David M. Paciocco

The Crown applied under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code to revoke the respondent's bail release order, which had extended his release pending appeal.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-application for release pending appeal.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the respondent had committed new indictable offences while on bail, including possession of break-in instruments, stolen mail, ammunition, and potential bomb-making materials.

The court concluded that the enforcement interest outweighed the reviewability interest, particularly given the nature of the new charges and the reduced concern for appeal delay.

Consequently, the respondent's bail release was revoked, and his application for release pending appeal was denied.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, Darren Pearce, sought leave to appeal a five-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately address the principle of parity between Mr. Pearce's sentence and that of his co-accused, Terrance Goodwin, who received a substantially shorter sentence for the same crime.

The court substituted a sentence of "time served" equivalent to approximately three and a half years, to achieve appropriate parity, considering Mr. Pearce's pre-sentence custody and credits.

This motion was brought by the appellant for a review of a single judge's decision dismissing his application for court-appointed counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was appealing his conviction and sentence for robbery and related offences, including a dangerous offender declaration.

The single judge had dismissed the application, finding little merit to the appeals and that counsel was not necessary given the straightforward nature of the grounds and the appellant's ability to present his arguments.

The panel of the Court of Appeal found no reason to differ from the single judge's conclusions and dismissed the motion for review.

The applicant sought a panel review from the Court of Appeal for Ontario of a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction dismissal.

The applicant had been convicted of breach of undertaking and assault.

His initial summary conviction appeal was dismissed due to a lack of transcripts.

Subsequent applications for extensions of time and panel reviews were dismissed by single judges of the Court of Appeal (MacPherson J.A. and Coroza J.A.) on grounds of unexplained delay, lack of bona fide intention to appeal, and absence of apparent merit.

The panel upheld the previous decisions, finding no error of law and no justification to depart from the prior rulings.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of speeding, appealed the dismissal of his provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial justice of the peace made a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider a significant discrepancy between the officer's oral testimony regarding time and distance and the radar reading, which could have raised reasonable doubt about the radar's functioning.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating it would withdraw the charge.

Costs were not awarded, consistent with the general rule for Provincial Offences Act proceedings.

The moving parties (mortgagees and their principal) brought motions in the Court of Appeal for Ontario seeking security for costs of an appeal, lifting a temporary stay of a writ of possession, further security for costs awarded below, and expediting the appeal.

The responding parties (mortgagors/appellants) had appealed a judgment enforcing minutes of settlement and granting a writ of possession, which had been temporarily stayed conditional on tax payments.

The court found the appeal grounds frivolous and vexatious, and the responding parties had insufficient assets.

The court granted security for costs and lifted the temporary stay, finding the responding parties breached the stay condition and that the writ of possession was not automatically stayed.

The motions for further security for costs below and expediting the appeal were dismissed.

The moving parties, Thomas Patrick Farrell and The Midas Investment Corporation, appealed an order dismissing their action concerning the validity of two mortgages and sought a stay of the declaration of validity and enforcement of the mortgages pending the outcome of the appeal.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for stays pending appeal.

While a serious issue was found to exist (though barely), the court determined there would be no irreparable harm to the moving parties and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, 9383859 Canada Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that dismissed its actions for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The respondents, Kubeskaran Navaratnam, Ronald Lachmansingh, and Marilyn Reiter Nemetz, brought motions to dismiss the appeal due to the appellant's failure to comply with a security for costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the motions, dismissing the appeal.

The court found that the appellant had not provided compelling reasons for its non-compliance and that it was in the interests of justice to dismiss the appeal, given the appellant's lack of assets and the manifest weakness of the underlying appeal.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment decision finding he unjustifiably repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The purchaser argued the vendors failed to provide a survey complying with the agreement, rendering it null and void.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the survey was not essential to the transaction or the purchaser's ability to close, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Sarfraz Malik, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied his motion to amend his statement of claim to add Family Law Act (FLA) s. 61 claims for losses arising from injuries to his children, more than four years after the accident.

