David M. Paciocco

The appellant, Charles Mark Hilton, appealed the dismissal of his 14B motion by Nicholson J., which sought to set aside previous orders made in divorce proceedings, including those issued after he was noted in default.

The appellant alleged that the respondent, Marlene Dale Hilton, committed fraud through misrepresentations and material omissions during the uncontested trial.

Nicholson J. had dismissed the motion on the basis that the appellant had not appealed the earlier orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, clarifying that while some orders resulting from the appellant's default required an appeal, the allegations of the respondent's misrepresentations and material omissions should have been determined on their merits under r. 25(19)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a new hearing on these specific allegations.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent submitted their costs, while the appellant chose not to make any submissions.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and all relevant taxes.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly analyze circumstantial evidence and contradictions in the victim's testimony, and erred in principle during sentencing by confusing the roles of the assailants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 6.5-year sentence was fit given the appellant's prior record and the aggravating nature of home invasions, though the assault conviction was conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed the trial judge's factual findings on an off-set issue and the costs disposition.

The respondent cross-appealed on costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the off-set issue, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court allowed the appellant's costs appeal and dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, as the parties agreed the trial judge erred in principle by determining success on a distributive-costs basis.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge to determine the quantum of costs.

The appellant was convicted of multiple weapons offences based entirely on circumstantial evidence after a police officer witnessed a single gunshot and briefly chased the fleeing suspect.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant's DNA found on the recovered handgun, a fleeting description by the officer, and grainy surveillance videos showing the appellant in the vicinity over an hour prior.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's verdict unreasonable, concluding that the totality of the evidence was too generic to establish the appellant's identity as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury for aggravated assault arising from a group altercation.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable due to flaws in the eyewitness identification evidence and alternatively sought a new trial on the basis that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was ample circumstantial and descriptive evidence to support the conviction, including bloodstain evidence matching the victim on the appellant's shirt.

The Court also held that the trial judge's charge clearly distinguished between descriptive evidence and in-court identification, and would not have misled the jury.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following his guilty pleas to several offences, including driving while disqualified.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum available under the Criminal Code at the time was five years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lifetime prohibition, and substituted a five-year driving prohibition, noting the appellant's criminal record and the nature of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences relating to a residential break-in and theft of firearms.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in denying him standing to challenge a warrantless search of his girlfriend's vehicle, unfairly dismissed his s. 8 Charter challenges and Garofoli application, and erred in finding reasonable grounds for search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge acted unfairly in summarily dismissing the Garofoli application and standing arguments without hearing submissions, no miscarriage of justice occurred because the applications had no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 6-year sentence for internet luring, sexual interference, and sexual assault of a developmentally delayed child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which relied on corroborating electronic messages showing grooming behaviour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the exploitation of a highly vulnerable child.

However, the court stayed the sexual assault charge to avoid double jeopardy.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding the timeline of events and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the timeline discrepancy went only to the reliability of time estimates rather than core credibility, and that the trial judge had ample corroborating evidence to support his findings.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing an error in the calculation of his pre-trial custody credit.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that the parties made a mathematical error at trial.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, allowed the appeal, and reduced the appellant's sentence by 257 days.

The appellant appealed an order awarding retroactive and prospective spousal support to the respondent.

The appellant argued the order was a nullity because it was made under the Divorce Act after being severed from a divorce order, and alternatively, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had attorned to divorce proceedings in Alabama.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the support order was properly made under the Family Law Act and that the application judge correctly determined he had jurisdiction.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed acquittals and sentence arising from offences involving the sale of sexual services by underage females.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by defining 'procures' and 'harbours' too narrowly when directing the jury and granting a directed verdict, which materially affected several acquittals.

New trials were ordered on multiple counts.

The court also found significant errors in principle in sentencing, including minimizing the inherent exploitation of the offences, overemphasizing bail conditions, and improperly relying on media publicity to satisfy deterrence.

While upholding declarations that certain mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court substituted a global sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of steroids and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence suggesting the appellant was associated with the Hells Angels and was a target of a large-scale organized crime investigation.

The Crown also introduced intercepted communications portraying the appellant as knowledgeable about the criminal justice system, and anecdotal opinion evidence from a police officer regarding steroid stockpiling.

The Court of Appeal held that the gang affiliation and intercept evidence constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence that was irrelevant to the material issues.

Furthermore, the police officer's anecdotal testimony exceeded the proper bounds of opinion evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the cumulative errors rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a motion.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the amount of $4,172.28, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract action on summary judgment.

The appellant claimed an ongoing oral contract required the respondent to make annual payments of $1.2 million in perpetuity.

The motion judge found no documentary evidence supporting the existence of such a contract and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appeal and the application for leave to appeal the costs award were dismissed.

Commercial landlord appealed an order limiting its entitlement to draw on a $2.5 million standby letter of credit posted by a bankrupt tenant as security for a lease.

The motion judge held that, following the trustee’s disclaimer of the lease, the landlord could draw only the statutory preferred claim for three months’ accelerated rent under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the autonomy principle governing letters of credit meant the issuing bank’s obligation to honour complying presentations was independent of the underlying lease and not limited by insolvency law absent fraud.

The court also found the motion judge erred in interpreting the lease to require a reduction in the letter of credit because the tenant had not “promptly” paid rent at all times as required.

The landlord was therefore entitled to draw the full amount of the letter of credit.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, appealed a judgment denying her application to set aside a municipal tax sale of a property previously owned by her deceased parents.

She argued the municipality failed to provide her with proper notice of the sale and acted in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the municipality strictly complied with the notice requirements under the Municipal Act, 2001 by sending registered letters to the assessed owners at their last known addresses.

The court held that the municipality owed no additional duty of good faith to notify the appellant, who had not registered her interest on title or updated the municipal tax rolls.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of physical and sexual abuse against his spouse and two children.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against cross-count reasoning and by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the extensive highly prejudicial bad character evidence presented at trial required specific instructions to prevent the jury from engaging in prohibited propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.