Robert A. Blair

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his whereabouts on a specific date when illegal content was accessed on his home computer.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was home on that date.

Furthermore, the court held that even if an error occurred, it was not essential to the conviction, as the distinctive pattern of internet browsing pointed to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing 1.18 kilograms of cocaine concealed in frozen fish in suitcases brought from Jamaica.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused knew about the cocaine, as he claimed he had been duped into transporting the fish.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on his false customs declaration and misapprehended evidence concerning surrounding circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held that the false declaration was conduct occurring during the commission of the offence and could properly be considered as circumstantial evidence and in assessing credibility.

The court further found no misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge’s findings and upheld the inference that the appellant knew about the cocaine.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault following a group swarming attack and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by finding he was a direct participant rather than merely a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was entitled to make independent factual findings where the jury's verdict was ambiguous, and that the 12-month sentence was entirely proper given the planned and organized nature of the attack.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of nine years in custody for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

He argued the sentence exceeded the range for a first offender, violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused, and overemphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was justified by the totality principle, the appellant's role as a supplier with a higher quantum of drugs, and the trial judge's proper consideration of mitigating factors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing his appeal against convictions for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and failure to comply with a recognizance, and reducing his sentence to nine months.

The appellant argued the appeal judge erred regarding the application of W.(D.) and the test for an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no errors of law, and dismissed the fresh evidence application as the proposed evidence could not reasonably be expected to change the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that the offence occurred in 1999 as alleged in the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of the offence is not an essential element unless it is critical and the accused is misled or prejudiced.

The court found the appellant knew the case he had to meet and the date played no part in his defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting three utterances he made to officers at the scene and in failing to properly instruct the jury on how his limited English proficiency might affect the interpretation of those utterances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the utterances were voluntary and made before the appellant was detained, and that the trial judge's jury instructions adequately addressed the language barrier issue.

The appellant insurer appealed a Superior Court judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent for costs incurred in defending a slip and fall lawsuit.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding that issue estoppel did not bar the claim and that the underlying lawsuit triggered a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his 10-month sentence.

He argued that the trial judge was biased, the verdict was unreasonable, and his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to call him or other witnesses to testify and for abandoning a section 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, and that trial counsel's decisions fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that an Easement and Lake Water Supply Agreement had been conveyed to the appellant through an Assignment and Assumption of Contracts Agreement and a vesting order.

The motion judge erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the agreement had not been transferred.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and partial summary judgment granted declaring the agreement was conveyed to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order granting in part the respondents' motion for summary judgment, which struck out several paragraphs of his Statement of Defence.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in striking his defence of truth, which the motion judge found to be a collateral attack on previous factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's requests for other relief, including a declaration of bias and a transfer of the matter to Florida.

The appellant partnership appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action and awarding the respondent former partner damages on his counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's calculation of goodwill attributable to the respondent's capital account, his conclusion regarding the equity of subsidiaries, or his calculation of goodwill for retained clients.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The moving party, Prince Edward County Field Naturalists, sought to stay an order of the Divisional Court that reinstated a renewable energy approval for a wind energy project.

The project overlapped with the habitat of the endangered Blanding's turtle.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the proposed appeal raised serious issues of first impression in environmental law.

The Court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if the habitat was destroyed before the appeal could be heard, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new hearing regarding a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal judge had found that the hearing judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the Crown failed to raise a question of law of public importance or demonstrate a clear error of law requiring leave for the due administration of justice.

The Crown appealed the 90-day intermittent sentence and three years' probation imposed on a first-time offender for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The sentencing judge had erroneously concluded that a conditional sentence was statutorily unavailable for both counts and imposed a single global sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while a conditional sentence was unavailable for the loaded firearm count, it was available for the defaced serial number count.

The court substituted individual sentences totaling two years less a day, allowing the offender to serve the majority of the sentence in the community to continue her rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and resolving inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. formula or her reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence over the appellant's.

The appeal was dismissed.