The Superior Court judge had reversed a Master's decision, finding that s. 61 FLA claims constitute a distinct statutory cause of action, subject to the Limitations Act, and not merely a claim for additional damages within an existing negligence action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a s. 61 FLA claim is a separate statutory cause of action that was statute-barred in this case, thereby dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Peter Ukwuaba, appealed his convictions for importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin, and sought leave to appeal his concurrent 11-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's inferences of complicity in importation and conspiracy were reasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing it from 11 years to 9 years concurrent, citing fresh evidence of the appellant's debilitating stroke post-sentencing, which significantly worsened his incarceration conditions and reduced the need for specific deterrence and incapacitation.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him.

JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent.

On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial.

The errors were deemed material and not harmless.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, found Not Criminally Responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for prior offences, appealed a 2019 Ontario Review Board disposition that continued his conditional discharge and imposed new alcohol and drug testing requirements.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its application of the significant threat test and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's determination that the appellant posed a significant threat was not supported by the evidence and lacked proper analysis regarding the degree of risk or gravity of apprehended harm.

The court emphasized that factors such as lack of insight, potential medication non-compliance, or substance abuse do not automatically establish a significant threat without specific analysis of the risk of serious criminal conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and an absolute discharge was granted, although the issue was rendered moot by a subsequent 2020 Board decision granting an absolute discharge.

The appellant, Shawn Orange, appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The primary ground of appeal was that the transcript of the trial judge's oral reasons was uncertified due to alleged substantive changes by the judge.

The Court of Appeal rejected this, finding the transcript accurate and the judge's edits permissible within the scope allowed for trial judges.

The court also dismissed alternative grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's factual and credibility findings amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal from convictions was dismissed.

The appeal from sentence was allowed by consent to subtract time spent on bail pending appeal from the driving prohibition.

The appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi, appealed his convictions for gun-related and criminal organization offences, and his 12-year sentence, stemming from a police investigation ("Project Traveller").

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of Somali-language translator's opinion evidence or in the jury charge regarding the criminal organization definition and flight as after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from 12 years to 10 years.

This reduction was due to the trial judge's error in considering the appellant's racial minority status as an aggravating factor, which the Court of Appeal deemed an improper basis for sentencing.

Justice Paciocco dissented in part on the conviction appeal, arguing that the jury charge on the definition of a criminal organization was inadequate for failing to properly instruct on the elements of structure and continuity.

The appellant was convicted of procuring and advertising sexual services.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in applying the actus reus for procuring by failing to consider the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, as required by the interpretation of "control, direction or influence" under s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant for advertising on a theory of party liability that the Crown had disavowed, without providing the defence notice and an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The appellant, Carl Quinton, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained through a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

The trial judge failed to hold a voir dire to determine the confession's admissibility under R. v. Hart, accepting defence counsel's mistaken concession that Hart did not apply.

The Court of Appeal found that the operation clearly fell under Hart, and the purported waiver of the voir dire was invalid because counsel was not fully informed and the agreement offered no benefit to the defence.

The Court highlighted significant abuse of process concerns, given the police exploitation of the appellant's vulnerabilities (alcoholism, mental health issues, physical stroke, social isolation, and financial destitution).

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, with the Court emphasizing the need for rigorous judicial scrutiny of police conduct in Mr. Big operations.

The appellant, S.H., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapplied the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis regarding reasonable doubt in credibility cases, despite correctly citing the principles.

The Court of Appeal found that, reading the trial judge's reasons as a whole, it could be inferred that the judge rejected the appellant's exculpatory testimony entirely, rendering it incapable of raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a former senior compliance manager at Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), appealed the dismissal of her application for lack of standing.

She sought to uncover and remedy alleged regulatory infractions and trust breaches by TD Bank in its mutual fund administration, claiming unjust enrichment and wrongful dismissal.

The motion judge dismissed her application, finding she lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise trusts does not negate standing requirements, that the private interest standing test (requiring a personal and direct interest) was correctly applied, and that the appellant failed to plead facts establishing such standing, including as a constructive trustee.

The court also rejected the argument that public interest standing principles should inform private interest standing or that her whistleblower status conferred standing for private litigation.