Karen M. Weiler

The parties, equal shareholders in a land development company, reached a deadlock.

The trial judge ordered the company wound up and gave the appellant the first right to buy the respondent's shares at fair market value.

After the parties failed to agree on a price, the trial judge fixed the share value and ordered a descending auction if the rights of refusal were not exercised.

The Divisional Court set aside this order and directed a public auction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by abandoning the valuation mechanism without notice, and the Divisional Court erred by removing the appellant's right of first refusal.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was defending himself and his property when he threatened to shoot police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had no legal justification for his actions, despite noting the police could have handled the situation with more sensitivity.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after driving a van with a friend on the hood, resulting in the friend falling off and suffering fatal injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make a specific finding that the driving was a marked departure from the norm, and by failing to consider all surrounding circumstances, including the victim's instigation and the appellant's youthfulness, in assessing wanton or reckless disregard.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral judgment released on January 20, 2006.

The court clarified that the new trial ordered for the appellant applied not only to the sexual assault conviction but also to the related counts of failing to comply with a recognizance and failing to comply with probation.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the counterclaim was in substance an action for damages for being sued and therefore did not disclose a valid cause of action.

The appellant husband appealed an order regarding support arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had sufficient material to infer that the husband's claim of inability to pay the arrears was false.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent wife.

The appellant husband, residing in Saskatchewan, obtained a provisional order to terminate spousal support.

The provisional order was sent to Ontario for a confirmation hearing because the respondent wife resided there.

The Ontario court found that not all evidence from Saskatchewan had been transmitted, failing to comply with s. 18(3) of the Divorce Act, but dismissed the motion for confirmation instead of remitting it back.

The Court of Appeal allowed the husband's appeal, holding that a proper record was essential, set aside the dismissal, and directed the matter be remitted for a confirmation hearing in Alberta, where the wife now resides.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a management contract.

The appellants argued that the earliest the respondents could terminate the contract was if they failed to meet the 2002 budget, and thus they were entitled to termination pay.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the contract was for a one-year term and was renewable only if the parties agreed on a sound business plan.

Since the parties could not agree on a plan, the contract was not renewed, and the respondents were not required to pay termination pay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that a denial in the statement of defence, when read with a letter from the respondent's counsel, did not constitute an admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to conclude there was no unambiguous concession and that the denial put the plaintiff to the proof of its allegations.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The appellant conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence, including animus, threats, and luring the victim to an ambush, capable of supporting the inference of planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed a decision granting permanent wardship of a child with no access, arguing that circumstances had substantially changed since the original decision, including the death of a younger child and the original foster mother, and the appellant's continuing efforts to improve parenting abilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence amply supported the lower courts' findings and that the changes did not alter the expert conclusion that permanent wardship with no access was in the child's best interests.

The court noted the child had been in a stable and loving foster home for three years and upsetting that stability would not be in the child's best interests.

The appellants, owners and employees of a body-rub parlour, brought an action challenging a municipal by-law regulating such establishments.

They alleged the by-law was a colourable attempt to prohibit body-rub parlours, trenching on federal criminal law power, and that it violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

They also claimed damages for misfeasance in public office and intentional interference with economic interests.

The motions judge granted the City's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellants raised triable issues regarding the colourability of the by-law and the s. 8 Charter claim concerning warrantless searches.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the tort claims and the s. 9 Charter claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay compensation to the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty in a failed restaurant venture.

The trial judge found the appellant breached his duty by causing his solely owned corporation to enter into a secret lease agreement with the partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Partnership Act did not preclude the respondent from suing in his own right, the respondent had not elected an exclusive remedy, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a breach of fiduciary duty or in the remedy awarded.

The Court also significantly reduced the respondent's costs claim, finding it excessive.

The appellant, SimEx Inc., acquired rights to certain films from IMAX Corporation under a Transfer Agreement.

A dispute arose when a third party, Robots of Mars, Inc., commenced arbitration in California claiming unpaid royalties under a prior Production Agreement with IMAX.

IMAX cross-claimed against SimEx, arguing SimEx assumed all liabilities under the Production Agreement.

SimEx applied for a declaration in Ontario that it was not bound by the Production Agreement's arbitration and royalty clauses.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the assignment conveyed both benefits and burdens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the unambiguous terms of the Transfer Agreement only transferred ownership rights to the films, not the contractual obligations of the Production Agreement.

The appellant, a lawyer, pleaded guilty to theft of funds from his trust account and received an 18-month conditional sentence.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional discharge and claiming he was denied the opportunity to address the court before sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge and concluding that the appellant suffered no prejudice as he was represented by competent counsel who made full submissions.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when a snowmobile track shredded while the defendants were attempting to start it.

The defendants sought a declaration that their automobile insurer (TD) and their property insurer (Germania) had a duty to defend the negligence action.

The motion judge found that TD had a duty to defend, as the injuries arose from the ownership, use, or operation of a motor vehicle, and that Germania did not, as its policy excluded such claims.

TD appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in admitting affidavit evidence regarding coverage preconditions and in finding a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the affidavit evidence was properly admitted as it only affected coverage and not liability, and that the negligence claims were inextricably linked to the use and operation of the snowmobile, thus falling within TD's coverage and Germania's exclusion clause.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and break and enter, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, relying on post-offence conduct, and accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness without confirmatory evidence.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant, while in custody, hired an accomplice to burn down his ex-girlfriend's chip stand and break into her home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, his use of a letter written by the appellant, or his reliance on the victim's testimony as confirmatory of the accomplice's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of two years less a day followed by three years' probation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons for conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in principle, noting the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's age of 78 and medical condition, which mitigated what would otherwise have been a three-year penitentiary term.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's medical condition was considered but did not alter the sentence, as it could be managed by prison authorities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed and the respondent cross-appealed an order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court's interpretation of s. 8 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and found no merit in the other grounds raised on the cross-appeal, including the costs order imposed by the Tribunal.

The cross-appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The Superintendent of Financial Services appealed a Divisional Court order that vacated a Tribunal's revocation of Sussman Mortgage Funding Inc.'s licence and substituted a lesser penalty with terms.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Tribunal erred by not allowing Sussman to make penalty submissions, but found the Divisional Court erred in law by failing to provide reasons for substituting the penalty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, remitting the matter to a differently constituted Tribunal to assess the penalty based on the original findings of conduct.