David M. Paciocco

The moving party brought a motion to extend the time to appeal a garnishment order issued over two years prior.

The moving party argued that its delay was due to its sole shareholder's ignorance of the law and the belief that the company was judgment proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party made a tactical decision not to appeal and that the delay caused prejudice to the victims of the underlying fraud.

The court also noted that the proposed appeal was not obviously meritorious.

The moving party filed a motion for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal that should have been filed in the Divisional Court.

He sought an order under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act transferring the file to the Divisional Court.

The responding party opposed the transfer and requested the motion be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the transfer motion, finding there was no realistic chance the Divisional Court would grant leave to appeal and that a transfer would cause undue prejudice and delay to the responding party.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $12,300.00, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The costs of the summary judgment motion below were ordered to be fixed by the trial judge at the end of the proceedings.

Traders General Insurance Company moved to review a single judge's decision denying it leave to appeal an order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying dispute involved a bad faith claim assigned to the respondents by a discharged bankruptcy trustee following a motor vehicle accident judgment.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to review the single judge's decision because the judge had mistakenly declined jurisdiction by failing to address the merits of the leave motion.

Applying the Pine Tree Resorts test, the Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised prima facie meritorious issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

The employee worked for a company for 36 years before its assets were sold to the appellant.

The appellant hired the employee, but laid her off after one month.

The employee sued for wrongful dismissal and was granted summary judgment based on the motion judge's finding that her employment was continuous under the common law, mirroring the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate due to material factual disputes regarding the terms of her new employment.

The Court clarified that at common law, a sale of a business results in constructive dismissal, and while a successor employer must give some recognition to prior service when assessing reasonable notice, it is not a seamless continuation of employment.

The appellant and a co-accused were charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an altercation at a nightclub.

At trial, the appellant's counsel cross-examined a security guard, suggesting he was lying to protect the co-accused.

The trial judge restricted certain lines of questioning regarding identity, prior statements, and an alleged drug deal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 48-month sentence, arguing the trial judge's rulings undermined trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her trial management discretion and the rulings did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed the moving party's motions for leave to appeal and permitted the responding party to make written submissions for full indemnity costs.

The responding party failed to file its costs submissions by the extended deadline and was deemed to have abandoned its request for full indemnity costs.

The court ordered partial indemnity costs of the four motions for leave to appeal to the responding party, fixed at $1,500 inclusive.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States for identity theft and misrepresentation, applied for judicial interim release pending the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender.

The applicant had previously fled the United States to Canada while on bail and made a refugee claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would surrender himself into custody, given his history of using fraudulent identification and breaching bail conditions to avoid returning to Ghana.

The moving party sought to dismiss the appeal or require the responding party to post security for costs.

The responding party had failed to pay a previous costs order of $2,000 and failed to appear for the scheduled appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal declined to dismiss the appeal outright for a single unpaid costs order but ordered the responding party to pay $19,000 into court as security for costs, plus the outstanding costs and the costs of the motion, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

The applicant, having been convicted of human trafficking and obstruction of justice, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds but contested the tertiary ground.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his release would not harm public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the offences, the weakness of the proposed grounds of appeal, his prior breach of bail conditions, and an inadequate release plan.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved mixed success, the appellants requested to make written costs submissions, arguing that each side should bear their own costs of the appeal and costs below should be in the cause.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its original costs order, finding that the respondent was more successful on the appeal as the appellants' claim was largely statute-barred.

The original award of $6,500 in appeal costs to the respondent was maintained.

The appellant, a university student who had been banned from campus, initiated over 20 separate legal proceedings against the university, student council, and others.

The application judge declared him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed the judgments but failed to identify any errors in the application judge's analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellant is a vexatious litigant.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a summary judgment dismissing the appellants' claim, the respondent sought to vary the costs order.

The respondent argued that the costs of the action unrelated to the summary judgment motion should not be payable since the action would proceed.

The Court of Appeal agreed and amended its previous judgment to vacate the motions judge's costs order and award the appellants $5,447.39 for the costs of the summary judgment motion.

The respondent, having successfully defended an appeal, sought costs of $17,818.44.

The appellant did not dispute the entitlement to costs but argued the quantum was excessive, noting he would have sought only $9,152.95 had he been successful.

The Court of Appeal agreed the requested amount was high given there was no oral hearing, and fixed the costs payable to the respondent at $9,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, incest, and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on principles of delayed disclosure to excuse inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for his credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law, grappled with the inconsistencies, and provided reasons sufficient for appellate review.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial due to inadequate reasons.

The claimant, an Ontario resident, was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident in Nunavut while driving a Nunavut-plated vehicle insured by the appellant.

The respondent, the claimant's Ontario insurer, paid Ontario statutory accident benefits and sought reimbursement from the appellant under the priority provisions of the Ontario Insurance Act.

The arbitrator and appeal judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not an 'Ontario insurer' for the purposes of the priority dispute and that the Ontario Insurance Act could not be applied extraterritorially to a Nunavut policy for an accident occurring in Nunavut.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The self-represented applicant moved to set aside a previous decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing his family law appeal, seeking a new hearing under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that Rule 37.14 had no application and that the authority to reconsider a decision under Rule 59.06 is exercised sparingly.

The applicant's arguments amounted to mere disagreement with the correctness of the appeal decision.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the proper route to contest the decision was to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant, an independent agent for the respondent financial services company, appealed the dismissal of his application for an order requiring the respondent to pay service commissions.

The respondent had changed its policy to make service commissions dependent on new sales performance.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the contract permitted the respondent to modify pay arrangements and impose minimum performance standards upon notice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of the appeal to the respondent in the fixed amount of $16,800.00, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.