Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and breach of trust by a public officer.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, finding a key witness credible, and applying the elements of fraud.

The appellant had submitted false travel expense claims to the government, claiming $217 per trip while only paying $50 and pocketing the difference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility.

The court also held that the element of deprivation for fraud was met, as the government would not have paid the claims had it known the truth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing that evidence seized pursuant to a telewarrant should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient and contained a false statement regarding the unavailability of a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal conducted a Grant analysis and concluded that the officer's conduct was not a serious Charter breach, as the statement, though sworn without personal knowledge, was factually true.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to address two Charter applications, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in refusing a conditional discharge.

The court held that the Charter applications were unsupported by particulars or sought remedies beyond the Board's jurisdiction or irrelevant to the annual review, found no material misapprehension of evidence, and concluded that continued detention was adequately supported by the Board's reasons.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions permitting community living.

The appellant argued that the Board’s finding of significant risk to the safety of the community was unsupported by the evidence and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the case was close, the evidence of the treating psychiatrist concerning the risk of a return to fire-setting and threatening behaviour supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (a farm tractor).

He argued he was denied an adjournment at the Summary Conviction Appeal Court and that the trial judge erred by finding dangerous driving without expert evidence on tractor operation and by inferring danger from the accident itself.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal due to a misunderstanding about procedure but dismissed the appeal.

The Court found ample evidence of dangerous driving, including ignoring police officers and driving erratically, and held that expert evidence was not required as the risks were plain and obvious.

The parties separated in 1998.

The respondent commenced an action in 1999, and the appellant counterclaimed for spousal support and other relief.

The action was dismissed for delay in 2003.

In 2011, the appellant commenced a new application for spousal support and other relief.

The motion judge stayed the entire application, finding the spousal support claim was statute-barred under the former Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the spousal support claim was statute-barred, subject to the appellant's right to seek an extension under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, lifting the stay on the other claims for relief and referring them back to the motion judge, as only interim spousal support was before the court.

The appellant appealed sexual assault convictions arising from allegations involving children within a family household and argued, among other things, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to credibility, failed to resolve testimonial inconsistencies, and relied on a critical factual finding without permitting response.

The court held that the reasons disclosed no unbalanced scrutiny, that the trial judge adequately addressed inconsistencies and explained which portions of the evidence were accepted or rejected, and that any inconsistency concerning the timing of a child’s birth was immaterial.

The court also rejected the fresh evidence application because the corrected birthdate would not have affected the trial result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to restore a personal injury action to the trial list seven years after it had been struck.

The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff seeking restoration under rule 48.11 bears the burden of showing both an acceptable explanation for the litigation delay and that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

On the record, there was no satisfactory explanation for the prolonged delay, and the respondent demonstrated actual prejudice arising from unavailable medical records, the destruction of discovery recordings, and faded witness memory.

Motions to adduce fresh evidence were also dismissed because the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the result.

The appellant challenged a status hearing order dismissing his civil action for delay arising from real estate transactions and sought leave to appeal costs.

The Court of Appeal held that the status hearing judge correctly applied the rule 48.14(13) framework, under which the plaintiff bears the burden to provide an acceptable explanation for delay and show that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The court rejected the submission that the rule 24.01 dismissal test should govern status hearings, emphasizing that the two mechanisms are distinct.

It also upheld the finding that the moving party bore primary responsibility for the prolonged inactivity and that the deaths of two material witnesses created severe prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed and costs of $10,500 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants challenged a regulatory decision reducing a power generator's proposed revenue requirements for nuclear compensation costs during a forward test period.

The Court of Appeal held that future compensation costs mandated by existing collective agreements were committed costs, not forecast costs that could simply be managed downward.

The Board acted unreasonably by relying on hindsight and current benchmarking information unavailable when the collective agreements were made, and by failing to conduct a prudence review based on what was known or ought to have been known at the time of the commitments.

The matter was remitted to the Board for rehearing in accordance with those principles.

The plaintiff RCI entered into an agreement to manufacture and install assembly lines for TMG in Ontario.

TMG later substituted its subsidiary TMC as the purchaser, allegedly providing assurances alongside its bank, Sparkasse, that they would guarantee payment.

When TMC failed to pay, RCI sued TMG and Sparkasse in Ontario for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding no jurisdiction simpliciter and that Ontario was forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on the tort and contract occurring in Ontario, the forum selection clauses did not apply to the guarantee claims, and the defendants failed to show Germany was clearly a more appropriate forum.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge made a mathematical error in calculating pre-sentence custody credit (dead time).

The Crown agreed with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a sentence of 14 months and 3 days.

Ontario sued foreign and domestic tobacco manufacturers under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009 to recover health care costs.

Six foreign defendants brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, which was dismissed.

The foreign defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory claim was analogous to a tort committed in Ontario, establishing a presumptive connecting factor under the Van Breda framework.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's findings that Ontario established a good arguable case and affirmed the costs award.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and related offences against his stepdaughter.

At trial, the judge excluded a portion of the child's video-recorded police interview, finding that her unresponsiveness during cross-examination violated the accused's Charter rights to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by making the exclusionary order without hearing submissions from the parties and by failing to consider the primary purpose of section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, which is to preserve a child's best recollection.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife.

At trial, both parties testified to engaging in dominant/submissive sexual role playing, but gave conflicting accounts of the night in question.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding the complainant more credible.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by approaching the case as a credibility contest, making key findings of fact on a balance of probabilities, and failing to consider whether the evidence as a whole raised a reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, alleging that the hospital report contained falsehoods.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the disposition was well-founded on the evidence and that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant lacked sufficient reliable information from confidential informants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if some information was excised, the ITO as a whole provided a sufficient basis for the warrant to issue due to independent corroboration of the informants' tips regarding the location and the individuals involved in drug trafficking.

As the warrant was valid, the court did not need to address the appellant's arguments under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed an order making his two biological children Crown wards with no access.

The appeal was dismissed for delay at a status hearing when the appellant failed to appear.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued the notice of the status hearing did not adequately warn that the appeal could be dismissed.

The Court of Appeal agreed the notice was deficient but dismissed the appeal, finding no appealable error in the underlying wardship decision and concluding no useful purpose would be served by remitting the matter.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after being arrested with four kilograms of cocaine.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to issue a material witness warrant for a person he believed was the confidential informant who tipped off the police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no evidence the proposed witness was a state agent or would provide material evidence on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for failing to comply with a probation order and uttering threats, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's delusional disorder, lack of insight, and continued threat to the community.

The fresh evidence would not have affected the outcome.