David M. Paciocco

The respondent pension fund was defrauded of millions of dollars, with $3 million diverted into a company solely owned by the appellant.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust based on wilful blindness, ordering her to pay $3 million.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by applying an objective constructive knowledge standard rather than the required subjective standard for wilful blindness.

The Court also found a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant continued to sign cheques without due inquiry, as there was no evidence linking her to cheques involving the diverted funds.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the issue of knowing receipt.

The appellants, in separate incidents, committed violent acts while in states of drug-induced psychosis and automatism.

At trial, they were precluded from raising the defence of non-mental disorder automatism due to section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which removes the defence for violence-based offences where automatism is self-induced by voluntary intoxication.

The Court of Appeal held that section 33.1 violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting convictions without proof of voluntariness or the requisite fault element, and by substituting voluntary intoxication for the essential elements of the offence.

The Court further held that these violations could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

Section 33.1 was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appeals were allowed, with a new trial ordered for one appellant and acquittals entered for the other on the violence-based charges.

The appellant, Gerard Lee, former CEO of Lalu Canada Inc., appealed the dismissal of his application for advance funding of legal costs to defend a fraud action.

The application judge denied funding, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud against Lee regarding "acquisition fees" he had received.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's interpretation of the consulting agreement and assessment of evidence regarding concealment.

The court also affirmed the application judge's application of the "strong prima facie case" test for denying advance funding, finding it commensurate with the stringent standard required.

The applicant father sought to re-open an already decided appeal based on new text message evidence from the respondent mother, which he argued undermined her previous narrative regarding their child's residency in Dubai.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, reiterating that re-opening an appeal is a rare event reserved for cases of "very serious injustice." The court found the new evidence irrelevant to its original decision, which focused on the need to respect a U.K. Consent Custody Order and for the father to pursue the matter in the U.K. first, rather than making credibility findings.

Costs were awarded against the father.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Act decision.

The respondent argued that the motion for leave to appeal should be heard in writing, relying on the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court, acting as a case management judge, determined that motions for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act are presumed to be heard orally, consistent with the settled practice of the Court of Appeal.

The court found that while the Rules of the Court of Appeal in Appeals Under the Provincial Offences Act (POA Rules) did not explicitly state an oral hearing for represented parties, the language used in Rule 3 and Form 1 implied an oral hearing.

The court also clarified that Rule 61.03.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to fill the gap regarding the exchange of facta.

The appellant sought to overturn the denial of an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing the enforcement of a trespass notice issued by the respondent university.

The notice was impeding the appellant's studies and jeopardizing his student visa status, pending a Human Rights Tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's assessment of evidence or misapplication of the interlocutory injunction test.

The court upheld the finding that the balance of convenience favored the university, given the serious threats perceived and the inadequacy of the medical information provided by the appellant.

This is an appeal from a judgment rescinding a settlement agreement.

The respondent, Irene Deschenes, had settled a sexual assault claim against the Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of London in Ontario (the "Diocese") in 2000.

Subsequently, it was discovered that the Diocese had misrepresented its knowledge of the priest's prior abuse, as police statements from 1962 indicating earlier assaults came to light.

The motion judge rescinded the settlement based on innocent misrepresentation.

The appellants (Diocese and others) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in applying the law of unilateral mistake, assessing materiality, and failing to uphold the finality of settlements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the settlement was properly rescinded for innocent misrepresentation, finding the misrepresentation material and relied upon, and that the interests of fairness and justice outweighed the principle of settlement finality in these circumstances.

The appellant, Wayne Laski, and the Estate of Harold Morton Laski appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and Norman Yu.

The action alleged negligent misrepresentation and breach of disclosure duty related to a transfer of securities from Harold Laski to a joint account with Wendi Laski, which passed by right of survivorship outside the estate.

The motion judge struck the estate's claim for non-compliance with procedural rules and the appellant's personal claim based on issue estoppel, collateral attack, abuse of process, and lack of duty of care/damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision to proceed with the motion in the appellant's absence due to repeated non-compliance with adjournment conditions.

The court also affirmed the striking of the personal claim, finding no error in the application of issue estoppel and noting the appellant's failure to demonstrate damages.

The appellant, Jeremy Gough, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to rely on post-incident conduct evidence (attending Tim Hortons, sending texts, delivering a skating form) as relevant to intent and planning/deliberation, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the post-incident conduct evidence was relevant and admissible.

The Court found a positive link between the appellant's pre-offence and post-incident conduct, which formed part of a continuous scheme to distance himself from the crime, thereby attenuating the reasoning risks typically associated with such evidence and negating the need for a specific cautionary instruction.

