Peter D. Lauwers

The appellants sought an adjournment of their appeal, citing illness and lack of preparation, which was denied by the Court of Appeal.

The court proceeded with the appeal in writing, finding it to be without merit and brought primarily for delay.

The court upheld the application judge's finding that the lease was properly terminated and that the tenants owed rent arrears, dismissing the appeal with costs.

The appellant, Ryan Gomboc, appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking cocaine.

He challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the validity of a search warrant for one of his residences (6 Gibbon Drive), specifically arguing that the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) misled the issuing justice and that there were insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The trial judge had found the search warrant for another residence (32 Royal Oak Drive) invalid but admitted the seized cellphone under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the affiant did not mislead the justice and that there were sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to search 6 Gibbon Drive based on the appellant's conduct and police observations.

Consequently, a new s. 24(2) analysis was deemed unnecessary.

The appellant, Gary Willett, appealed his convictions for child abduction, assault, and theft over $5,000.

He brought a fresh evidence application, including the complainant's testimony from his wife's separate trial, which significantly differed from previous evidence.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence should be admitted and the convictions quashed.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer criteria, finding the new evidence admissible as it undermined the complainant's credibility and the reliability of his original testimony, thereby affecting the safety of all verdicts.

Consequently, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

This appeal addresses whether Canadian law recognizes an Islamic bare talaq divorce, performed in Ontario and subsequently registered with Egyptian governmental agencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in recognizing the divorce under s. 22(3) of the Divorce Act.

The Court clarified that administrative registration of a divorce does not equate to the "granting" of a divorce by a competent authority, as required by the Act.

Furthermore, the Court held that the parties lacked a real and substantial connection to Egypt at the time of the divorce, and that recognizing such a divorce would be contrary to Canadian public policy, particularly due to its unilateral nature and the potential for forum shopping.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court's order and allowing the appellant's spousal support claim to proceed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of awareness of potential immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding it unbelievable that the appellant, given his prior immigration history, was unaware of the potential consequences.

However, the court allowed the appeal against sentence, varying it to reflect the joint submission that had been made at the time of the guilty plea.

This appeal addresses issues of jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conveniens in a complex international insurance coverage dispute.

Vale and RSA initiated actions in Ontario seeking coverage for environmental liabilities, primarily in Ontario, after Travelers commenced a similar action in New York.

The motion judge largely found Ontario had jurisdiction and was not forum non conveniens, except for North River.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurers' appeals, affirming Ontario's jurisdiction over them, and allowed Vale's appeal, finding Ontario also had jurisdiction over North River.

The court emphasized that a comprehensive general liability insurer underwriting Ontario risks connects itself to Ontario for jurisdictional purposes, and that the "first-to-file" rule does not automatically determine the appropriate forum.

This appeal concerns the application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP provision, s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, in a defamation action arising from negative online reviews posted by a client against contractors.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the public interest in the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by unduly focusing on SLAPP hallmarks, failing to adequately consider reputational harm, and not qualitatively assessing the value of the respondent's vitriolic expression.

The Court conducted a fresh analysis, concluding that the significant harm to the appellants' professional reputations outweighed the minimal public interest in the malicious and scurrilous statements, reinstating the defamation action.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing consent and credibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was intelligible, coherent, and based on the totality of the evidence, particularly the implausibility of the appellant's account and the plausibility of the complainant's testimony and physical state.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The appellant, Kevin Hanse, appealed his convictions for two firearm offences (attempting to obtain possession of a firearm and transferring ammunition) and his sentence.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence, with the defence challenging the admissibility of expert and lay witness testimony regarding code words for firearms and marijuana.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh post-sentencing evidence concerning a workplace injury and argued the trial judge erred in assessing aggravating factors and imposing a consecutive sentence for a marijuana trafficking offence to which he had pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding no error in the sentencing principles or the fitness of the sentence.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal on drug and firearm possession and conspiracy charges arising from contraband found in a storage locker and hidden vehicle compartments.

