Karen M. Weiler

The appellants appealed a decision applying the doctrine of res judicata based on prior CCAA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants were neither parties nor privies in interest to the prior proceedings.

The court noted that the appellants only participated as witnesses and that respondents' counsel had previously indicated that findings in the CCAA proceedings would not affect proceedings against other parties.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's disposition, noting it responded to the alternative section requested by the appellant and was supported by the evidence.

Although the appellant refused to cooperate with some conditions, he had been an exemplary patient in the hospital setting.

The appeal was dismissed, with the expectation that the Board would consider all relevant dispositions at the next annual review.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed his discharge at a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded their jurisdiction by weighing the defence of 'reasonable excuse', which falls outside the essential elements of the offence.

The appeal was dismissed, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge crafted a fit sentence at the time, compelling fresh evidence made it not in the interests of justice to re-incarcerate the appellant.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by two years of probation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment which found that although the respondent lawyers were negligent, their negligence caused no actual loss to the appellants.

The appellants argued the trial judge ignored evidence that settlement funds were a loan from their mother.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no credible evidence of a loan, and that the appellants would have proceeded with the settlement regardless of the lawyers' negligence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that his statements to police, which led to the discovery of his wife's cremated remains and forensic evidence in his home, were obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) and s. 7.

He also challenged the trial judge's use of his after-the-fact conduct to infer murderous intent and the assessment of expert bloodstain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches and no errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the parole ineligibility period was reduced to 13 years to accord with the parity principle for domestic murders.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a medium secure unit following a finding of not criminally responsible for public mischief.

The appellant argued he had been detained too long for a minor offence and that the Board failed to adequately consider the least onerous and least intrusive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory cap on detention relied upon by the appellant was not in force, and that the Board's reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated adequate consideration of the requirement to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed her sentence for fraud over $1,000.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence, noting the appellant reoffended while on probation, the length of time over which the offence occurred, the amount involved, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to vary the remaining 3.5 months of his conditional sentence to allow him to leave house arrest two days a week for business purposes.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and allowed the appeal, varying the sentence to permit the appellant to leave his residence on Mondays and Thursdays in the company of his spouse to examine job sites.

The appellant, the deceased's son-in-law, appealed a trial decision that found the deceased intended to gift his investments to his daughter (the respondent) by placing them in joint ownership.

The appellant argued the investments should form part of the estate residue, of which he was a joint beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the deceased actually intended to gift the beneficial interest to his daughter, making it unnecessary to rely on the presumption of advancement or resulting trust.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued that evidence of his criminal record should not have been admitted, that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on 'repeatedly communicated' instead of 'engaged in conduct', and that the reasonable doubt instruction was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the criminal record evidence was relevant to the complainant's reasonable fear, that communicating constitutes conduct, and that the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt.

The appellant pleaded guilty to six criminal offences and was sentenced to 75 days, reduced by five days for an alleged Charter breach related to a delayed bail hearing.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the five-day reduction was insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellants were stopped at an airport and searched on suspicion of being drug couriers.

Police seized approximately $61,445 in cash without a warrant.

The Crown applied for forfeiture under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The justice of the peace dismissed the application, ruling all hearsay evidence inadmissible, and ordered the money returned.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal, ruling hearsay admissible if credible, and ordered a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that the ordinary rules of evidence apply to s. 490(9) hearings, meaning hearsay is only admissible if it meets the necessity and reliability criteria.

The Court also held that the justice of the peace erred in automatically ordering the return of the money; the appellants must initiate a separate proceeding, such as a Charter application, to seek its return.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping and extortion after a retrial where they were self-represented.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing their request for an adjournment to retain counsel.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the appellants' right to counsel against the need to control the trial process, given the history of delays and the appellants' lack of diligence.

The court also found that the trial judge provided adequate assistance to the self-represented appellants and made no reversible errors regarding evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the refusal to grant an adjournment created an appearance of unfairness.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder after assisting his cousin in disposing of the bodies of two hitchhikers.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted under duress due to an implied threat from his cousin, who had just committed the murders in his presence.

The trial judge rejected the defence, finding no air of reality to the claim of an implied threat.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to appreciate the significance of witnessing an execution and by focusing incorrectly on the absence of a specific act or gesture.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with driving over the legal limit.

At trial, he argued that the warrantless seizure of his breath violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown called no evidence to establish that the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused bore the burden of proving the seizure was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, confirming that a warrantless seizure of breath is prima facie unreasonable and the burden shifts to the Crown to prove its reasonableness.

The appellant contractor sued the respondent bank for misrepresentation after the bank failed to advance a $150,000 loan to a mall owner to pay for renovations.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the bank had informed the contractor that the loan was conditional on a guarantor's signature.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The bank had represented that the loan was a sure thing and that the signature was a mere formality, knowing this was untrue and that the contractor would rely on it.

Judgment was entered for the contractor for the undisputed contract amount plus costs.

The appellants, two political candidates, were forcibly arrested by mall security guards for trespassing after soliciting in a shopping centre.

At trial, a jury found the arrest lawful but awarded damages to one appellant for excessive force.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether a forcible arrest was a reasonable course of action in the first place, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Asante-Mensah.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day and three years' probation for sexual assault and uttering threats.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding him a danger to the community and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the violence of the assault and the subsequent threats, which required denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a motion to extend the time to appeal a child protection order and dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was an unexplained delay in ordering transcripts and no merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized that delay is of particular concern in child protection proceedings where expeditious resolution is in the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.