The appellants, general partners in three limited partnerships, appealed an application judge's order requiring them to produce information to the respondent limited partners and to include specific material in annual and semi-annual reports.

The appellants argued procedural unfairness and that the order exceeded the limited partnership agreements (LPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the appellants had ample notice, and that the order was consistent with the broad information rights of limited partners under section 10 of the Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

L.16, and did not prejudice the appellants.

The appellant, Newton Wong, appealed a summary judgment that ordered him to pay common expense arrears to the respondent, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 476, and dismissed his counterclaim.

The appeal raised issues concerning the interpretation of statutory notice periods for condominium liens, the application of limitation periods to counterclaims, and vicarious liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the lien notice was validly given, the counterclaim was statute-barred, and there was no basis for vicarious liability.

The appellant, Tola Paul, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defences of self-defence and defence of others to the jury, finding no air of reality to these defences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by making factual conclusions and credibility assessments that usurped the jury's role in determining the air of reality of the defences.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find that the defences of self-defence and defence of others had an air of reality.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is an appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The appellant, C.L., argued that the trial judge erred in modifying the standard W.(D.) jury instruction on reasonable doubt and credibility by incorporating a "J.J.R.D. instruction." The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's modification was an error, as the "J.J.R.D." language was intended for sufficiency of reasons in judge-alone trials, not for jury instructions, and could confuse the standard of proof.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, while dismissing the unreasonable verdict challenge.

The father brought an application under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) seeking the return of their child to Dubai, claiming wrongful retention in Ontario.

The application judge ordered the child's return to Dubai, erroneously applying the Hague Convention framework despite the UAE not being a signatory.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, as s. 40 CLRA is distinct from the Hague Convention, particularly regarding the concept of "habitual residence" and the court's broad discretionary powers.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the father's application stayed on condition he commence proceedings in the UK, where a prior consent custody order existed.

This decision addresses a refusals motion and an adjournment application brought by George Volk in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The underlying dispute involves litigation under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, concerning the property of Doris Volk.

Darlene Mussato and Felicia Kowalski, who are appealing an earlier order for the sale of a jointly-owned home, brought a motion to stay that order.

During cross-examination on an affidavit supporting the stay motion, Felicia Kowalski refused to answer several questions.

The court granted George Volk's refusals motion in part, compelling Felicia Kowalski to answer specific categories of questions in writing, and adjourned the stay motion to allow for compliance and further submissions.

This is a criminal appeal concerning convictions for possession of child pornography, making child pornography, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that police breached his Charter rights (ss. 8 and 10(b)) through delayed access to counsel, an unlawful strip search, an unauthorized bedpan vigil, unlawful detention, a warrantless apartment entry, and invalid search warrants for electronic devices.

The Court of Appeal found multiple serious Charter breaches, including a reckless disregard for fundamental constitutional rights and significant impact on privacy interests (body, home, devices).

The court re-evaluated the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, concluding that the evidence obtained through these breaches should have been excluded.

The trial judge's attempt to sever the breaches and stay lesser charges was deemed an error in principle, as the police conduct tainted all evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, in-person appeal hearings were suspended.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal to a later date, while the respondent requested the appeal proceed in writing.

The chambers judge denied the adjournment, finding that the appeal could be fairly adjudicated in writing and that delay would prejudice the respondent, who was owed condominium fees.

The appeal was ordered to proceed in writing, with an opportunity for the parties to respond to panel questions by teleconference.

The appellant, Gordon Hartling, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault, resisting arrest, and two counts of breach of probation, and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of forensic evidence, proper admission of spontaneous utterances, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, the court stayed one breach of probation charge due to the Kienapple principle (same conduct grounding both charges) and allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the total sentence by five months.

This reduction was a remedy for an unreasonable 14-month post-verdict delay in sentencing, primarily caused by institutional resource issues in obtaining a Gladue report, which the court found not to be an exceptional circumstance.

The appellants commenced an action in nuisance and negligence against the respondent municipality for property damage allegedly caused by heavy truck traffic vibrations.

The action was commenced after the Ontario Municipal Board declined jurisdiction over the appellants' injurious affection claim.

The motion judge dismissed the civil action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the application of the two-year limitation period and the finding that it was not legally appropriate to wait for the OMB decision before commencing the civil action.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the municipality engaged in ongoing wrongful conduct causing damage within the two years prior to the statement of claim.

The appellant, A.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his wife, alleging the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by misapprehending J.R.'s testimony regarding leg bruises, which was central to the conviction's corroboration finding.

Furthermore, the trial judge improperly relied on a prior consistent statement as corroboration.

This misapprehension of evidence constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.