Karen M. Weiler

The appellant insurer appealed an order appointing an appraiser under s. 128(5) of the Insurance Act, arguing the policy was void due to a material change in risk under Statutory Condition 4.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that liability remained a live issue because the insurer chose not to cross-examine the insured on her affidavit asserting a valid policy.

The court noted that even if a breach occurred, relief from forfeiture might be available, making the appraisal process appropriate for resolving valuation issues.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an unprovoked attack on two intoxicated victims outside a bar.

He appealed his convictions and six-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his alibi evidence, failed to assess the reliability of identification evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and improperly admitted reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed both the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, and imposed a fit sentence given the serious, premeditated nature of the assaults.

The father appealed an order refusing to vary custody and access, and varying child support and costs.

The mother cross-appealed seeking additional retroactive child support for 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusions that there was no change in circumstances regarding custody and access, and that the limitation on retroactive support was within the judge's discretion given the father's other financial obligations.

The appellant appealed the custodial portion of his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence greater than the joint submission.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and reduced the custodial sentence to time served in accordance with the joint submission, while leaving the three-year probation term unchanged.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm arising from two encounters with the complainant, and sought leave to appeal a total five-year penitentiary sentence.

The court rejected challenges to the admissibility of expert medical evidence on sexual assault-related injuries, the provision of transcripts to the jury, the charge on credibility, mens rea, bodily harm, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that consent is vitiated for sexual assault causing bodily harm only where the accused both intended and caused bodily harm, the court held that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred on the evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and two co-accused were jointly charged with sexual assault.

The jury convicted the appellant but acquitted the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were unreasonably inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that independent confirmatory evidence against the appellant, including DNA evidence and after-the-fact conduct, provided a rational basis for the jury to distinguish his culpability from that of his co-accused.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to cross-examination on prior sexual history, the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and the admission of post-offence conduct.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision, arguing that once a breathalyzer technician submits a breath sample and the instrument produces a result, the sample is automatically deemed 'necessary to enable proper analysis' under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, removing any discretion to reject it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statute contains no such limitation and agreeing that the trial judge erred in concluding the technician lacked discretion to reject an unsuitable sample.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred regarding the burden of proof and in assessing the evidence of surveillance officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly understood the burden of proof, did not draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to testify, and made no error in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police witnesses.

The appellant pharmaceutical company sued the respondents for defamation arising from radio and internet broadcasts, as well as statements made in the House of Commons.

The appellant failed to serve a notice of defamation prior to commencing the action, as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the defamation claims, confirming that the notice requirement applies to non-media defendants and that failure to provide notice is an absolute bar to the action.

The Court also upheld the striking of claims based on statements made in Parliament due to absolute parliamentary privilege.

The respondent dentist sued his former lawyer for deceit and breach of a barter arrangement after the lawyer falsely claimed for years that the dentist's actions were proceeding to trial.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 for deceit due to office disruption and $15,467.65 for unpaid dental services under the barter arrangement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the deceit damages, finding no evidence of actual financial loss, but upheld the damages for the barter arrangement.

Trial costs on a substantial indemnity basis were reduced from $55,000 to $40,000.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, harassment, and threatening his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. test, assessing credibility due to interpreter issues, and failing to address inconsistencies and good character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and demonstrated no error in assessing credibility or applying the burden of proof.

The appellants defaulted on a mortgage held by the respondent, who subsequently attorned rents, took possession of the property, and sold it under a power of sale.

The respondent sued for the deficiency, while the appellants counterclaimed for damages, alleging improper procedures and mismanagement.

The trial judge dismissed the deficiency claim and awarded the appellants reduced damages.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the respondent's right to take possession and sell the property but found the trial judge erred in valuing the property based on an internal memorandum and failed to properly assess whether the respondent breached its duties as a mortgagee in possession.

The matter was remitted for a new trial on the issues of mismanagement, valuation, and the deficiency claim.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after driving impaired the wrong way on a 400-series highway.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment and forcing him to proceed unrepresented after his counsel was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant was manipulating the system to delay the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the nine-year imprisonment term due to the severe aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating the victim to death.

At trial, the appellant's core defence was that he was not present when the victim was killed, but he also relied on the defence of provocation based on an alleged unwanted sexual advance by the victim.

The trial judge left provocation to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury charge on provocation was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality on both the objective and subjective elements, and therefore should not have been left to the jury.

As the jury had to find the appellant committed murder before considering provocation, the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant financed insurance premiums for the respondent, taking an assignment of the right to receive any unearned premiums as security.

After the respondent defaulted and obtained CCAA protection, the appellant sought to enforce its security.

The motion judge held that the appellant's security interest was not perfected because it was not registered under the PPSA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the assignment of unearned premiums is a transfer of an interest in or under a policy of insurance, which is exempt from PPSA registration under s. 4(1)(c) of the PPSA and s. 138 of the Insurance Act.

The Crown appealed an order quashing authorizations to take DNA samples from two respondents convicted of multiple murders.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 487.055(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which permits DNA sampling for offenders convicted of 'more than one murder committed at different times'.

The Court of Appeal rejected the application judge's 'transaction' analysis but affirmed the result, holding that 'different times' requires the murders to be distinguishable in nature or quality.

Because the murders committed by both respondents occurred in close proximity and were not distinguishable in nature or quality, the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The court ordered that an order go in terms of the draft order filed by the parties.

The appellants abandoned their appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs of $7,500 to the Clarkson respondents and $4,000 to the City of Hamilton as per a settlement.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

As the matter was settled between the parties and the appeal was unopposed, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal without commenting on the merits and made no order as to costs.

The appellants were convicted of second-degree murder and manslaughter in a gang-related shooting.

At trial, the francophone co-accused requested trials in different official languages, leading the trial judge to conduct a bilingual trial.

The trial judge also admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim before his death under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the bilingual trial was permissible under the Criminal Code and did not violate the appellants' language rights.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's statements by improperly relying on extrinsic evidence and mere consistencies to establish threshold reliability.

The Court also found a significant error in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and the absence of evidence (the 'Miller' error).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.