Robert J. Sharpe

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to his blind and cognitively impaired mother and sister, resulting in their deaths from starvation and septic shock respectively.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of 18 years (8 years consecutive for criminal negligence in his sister's death and 10 years for manslaughter in his mother's death).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

The court found that while the verdicts were inconsistent (acquittal on manslaughter but conviction on criminal negligence for the sister's death), the criminal negligence conviction was reasonable and supported by evidence, whereas the manslaughter acquittal arose from a manifest legal error.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's cognitive limitations on the sentencing issue and reduced the global sentence to 14 years, minus presentence custody credit of 1,405 days, resulting in a net sentence of 10 years and 2 months.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement sought a stay of a Direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge that prohibited the Chief Adjudicator from continuing participation in three appeals, including one before the Supreme Court of Canada scheduled for October 10, 2018.

The Direction was issued without notice to the Chief Adjudicator or other parties and without supporting record.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, jurisdiction, and the scope of participation permitted for administrative tribunals in appeals challenging their decisions.

Appeal of a motion judge's order granting sole custody to the father in a child custody dispute.

The mother had taken the 13-year-old son to India in 2013 under the guise of visiting her ill mother and did not return him despite a court order.

The motion judge found Ontario had jurisdiction based on the child's habitual residence and granted the father sole custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the father had attorned to the Indian courts by seeking a final custody order based on Indian law, and therefore Ontario should have declined jurisdiction.

The Court also found that the motion judge erred by making a final custody order without considering the best interests of the child factors required by statute.

The appellant, the mother of Monica Gaumont, appealed a judgment appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as guardian of Monica's property and personal care.

Monica, age 30, has a form of epilepsy with progressive seizures that have caused cognitive regression.

The application judge found Monica lacked capacity and appointed the PGT as guardian, allowing the appellant to reapply upon important changes in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding no procedural unfairness, no error regarding the capacity finding, and no merit to arguments concerning a power of attorney or alternative guardians.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment order dismissing his action to collect an account for legal services in the amount of $51,493.37.

The appellant's sole ground of appeal was that the motion judge erred in concluding there was no material non-disclosure or fraudulent representation by the respondents regarding the release of the account or during the assessment proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's findings of fact, which were fully supported by evidence, including that the respondent was aware of the appellant's outstanding action 14 months before signing the release, that the appellant was aware of the assessment proceeding, and that the respondents were entitled to rely on counsel's representations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000.

This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of section 4 of the Interest Act to complex commercial loan agreements between ClearFlow Energy Finance Corp. and Solar Power Network Inc. The central dispute involves whether a "discount fee" of 0.003% per day and "administration fees" constitute interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, and whether the loan agreements comply with the statutory requirement to express interest as an annual rate or percentage.

The application judge found that the discount fee was interest, that the loan agreements failed to comply with section 4, and that all interest payable should be capped at 5% per annum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the discount fee was properly annualized through a formula in the Loan Agreement, that the Loan Agreement complied with section 4, and that the appropriate remedy for non-compliance in the Promissory Notes was to limit only the non-compliant discount fee to 5%, not all interest payable.

A disciplinary appeal concerning allegations of professional misconduct and participation in mortgage fraud by a real estate lawyer.

The Law Society alleged that the lawyer failed to disclose credits to lenders in eight real estate transactions, thereby assisting in mortgage fraud.

The Hearing Panel found no fraud but found the lawyer fell below the standard of competent practice in seven transactions, imposing a two-month suspension.

The Appeal Panel reversed, finding the Hearing Panel applied an incorrect legal test for mortgage fraud and ordered a new hearing.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision by majority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the Appeal Panel's articulation of the legal test was reasonable, ordering a new hearing was unreasonable given the Hearing Panel's clear factual findings that the lawyer lacked the requisite mental element for fraud.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against the estate of their first cousin, Dr. Sherman, and others.

The appellants claimed that Dr. Sherman owed them an ad hoc fiduciary duty to look after their financial interests and that he breached this duty by failing to honour an option agreement that would have allowed them to acquire shares in the family businesses.

