David M. Paciocco

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography.

The Crown's case depended on evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure of the accused's computer at a repair shop, followed by searches pursuant to warrants.

The defence challenged the admissibility of all evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure).

The court found multiple Charter breaches: the warrantless search at the repair shop lacked reasonable and probable grounds and lawful authority; the warrantless seizure was tainted by the illegal search; and the police failed to file a required Report to a Justice.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that while the breaches were serious, their practical impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was modest, and exclusion would not serve the long-term repute of the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, obstructing a peace officer, and breaching probation.

The offences arose from a collision between the accused's vehicle and a snowmobile operated by a 16-year-old victim, resulting in life-threatening injuries including internal organ damage, brain bleed, and multiple fractures.

The accused fled the scene without rendering assistance and subsequently lied to police.

The court imposed a global sentence of 44 months, with credit for 428 days of pretrial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in a remaining sentence of 22 months and 20 days.

The court also imposed a lifetime driving prohibition and DNA order.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: assaulting a bus driver contrary to section 266, committing that assault while bound by a probation order contrary to section 733.1, and theft of tip money from a restaurant contrary to section 334(b).

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration followed by one year probation.

Defence counsel sought one year custody.

The court rejected the Crown's submission as disproportionate, finding the assault itself was minor in nature despite aggravating circumstances including the reckless endangerment of bus passengers and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 months and 9 days incarceration (after crediting 44 days pretrial custody at 1.5:1 ratio), plus 12 months probation.

The accused was charged with wilfully obstructing a peace officer in the execution of his duties contrary to section 129(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded in an unusual fashion, with the accused initially refusing to identify himself at arraignment and subsequently absconding during trial, requiring the trial to proceed in absentia.

The court found the accused guilty based on his refusal to exit his vehicle when commanded to do so and his attempt to roll up the window to prevent the officer's entry during the lawful execution of an arrest.

The court rejected the obstruction charge based on the accused's initial refusal to identify himself, finding that the Highway Traffic Act provided an alternative enforcement mechanism that should have been used.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Mie-Tha Lah, a conditionally accredited Karen interpreter, was competent to provide interpretation services for the accused in a trial for impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's counsel objected to the interpreter's qualifications.

The court found the interpreter competent to provide interpretation services meeting constitutional standards under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, applying the test established in R. v. Tran.

The accused subsequently pleaded guilty to the section 253(1)(b) charge and was sentenced.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a motor vehicle accident on February 9, 2013, in which his car struck a snowmobile operated by a 16-year-old, causing serious injuries.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire regarding alleged Charter breaches.

The court excluded evidence obtained through unconstitutional questioning and breath samples derived therefrom, but admitted evidence of alcohol odour.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain at the scene with knowledge of bodily harm, breach of probation, and obstruction of justice, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to exclusion of breath samples.

The court found the accused was impaired by alcohol and that his impairment was a significant contributing cause of the collision.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and care and control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision in Ottawa.

The Crown conducted a blended voir dire to address both substantive charges and alleged Charter breaches.

The court found that the evidential breath samples were obtained in violation of the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code, rendering them inadmissible and precluding reliance on the presumption of identity.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the over-80 charge.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care and control based on admissions regarding alcohol consumption, physical signs of impairment, and the manner of driving that caused the accident.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after providing breath samples at a police station that exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown could not rely on the statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity because the first breath sample was taken beyond the two-hour limit.

The accused sought to raise a reasonable doubt by presenting evidence of his alcohol consumption pattern, arguing that based on his drinking, his blood alcohol level would have been below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The court found the Crown's expert toxicology evidence credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's testimony as inconsistent with the breath readings and unconfirmed by other evidence.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, unrepresented, defended on the basis that his Charter rights were violated through racist treatment by police.

The court rejected this defence.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by law.

The court identified three periods of inadequately explained or unexplained delay totalling approximately 20 minutes, which undermined the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity.

Without evidence of the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, the court found the accused not guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by drug, dangerous driving, and breach of an undertaking.

The accused admitted to the actus reus of both impaired and dangerous driving but raised the defence of involuntary intoxication, claiming he did not knowingly consume Clonazepam.

The court found that while involuntary intoxication can undermine the mens rea for impaired driving and modify the objective standard for dangerous driving, the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntary consumption.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to significant memory gaps and credibility concerns, and noted that evidence of powdery residue in the accused's nostrils was consistent with voluntary drug ingestion.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The accused brought a renewed motion for disclosure of Ottawa Police occurrence reports relating to prior police contacts within 90 days prior to the alleged offence.

