Robert A. Blair

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had declared the three-year mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a five-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration that the mandatory minimum violates s. 12 of the Charter, relying on its companion decision in R. v. Nur.

However, the Court found that the trial judge made unsupported findings of fact that improperly mitigated the offence.

The Court concluded the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and requested further submissions to determine an appropriate sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter because it is grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonable hypothetical offender at the regulatory end of the spectrum.

The court declared s. 95(2)(a)(i) of no force or effect, but affirmed the appellant's specific sentence of time served.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from sexual activity with a complainant under the age of consent and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that, given the significant age difference, the complainant's youth, and the circumstances of the first meeting, a reasonable person would have taken significant steps to ascertain age, and the appellant took none.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the consecutive penitentiary sentences, including for possession of child pornography, were upheld under the totality principle.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual offences and internet luring involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by focusing on evidence relevant to the accused's subjective belief about the complainant's age, rather than the objective steps taken to confirm that belief.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, who was unrepresented at trial, appealed his conviction on the grounds that he did not receive a fair trial because he misunderstood the concept of wilful blindness and the evidentiary nature of disclosure material.

He also argued the trial judge applied an objective standard to wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant understood wilful blindness, the confusion over disclosure did not impact the trial's fairness, and the trial judge did not err in applying the wilful blindness doctrine given the overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a prescriptive easement over the respondents' parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellant's affidavit evidence failed to establish 20 years of continuous use prior to the property's transfer to the land titles system in 2002, as it did not comply with Rule 39.01(5).

Furthermore, the Court agreed that the use of the parking spaces was a matter of mutual convenience rather than 'as of right'.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Following the dismissal of the foreign tobacco defendants' jurisdictional appeals, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the appeals.

The appellants argued that costs should be capped at $100,000, asserting that the Crown treated the five appeals as one by filing a common factum.

The Court rejected this argument, finding no $100,000 ceiling exists for costs awards in the Court of Appeal.

Given the complexity, the $50 billion stakes, and the necessity of responding to five separate appeals, the Court fixed the Crown's partial indemnity costs at $237,332.50, apportioned between the BAT and RJR appellants.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order regarding the ownership of assets.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion, based on pleadings, correspondence, and subsequent conduct, that the parties intended to hold the assets 50% for each other regardless of legal ownership.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $11,000.

The appellants, acting as mortgagees, sold a 130-acre commercial property under power of sale for $12.5 million.

The trial judge found the fair market value was $16 million and awarded the respondent mortgagor $3.5 million in damages for an improvident sale, noting the appellants failed to adequately market the property or allow meaningful due diligence by potential buyers.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding bad faith, imposing liability without expert evidence of appraiser negligence, and calculating damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal test regarding the mortgagee's duty to take reasonable precautions to obtain fair market value and made no palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to live off the avails of prostitution of a person under 18 and aiding the complainant to engage in prostitution.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence of extrinsic misconduct, including text messages, online advertisements, and provocative photographs found on the appellant's computer and cell phones, which were not directly connected to the complainant.

The trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction to the jury warning against propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure was a reversible error, as there was a real risk the jury would use the evidence to conclude the appellant was a bad person likely to have committed the offences.

The curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action after the trial judge held that he failed to mitigate his damages by refusing an offer to return to the same position, at the same location, salary, duties, and benefits, shortly after a constructive dismissal.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapplied the governing mitigation principles and wrongly found no workplace acrimony sufficient to make re-employment unreasonable.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the framework from the leading Supreme Court authorities, made factual and credibility findings open on the record, and reasonably concluded that a reasonable person would have accepted the return-to-work offer.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

A non-party purported to appeal a vesting order made in a Family Law Act proceeding, claiming he had purchased a 50% interest in the subject cottage property prior to the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no standing as he was not a party to the original proceeding and had taken no steps in the Superior Court to be added as a party or to set aside the order.

The dismissal was without prejudice to any steps the appellant might take in the Superior Court.

The appellant law firm acted for the purchaser in a commercial real estate transaction.

After closing, the purchaser discovered a 0.3 metre reserve on the property that required a significant cost recovery payment to the municipality for road access.

The purchaser successfully sued the law firm for negligence.

On appeal, the law firm challenged the negligence finding and the dismissal of its cross-claim against the vendor for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the law firm failed to properly investigate the access issues raised by the reserve, and that the vendor had no legal or equitable obligation to disclose the unregistered cost recovery agreement.

The appellant owed the respondent bank approximately $275,000 on various accounts and defaulted.

The bank obtained summary judgment.

The appellant appealed, arguing he had paid the debt by presenting an instrument drawn on an account with no funds, which the bank mistakenly credited before it was dishonoured.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial as the debt had not been paid.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants were awarded costs for the motion in the amount of $15,000 against one respondent and $10,000 against the other.

The appellants were also awarded costs for the appeal in the amount of $12,000 against each respondent, for a total costs award of $49,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after striking a pedestrian in a parking lot.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to conduct a meaningful analysis of the mens rea component of the offence, specifically whether his conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea by inferring fault simply from the dangerous manner of driving without assessing all circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following a successful appeal that set aside orders directing an assessment of the appellant's legal fees, the parties submitted written arguments regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the appeal, including a previous motion to quash, at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes in favour of the appellant.

The Court also confirmed that any monies paid on account of the previous costs award must be returned.

Following a major apartment building fire, the owner and property manager were found liable as one defendant.

The appellant insured both the owner and property manager, while the respondent insured only the property manager.

After the respondent paid the full excess claim to the tort plaintiffs, it sought to recover half the amount from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision that the respondent was entitled to recover 50% from the appellant under the principles of equitable contribution and unjust enrichment, as the appellant retained an obligation to indemnify the owner.

PreMD retained Ogilvy Renault to manage its patent portfolio.

Ogilvy negligently failed to pay maintenance fees, causing two US patents to lapse.

PreMD's business ultimately failed, though the trial judge found the failure was due to lack of regulatory approval and market acceptance, not the lapsed patents.

The trial judge awarded PreMD $1,063,069 in reliance damages and mitigation expenses, rejecting claims for lost profits and broader reliance damages.

PreMD appealed, seeking $14.4 million in reliance damages for pre-contractual and post-contractual expenses.

Ogilvy cross-appealed the damages calculation and costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the additional expenses claimed by PreMD were not caused by the breach and would not have been recouped even if the patents had been maintained.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health facility.

He argued his risk could be managed on a conditional discharge and that his detention amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable given the appellant's lack of community support, history of elopements, and substance abuse issues.

The Court also rejected the Charter argument, noting the detention was not a probable period of indefinite incarceration as the facility offered necessary programming for potential future reintegration.