Karen M. Weiler

The respondents were charged with fraud related to the issuance of alleged native status cards.

They applied for state-funded counsel to raise a constitutional challenge based on their aboriginal heritage, without first applying to Legal Aid.

The trial judge ordered the Crown to fund the defence and pay costs of the application.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the funding and costs orders, holding that under R. v. Rowbotham, defendants must apply to Legal Aid or demonstrate futility before seeking a funding order.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal but failed to provide reasons capable of review.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged this error of law but reviewed the trial record directly.

The Court found that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, applied the correct standard of proof, and considered the evidence as a whole.

The verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a minor, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding inconsistencies in the child complainant's testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's charge was fair and adequately addressed the assessment of child testimony and inconsistencies.

The Court also held the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was ample evidence to support it and the inconsistency did not relate to an essential element of the offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the tort of deceit and ordering them to pay damages equivalent to US $7,832,083.00.

The trial judge found that the appellants falsely represented that computer equipment purchased from the respondents was destined for educational ministries in China and Australia in order to obtain special discounted pricing, when in fact the equipment was diverted to the grey market.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants made false representations, that the respondents relied on them, and that the deceit caused the respondents' loss.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence of a handgun and cocaine discovered during a search incident to arrest should have been excluded.

The appellant claimed he was unlawfully detained when police questioned him after observing him riding a bicycle on the sidewalk and fleeing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the officers acted in good faith, the search was minimally intrusive, and the offences were serious.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crack cocaine.

He argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and that the Crown failed to prove possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the subjective and objective tests for reasonable and probable grounds and reasonably inferred the purpose of trafficking.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation, reducing the 18-month sentence to time served plus two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors meant he had considered and rejected them.

Given the young age of the victim, the fact of penetration, and the threat of violence, the sentence was deemed fit, even having regard to the totality principle.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that an oral agreement existed between the parties.

The agreement provided that the respondent would provide exclusive management services to the appellants' retirement residences in exchange for a 5% value-added equity position upon termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion, which was supported by objective evidence, surrounding circumstances, and the history between the parties.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day, three years' probation, and a 12-year driving prohibition for criminal negligence causing death and impaired driving causing death.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to seriously consider a conditional sentence and appealed the length of the driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in prioritizing general deterrence through incarceration and that deference was owed to the driving prohibition imposed.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice under s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code regarding the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Murray Truscott, the parties sought directions on the scope of the issues.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the Reference is limited to the issue of fresh evidence, which means material not presented in prior court proceedings (including the 1966 Supreme Court Reference).

The Court further held that the Kaufman Report does not limit the evidence the parties can tender, and that transcripts from the Kaufman investigation are part of the record but must satisfy hearsay exceptions to be admitted for their truth.

The appellants, who had limited English proficiency, attended a settlement meeting regarding a motor vehicle accident claim.

The husband signed a release but allegedly instructed his solicitor to hold it until he consulted his wife, who was also a plaintiff.

The solicitor released the document to the respondent, and the appellants promptly instructed the solicitor to reject the settlement.

The motion judge enforced the settlement based on the solicitor's apparent authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider the wife's lack of agreement and the discretionary exceptions to enforcing settlements where there is a mistake concerning instructions and no prejudice to the defendant.

The appellant manufacturer sued a competitor and its employee for slander, inducement of breach of contract, and interference with economic relations after the employee allegedly told customers the appellant's product was dangerous.

The slander claim was withdrawn as it was outside the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge struck the remaining claims, finding they were an attempt to indirectly plead slander.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the economic torts were distinct causes of action that provided remedies for commercial losses not covered by slander, and were therefore not barred by the two-year limitation period.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent bank's motion for summary judgment based on minutes of settlement.

The appellants argued the motion judge misapplied the test for summary judgment, improperly dismissed their claim that the minutes were altered without permission, and made implicit factual findings on conflicting evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial, as the documentation clearly showed the appellants agreed to a $100,000 settlement on a $125,000 loan, and bald assertions in a self-serving affidavit did not create a triable issue.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay over $10.6 million to class action plaintiffs.

The appellant argued the loss was caused by his business being placed into receivership, not his fraudulent conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial as the appellant's guilty plea evidenced his fraudulent conduct as the cause of the loss.

The court also rejected the argument to limit the judgment to a specific sub-class, noting the damages were adequately assessed in a reference process.

The appellants, holders of Convertible Notes of Stelco, appealed an order establishing an expedited claims process to determine inter-creditor subordination claims in a CCAA restructuring.

The appellants argued they were entitled to a full civil trial process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the CCAA plan explicitly contemplated a timely process to determine entitlements to the turnover proceeds, and the supervising judge's discretionary scheduling order was entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault, and pointing a firearm after shooting an intruder who was stealing marijuana plants from his property.

The intruder was rendered a permanent paraplegic.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the burden of proof, propensity reasoning, and the treatment of defence expert evidence.

The appellant also appealed his eight-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the devastating consequences to the victim and the need to denounce and deter the use of firearms to protect illegal grow operations.

The corporate defendant appealed its convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, arguing it was not the 'employer' of a common carrier's driver who was injured on its site.

The Crown appealed the provincial offences appeal judge's decision to remit the defendant's s. 11(b) Charter delay motion for a rehearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, finding it was an employer because it controlled the workplace.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a corporate defendant cannot rely on presumed prejudice for s. 11(b) delay and must show actual prejudice to its fair trial rights, which it failed to do.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder, as well as his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

He argued the trial judge failed to provide a special instruction regarding identification evidence from neighbours who had picked out photos of other persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the standard instructions were adequate and noting no objection was made at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within the appropriate range given the brutal nature of the attack, the home invasion, and the finding that the appellant killed the deceased to eliminate a witness.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a marijuana grow operation, arguing that conditional sentences are normally given for such offences in the London area.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to consider the aggravating factors that the appellant's negligence caused a fire and that his young children and partner were present in the home.

The decision not to impose a conditional sentence was entitled to deference, and the global sentence was not unfit.