The motion judge dismissed the action on two grounds: first, that no genuine issue requiring trial existed regarding the fiduciary duty, and second, that the action constituted an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate issues already determined in a prior unsuccessful action against Royal Trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The appellants appealed a contempt of court order finding them in breach of a restoration order issued by Lahaie J. The appellants had been convicted under the Conservation Authorities Act for interfering with and removing material from wetlands.

The restoration order required them to rehabilitate and restore the wetlands to conform with guidelines set by the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority within six months.

The appellants argued the order was ambiguous and did not clearly specify what they were required to do.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, holding that the order was sufficiently clear when read in context with the judge's reasons, and that the appellants deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the order rather than being unable to comply with it.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application under the Condominium Act challenging the respondent condominium corporation's requirement that she renovate her unit to a luxury standard as a condition of remaining in the hotel rental pool.

The appellant also objected to the removal of her unit from the pool when she refused the renovations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's dismissal, finding no oppressive conduct by the respondent and confirming that the appellant could not remain in the pool without meeting the luxury standard while having the option to rent or use the unit residentially.

A motion to review a lower court order dismissing a request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The moving party, an experienced litigant acting in person, sought to appeal an order refusing permission to represent an estate and refusing to amend a statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's dismissal, finding the moving party failed to provide adequate explanation for delay, the underlying order was interlocutory in nature, and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court also considered the moving party's history of non-compliance with costs orders in denying the extension.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's award of costs in favour of the respondents following an unsuccessful trial.

The appellants had brought a claim for misfeasance in public office but discontinued it midway through trial after the trial judge identified that they lacked evidence for an essential element.

They sought to reopen the claim based on fresh evidence, which the trial judge rejected.

The appellants argued that no costs should be awarded due to the respondents' conduct, but this argument was based on the same evidence that had already been rejected in the misfeasance claim.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal costs, finding that the trial judge had properly considered the respondents' conduct and reduced the costs award accordingly.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the evidence of sexual assault of an unconscious, highly intoxicated complainant was overwhelming.

On the sentence appeal, the court confirmed that the trial judge's findings satisfied the requirements of intractability and high likelihood of harmful recidivism established in R. v. Boutilier.

The court rejected arguments regarding misapprehension of prior criminal record, consideration of unproven allegations, and failure to consider Gladue factors and alternative measures.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The complainant testified that the appellant overpowered her, pinned her on a bed, and touched her sexually without consent.

The appellant provided a contradictory account, claiming the complainant initiated sexual contact and that he ended it after thinking of his girlfriend.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence, supported by corroborating evidence including a torn bra, a mark on the complainant's neck, and text messages.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and evidentiary rulings.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error or overriding error of fact in the trial judge's decision.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2000 for assault and uttering threats appealed his disposition of detention in a general forensic unit with community living privileges at the discretion of the hospital.

The appellant argued the Board's finding that he continues to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and sought a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's majority decision, finding the disposition reasonable based on the appellant's persistent pattern of threatening behaviour, impulsivity, inability to control anger, and the structured environment's role in preventing escalation to physical violence.

The appellant appealed an order of Forestell J. concerning the jurisdiction of a trial judge to issue a bench warrant to compel the personal attendance of the accused in summary conviction proceedings.

The appellant filed a motion seeking to compel the attendance of three individuals to provide testimony regarding whether the appellant appeared in court on September 15, 2017.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as the evidence sought had no relevance to the issue on appeal, which concerned the trial judge's jurisdiction to issue the bench warrant.

The court ordered the appellant to perfect her appeal by August 31, 2018, with no extensions permitted, and warned that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the appeal without further notice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of Nighisti Semret in downtown Toronto on October 23, 2012.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that after-the-fact conduct had no probative value in distinguishing between levels of culpability; (2) that the trial judge failed to provide an O'Connor instruction regarding the appellant's false statements to police and medical personnel; and (3) that evidence of the appellant's trip to Germany should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

An appeal from two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board concerning a person found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the Board's May 23, 2017 conditional discharge order and its August 11, 2017 detention order, arguing both were unreasonable and that the August 11 order resulted from procedural unfairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the May 23 order as moot and upheld the August 11 detention order, finding it was reasonable based on the appellant's relapse into drug use, violent behavior, and non-compliance with medication and reporting requirements.