The Crown initially opposed disclosure under the Mills regime for third party records in sexual offence prosecutions.

Following the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Quesnelle, which held that police occurrence reports prepared by the investigating police force are not "records" under section 278.1 and are therefore governed by the Stinchcombe disclosure regime rather than the Mills regime, the court reconsidered its initial ruling.

The court found that Quesnelle could be reconciled with prior authority from R. v. McNeil and R. v. Thompson and determined that the Crown must apply the Stinchcombe disclosure obligation to produce occurrence reports relating to the complainant that are in the possession of the investigating police force.

An appeal of a conviction under section 25(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace injury where a temporary employee's foot was crushed under a moving refuse truck wheel, resulting in amputation.

The trial judge convicted the employer of failing to provide adequate information, instruction, and supervision.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred by conflating the actus reus analysis with the due diligence defence, failing to properly evaluate whether the Crown proved the prohibited act beyond a reasonable doubt, and misapplying the law regarding delegation of supervisory responsibilities.

The court ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, possession of marijuana, and breach of probation following an incident on January 16, 2012.

The accused conceded causing bodily harm but claimed self-defence under section 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the initial use of force was justified, the accused continued the assault long after the threat was neutralized, acting out of anger rather than self-defence.

The court convicted the accused of assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation, and acquitted on the marijuana charge.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in marijuana between November 15, 2010 and March 7, 2011.

The Crown's case relied primarily on wiretap intercepts of the accused's phone conversations with an alleged drug trafficker, combined with surveillance evidence.

The central issues were whether the accused was the party to the intercepted conversations and whether the evidence established a conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

The court found that the accused was indeed a party to the conversations and that the evidence established a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the proposition that mere knowledge by a seller that a buyer intends to resell is sufficient for conspiracy; rather, the Crown must prove an agreement to pursue a mutual criminal objective.

The court found that the accused agreed to supply marijuana on an ongoing basis as part of the alleged trafficker's distribution scheme.

The defendant, a construction company, was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act with failing to ensure that a temporary wooden brace used in a winch system was designed and constructed to support or resist all loads and forces to which it was likely to be subjected.

The charge arose from a fatal construction accident in which a worker died when the wooden brace failed.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the wooden brace was inadequately designed and constructed for the likely forces it would encounter, given its intended use for achieving alignment rather than applying maximum force.

The court also found that the defendant exercised due diligence by relying on manufacturer instructions and industry standards.

The defendant was acquitted.

Two accused were charged with drug offences arising from a police investigation of a suspected marijuana grow operation at 21 St. Clair Avenue in Ottawa on June 25, 2010.

Eneida Pino was charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Randall Scott Edwards was charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and unlawfully producing cannabis marijuana.

The Crown alleged that Pino removed a box containing 50 marijuana clone plants from the residence and placed it in her vehicle.

Edwards was found inside the residence during the execution of a search warrant.

Pino claimed she believed the box contained groceries and was unaware of its contents.

Edwards' defence was that the Crown failed to prove he was party to the grow operation enterprise or in possession of the marijuana.

The court found Pino guilty as charged, rejecting her testimony as incredible and finding she had knowledge and control of the marijuana for trafficking purposes.

The court acquitted Edwards, finding insufficient evidence to prove he exercised control over the grow operation or possessed the marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant challenged a search warrant executed on March 10, 2005, as violating section 8 of the Charter.

The defendant raised four categories of complaints: (1) the use of hydro records obtained without a warrant; (2) insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the search; (3) misconduct by the affiant detective in securing the warrant; and (4) improper authorization and execution in evening hours.

The court found that while the hydro records were properly obtained, the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds because the credibility foundation for the informant information was insufficient.

The court excluded all evidence obtained pursuant to the unconstitutional search under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering into a residential unit and committing assault therein.

The Crown sought a conviction for mischief as an included offence after the accused was acquitted of the primary charges.

The court examined whether mischief constitutes an included offence within a break and enter charge under section 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the strict test from R. v. G.R., finding that mischief is not necessarily committed every time a break and enter occurs, and therefore cannot qualify as an included offence.

The accused was acquitted of mischief.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death while street racing after the other driver involved in the race lost control and died in a collision.

The court found that the accused and the deceased were engaged in a spontaneous street race at high speeds in a residential area.

The court held that the accused's participation in the race was a significant contributing cause of the deceased's death and constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, satisfying the elements of dangerous driving causing death.

However, the court found the conduct did not meet the higher standard of a marked and substantial departure required for criminal negligence.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and not guilty of criminal negligence causing death.