First degree murder

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought bail pending his conviction appeal.

The Crown opposed the application based on the public interest criterion.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, requiring the applicant to show the appeal is not frivolous, they will surrender, and detention is not necessary in the public interest.

While the surrender criterion was met, the court found the grounds of appeal weak, particularly the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Considering the gravity of the first-degree murder offence, its heinous circumstances (murder-for-hire), and the applicant's dangerousness, the court concluded that the reviewability interest did not outweigh the enforceability interest, and public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by release.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding blood spatter evidence and improper cross-examination regarding a gun.

The Court of Appeal found no error or unfairness in the first ground, ruling that the Crown was entitled to challenge the appellant's version of events with contradictory reliable evidence.

Regarding the second ground, while the Crown conceded the questions should not have been asked, the court found no trial unfairness given the brevity of the exchange, the lack of objection from defence counsel, and proper jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Brandon Drakes-Simon and Jason Williams for attempt murder, following their conviction for first-degree murder of the same victim.

The attempt murder involved a planned shooting on a highway.

The court identified several aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, possession of multiple illegal guns, Drakes-Simon's prior gun convictions, extreme recklessness endangering others, and a judicial finding that the crime was a contract killing.

Mitigating factors for Williams included his lack of a prior criminal record and strong family support.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 years for Drakes-Simon and 11 years for Williams, both running concurrently with their life sentences for first-degree murder.

Dellen Millard and Mark Smich appealed their first-degree murder convictions for the death of Timothy Bosma.

The appeals raised issues concerning the admissibility and jury instructions on bad character evidence in a joint trial with antagonistic defences, jury instructions on planning and deliberation, and the propriety of closing addresses by the Crown and co-counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of corrective instructions for closing arguments.

The appellant, S.B., appealed his adult sentence for first-degree murder, arguing the youth court judge erred in finding him the shooter, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to consider the presumption of diminished moral culpability for young offenders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding that while the youth court judge erred by not explicitly applying the presumption of diminished moral culpability, a de novo analysis applying the correct principles still resulted in the imposition of an adult sentence due to the seriousness of the offence and S.B.'s demonstrated maturity and lack of rehabilitation.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arising from a home invasion robbery, on two grounds: alleged errors in jury instructions regarding the mens rea for murder as a party to the killing and the requirements for a party to be found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on party liability for murder and first-degree murder were proper, adequately related to the evidence, and did not require hypothetical scenarios not supported by evidence, distinguishing the case from R. v. Ferrari.

The appellant, Mark Staples, appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of his father and sister.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged errors by the trial judge regarding demeanour evidence, post-offence conduct instructions, discreditable conduct, circumstantial evidence, Crown's closing arguments, impermissible opinion evidence, and refusal to admit evidence of another unsolved homicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions, and concluded that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the substantial circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and post-offence cleanup.

The appellants, Jasmine and Richard Doxtator, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Their primary argument was that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the included offences of second-degree murder and manslaughter for Jasmine Doxtator, which they argued also impacted Richard Doxtator's trial.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, agreed that there was an "air of reality" to the lesser included offences for Jasmine Doxtator, and the trial judge's failure to leave these options to the jury constituted a legal error that tainted the verdict for both appellants.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both Jasmine and Richard Doxtator.

The appellant, Odain Gardner, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He was tried jointly with Erick Reid, who was convicted of manslaughter.

Gardner argued the trial judge erred by failing to properly relate material evidence to the issues for the jury and by giving an erroneous after-the-fact conduct instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's instructions were not perfect, they were adequate in conveying the central issues of identity and credibility to the jury.

The court also found no reversible error in the after-the-fact conduct instruction, noting it was not circular or prejudicial.

The appellant, Adrian Daou, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions made by the appellant to police while he was incarcerated and suffering from schizophrenia.

The lead investigator, Det. Monette, testified that he believed the confession was true, providing detailed reasons.

The Court of Appeal found this police opinion evidence inadmissible as it amounted to an opinion on the appellant's guilt and usurped the jury's function.

The trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction and by reiterating the officer's opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that the inadmissible evidence and lack of caution seriously risked dominating the jury's consideration of the confession's veracity and the appellant's guilt, thus resulting in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions concerning planning and deliberation and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and appropriately tailored to the jury's questions regarding the timing of planning and deliberation.

The court also affirmed that after-the-fact conduct is admissible circumstantial evidence that can be used to determine intent and distinguish between levels of culpability, including supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, provided proper cautions are given.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.

The appellant, Thanh Tung Phan, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged error in the disposition of a Garofoli application concerning the judicial authorization for surveillance and tracking, and an error in admitting evidence of a history of violence between rival gangs (Chin Pac and Asian Assassinz) to establish motive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Garofoli ruling, concluding that the authorizing justice had reasonable and probable grounds even after excising inaccurate information from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also found no error in admitting the gang evidence, determining its probative value for narrative, animus, and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially given the trial judge's careful instructions and the manner of admission.

The appellant, Mathew Hayes, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, raising nine grounds of appeal.

These grounds included allegations of police trickery in obtaining his statement, errors in denying third-party suspect applications, failure to disclose a Crimestoppers tip, denial of a directed verdict of acquittal, and misdirections in jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and the proper use of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's decisions or jury instructions.

The appellant, Marc Vickers, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking a new trial based on fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of unsworn, unrecorded hearsay statements from C.B. (the victim's son, also convicted of the murder) recanting his trial testimony and claiming sole responsibility for the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the admissibility requirements of necessity and reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, nor the cogency requirement.

The court emphasized that C.B. was available to testify, and his inconsistent recantations lacked inherent trustworthiness and adequate procedural safeguards.

The appellants, Brandon Barreira, Joshua Barreira, and Chad Davidson, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

Davidson had admitted to shooting the victim, Tyler Johnson, but claimed manslaughter, while the other appellants denied party liability.

The appeal primarily focused on the trial judge's jury instructions, arguing a failure to adequately relate the evidence to the issues, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder verdict.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions inadequate for failing to properly summarize and relate the evidence to the specific elements of the offence and party liability.

While the court determined that the first-degree murder verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence, the instructional errors necessitated a new trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder was ordered for all appellants.