The accused had repeatedly accompanied a co‑conspirator to a storage locker used as a drug stash house and later exercised exclusive control over the co‑conspirator’s vehicle containing large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, and a handgun.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in removing the case from the trier of fact.

Applying the directed verdict framework, the circumstantial evidence could support reasonable inferences of participation in the drug conspiracy.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Mark Sheldon Roberts appealed a 2020 Ontario Review Board disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the 2020 disposition had been superseded by a 2021 disposition, and new criminal charges and re-admission to a secure forensic unit at CAMH had rendered the factual record stale.

The court reiterated the principle of not deciding moot cases, especially in Review Board matters where no effective remedy can be given for a spent disposition.

This is an appeal from an order granting the respondent leave to amend his Answer seven years after filing, to advance constructive and resulting trust claims in three properties purchased during the marriage and held in the appellant’s name, but sold before the motion for leave to amend.

The appellant argued prejudice due to timing, that claims were statute-barred, and lack of jurisdiction over foreign land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision that leave to amend was proper, the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied to the trust claims even after property sale, and the in rem jurisdiction issue was not relevant to the leave to amend motion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising arguments of insufficient reasons from the trial judge, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous findings regarding evidence that confirmed the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the scrutiny of evidence balanced, and the corroborating evidence (specifically the complainant's demeanour) properly considered, despite some disagreement with the trial judge's assessment of one piece of corroborating evidence.

Stuart Murray, convicted of fraud, sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and uninformed due to his mental state and unexpected collateral consequences from Law Society proceedings.

The Crown opposed, citing delay and lack of merit.

The motion judge granted the extension, finding that psychiatric evidence raised sufficient doubt about Murray's cognitive functionality at the time of the plea and adequately explained the delay, thus warranting an appeal on the validity of the guilty plea.

This is an appeal from summary judgment dismissing the appellant’s action claiming damages for malicious prosecution.

The underlying criminal prosecution rested on allegations that the appellant fraudulently received social assistance.

The appellant raised several grounds of appeal, including errors regarding partial summary judgment, the determinative nature of prior judicial determinations on reasonable cause, sufficiency of reasons, and failure to infer malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's approach and upholding the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.

The appellants, construction lien claimants, appealed a Divisional Court decision that granted priority to a vendor-take-back mortgage, including interest and enforcement costs, over their lien claims.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's ruling, holding that the priority of prior mortgages under s. 78(3) of the Construction Act extends to arrears in interest and enforcement costs, consistent with long-standing judicial interpretation and practice, and that a vendor-take-back mortgage constitutes an "advance" for the purposes of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a failed real estate transaction.

The appellant vendor sued the respondent purchaser for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and sought loss of bargain damages.

The motion judge found the respondent liable but erred in calculating damages by relying on expert evidence instead of the difference between the APS price and the actual resale price.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where a vendor reasonably mitigates damages by reselling the property in an arm's length transaction, the loss of bargain damages are the difference between the original APS price and the resale price, and expert evidence is not required.

The cross-appeal, which challenged the pre-judgment interest rate and the deduction of interest on the deposit, was dismissed.

The appellant, Akada Bruce, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The sentence appeal was resolved by joint submission from counsel, varying the original sentence to a conditional sentence of 583 days, accounting for time served.

The appellant, Prof. Starson, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in concluding he remained a significant threat to public safety, failing to consider a conditional discharge as the least onerous disposition, and providing direction to the Hospital instead of ordering a discharge plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's decision.

The court upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked insight into his mental illness and would pose a significant public risk without medication, justifying a detention order.

The court also found the Board's direction to the Hospital regarding a discharge plan was appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, alleging misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous reliance on the complainant's apparent lack of animus.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's memory and exculpatory text messages, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly used the complainant's apparent lack of animus to bolster her credibility.

These errors, in their cumulative effect, detrimentally impacted the reasoning process and rendered the conviction unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.