Dale A. Turner

The moving party sought leave to appeal a prior order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs and vacated the partial interim stay order that had been previously granted.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary a temporary parenting order, seeking primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for the parties' 4-year-old child, with supervised parenting time for the respondent mother.

The mother had repeatedly denied the father parenting time based on unsubstantiated allegations of physical and sexual abuse, and drugging, which were investigated and closed by police and child protection services.

The court found compelling circumstances to change the status quo prior to trial, noting the mother's failure to support the child's relationship with the father and the emotional harm caused by her conduct.

The court granted the father's motion, awarding him primary residence and sole decision-making, and ordered the mother to have supervised parenting time.

The applicant, S.B., sought guardianship of her adult daughter, A.L., for both property and personal care under the Substitute Decisions Act.

A.L., diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Bi-Polar II, and intellectual disabilities, was found by a capacity assessor to be incapable of managing her finances and personal care.

The court granted the guardianship orders, deeming it the least restrictive option given A.L.'s fixed and limited functioning.

However, the court denied S.B.'s request for a broad apprehension order under s. 59(3) of the Act, interpreting the provision as limited to specific instances rather than a general delegation of power.

The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee was served and provided input on the proposed plans but took no position on the incapacity finding.

The appellant, Charles Mark Hilton, appealed the dismissal of his 14B motion by Nicholson J., which sought to set aside previous orders made in divorce proceedings, including those issued after he was noted in default.

The appellant alleged that the respondent, Marlene Dale Hilton, committed fraud through misrepresentations and material omissions during the uncontested trial.

Nicholson J. had dismissed the motion on the basis that the appellant had not appealed the earlier orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, clarifying that while some orders resulting from the appellant's default required an appeal, the allegations of the respondent's misrepresentations and material omissions should have been determined on their merits under r. 25(19)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a new hearing on these specific allegations.