Karen M. Weiler

The appellant pleaded guilty to parental abduction of a child under fourteen after taking his son to Libya and depriving the mother of contact for eleven years.

He appealed his sentence of 19 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by treating the guilty plea as a neutral factor, but concluded the sentence was fit and proper in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction.

The trial judge had found that the respondent had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel before a roadside screening device arrived, based on the late hour and the short, anticipated delay of five to ten minutes.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court substituted its own findings of fact, concluding the respondent had a cell phone and faced an unknown delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in substituting its findings, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and related charges following a stabbing outside a nightclub.

She appealed on the grounds that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of a co-accused's statement, failed to adequately instruct on eyewitness identification frailties, and erred in his handling of trial exhibits that went missing during jury deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a reversible error by instructing the jury that the co-accused's statement could be used as evidence for all accused.

The court also found errors in the identification and missing exhibits instructions.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, former senior officers and directors of Hollinger Inc., appealed an order compelling them to submit to questioning by an Inspector appointed under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

They argued that being compelled to answer questions in Canada would violate their Charter rights against self-incrimination, as their answers could be used against them in ongoing criminal proceedings in the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were not entitled to a constitutional exemption because the Canadian inquiry was fact-finding rather than prosecutorial.

The Court also declined to stay the order, noting that the application judge had established a procedure to rule on specific questions and craft protective mechanisms on a case-by-case basis.

The testator's will left the family home to his son, provided the son was not convicted of a criminal offence before reaching the age of 21.

The son was convicted of several criminal offences at age 17.

The application judge held that the condition was a condition subsequent, its operation should be postponed until the son reached the age of majority (18), and alternatively granted relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal allowed the executor's appeal, finding that the son was capable in law of committing criminal offences at age 17 and therefore breached the condition.

The Court further held that relief from forfeiture was not available as the son was not faultless and the condition was not a penalty clause.

The appellant, an aboriginal man found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety and failed to adequately consider his aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Board has a positive duty to ensure unique factors associated with aboriginal accused are considered under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, the failure to elicit more information in this case did not amount to a reversible error.

The appellant, a public school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats against a former student.

He appealed his convictions, alleging errors in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the Vetrovec warning, and his failure to testify, as well as the admission of the complainant's videotaped statement.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer allegedly prevented him from testifying.

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence as manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions, rejecting the fresh evidence and ineffective assistance claims, and deferring to the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, sexual touching of a young person, and inviting a young person to touch him for sexual purposes, arguing multiple errors in the jury charge and seeking relief from a four-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly prevented the jury from speculating about collusion where no evidentiary foundation had been laid through cross-examination, and that the charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the defence position and the relevance of prior inconsistent statements to credibility.

On sentence, the court found no misapprehension of the psychologist’s evidence, no error in principle, and no basis for a conditional or intermittent sentence given the breach of trust, criminal record, and need for denunciation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding the respondent's statement to police, improperly leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury, and refusing to allow expert DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant's evidence suffered from many frailties and improbabilities, and that any errors made by the trial judge were harmless and would not have affected the outcome.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging disability discrimination by his former employer.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry under s. 36 of the Human Rights Code because the employer had made an adequate settlement offer, which the appellant refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Commission was entitled to consider the settlement offer, which was not privileged against the Commission, and that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York while volunteering for post-9/11 relief work.

She sued her New York supervisor, who was driving the vehicle, in Ontario.

The defendant moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, noting the plaintiff's extensive medical treatment in Ontario, the pre-existing relationship between the parties, the defendant's insurance coverage, and the mandatory Ontario venue for the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all relevant factors, including rehabilitation, and appropriately emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The court concluded there was no error in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The defendants appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay a proposed class action in favour of arbitration.

The plaintiff brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was precluded by s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the motions judge's decision was interlocutory because she deferred the final determination of whether the dispute should be arbitrated to the certification stage of the class proceeding.

As the order was not final, s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act applied to bar the appeal.

The appellant challenged the jurisdictional and constitutional validity of a City of Toronto by-law requiring restaurant operators to post the results of food premises inspections.

The appellant argued the by-law conflicted with provincial health legislation and infringed freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the city had jurisdiction to enact the by-law under its business licensing powers and that the by-law did not unjustifiably infringe Charter rights.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable on a mortgage.

They argued they were not liable because they did not sign the agreement of purchase and sale, although their son directed title to be taken in all three names and they signed the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the defence of non est factum was answered by Marvco Colour Research Ltd. v. Harris, and that bald allegations of fraud did not raise a triable issue.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant, staying his previously instituted proceedings, and requiring him to obtain leave before instituting further proceedings.

He also appealed a costs order of $21,000 and the dismissal of two other motions.

The Court of Appeal found the appeals to be without merit, noting the appellant's unfounded allegations of bias against judges.

The appeal was dismissed, the vexatious litigant order was confirmed, and costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The appellant, a wholesale distributor of fresh fruit, suffered produce spoilage due to a widespread power failure that caused its refrigeration equipment to stop working.

The respondent insurer denied the claim based on exclusion clauses for mechanical/electrical breakdown and changes of temperature.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the insurer and refused the appellant's request for an adjournment to file evidence on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the refusal to grant an adjournment would not have affected the result and that the change of temperature exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous.

The appellant was convicted of assault after striking a store employee who confronted him for shoplifting.

He appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that he was suffering from diabetic shock during the trial, which impaired his ability to participate.

The appeal judge dismissed the application and the appeal.

On further appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued the appeal judge erred in rejecting the fresh evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the fresh evidence ruling and concluding the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The Court also declined to hear new grounds not raised below.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

Police officers responded to a 911 call about armed men and lawfully detained the respondent and his passenger in their vehicle.

After a pat-down search yielded no weapons, officers searched the vehicle and found cocaine and ecstasy in a zippered case in the glove compartment.

The trial judge found the extended vehicle search violated section 8 of the Charter as it was not reasonably necessary, and excluded the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officers could have easily verified the respondent's innocent explanation instead of conducting the extended search.