The sole evidence linking the appellant to the crime was his fingerprints found on window panes removed to gain entry to the building.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence did not reasonably permit the inference that the fingerprints were placed on the windows in connection with the break-in, as opposed to at some other time.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife while she was heavily medicated.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge correctly examined the circumstances from the appellant's perspective and that the complainant's credibility was not central to whether the appellant took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.