Karen M. Weiler

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction.

On the appeal against the four-year sentence, the Court of Appeal found no error by the trial judge, considering the offences and the appellant's criminal record.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed paragraph 4(d) of an order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the issue of jurisdiction, finding that the order was not made under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Costs were fixed at $7,000 all inclusive.

In supplementary reasons settling the order of a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal fixed the judgment awarded to the respondent franchisee at $208,632.26 and the appellant franchisor's counterclaim at $94,200, along with respective prejudgment interest.

Because the respondent ultimately recovered less than its trial settlement offer, the court varied the trial costs award from a solicitor and client basis to a party and party basis, reaffirming that distributive costs awards should be avoided.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for stabbing his wife.

At trial, he admitted to the killing but raised the defence of provocation, arguing he lost control after she made a comment implying infidelity.

He sought to introduce expert evidence on Islamic cultural views regarding female infidelity to support the subjective and objective elements of provocation.

The trial judge excluded hearsay evidence of the victim's statements to a hotel clerk and instructed the jury not to consider the appellant's cultural background for the objective 'ordinary person' test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay exclusion was a harmless error and that the provocation defence lacked an air of reality because there was no evidence the appellant personally held the cultural beliefs described by the expert.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge gave the appellant an enhanced credit of seven years for five years and three months of pre-sentence custody, effectively applying a 1.33-for-1 ratio instead of the usual 2-for-1 credit.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the judge erred by departing from the 2-for-1 practice without adequate explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's reasons clearly indicated the appellant posed a serious danger to society and was unlikely to receive early parole, which justified the departure from the normal practice.

The Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellant from a Superior Court decision under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.

The Society argued that because the Act states the judge's decision is 'final', no further appeal lies and the appellant must proceed by judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the word 'final' does not oust the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Courts of Justice Act, and the decision is appealable as a final order of a Superior Court judge.

The appellant, an aircraft maintenance company, negligently lost parts of an aircraft left in its possession for repair and storage.

The appellant claimed a lien for its unpaid repair and storage charges.

The respondent bank, which held a security interest in the aircraft, took possession and received insurance proceeds for the lost parts.

The appellant argued that the bank could not set off the cost of the lost parts against the lien claim because of an alleged agreement that the aircraft owner would insure against loss, and to prevent double recovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the insurance was not obtained to protect the appellant from its own negligence, and applying the principle that a wrongdoer cannot benefit from an innocent party's insurance.

The bank was entitled to equitable set-off.

The appellants appealed an order requiring indemnification under an all risk insurance policy for losses of perishable food following a massive power failure in southern Ontario.

The court held that the blackout, not the lack of refrigeration, was the proximate cause of the direct physical loss.

It agreed that ambiguity in the exclusion clauses had to be construed in favour of the insured and distinguished prior authority based on materially different policy wording.

The appeal was dismissed, and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order granting a divorce judgment, arguing that the respondent was improperly served.

The appellant had served the respondent's solicitor's clerk with the divorce petition, but the respondent did not file an acceptance or admission of service.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no proper service under Rule 6(3)(b) of the Family Law Rules, as service of the application initiated a new case and there was no lawyer 'in the case' yet.

The appeal was allowed, the divorce judgment was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant challenged historical sexual offence convictions and custodial sentences arising from Youth Court and Superior Court proceedings, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal applied the governing incompetence and miscarriage of justice framework and held that most factual predicates for the complaints were not established, while one impugned cross-examination in the Superior Court proceedings, though bordering on incompetence, did not undermine trial fairness or verdict reliability.

The court also rejected the challenge to the Youth Court judge’s credibility assessment, finding proper self-instruction under the governing credibility principles.

Leave to appeal sentence in the Youth Court matter was granted but dismissed, and the sentence appeal in the Superior Court matter was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day of incarceration for an offence involving supplying alcohol to a 16-year-old CAS ward he was hired to protect and engaging in sexual intercourse with her despite her protests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's moral blameworthiness, which outweighed the restorative objective of a conditional sentence despite his expressions of remorse.

The appellants appealed an order reviewing their committal for trial on fraud-related charges.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that there was some evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the appellants engaged in deceit.

This included attracting investors who could not afford the loans, directing them to obtain loans for the benefit of a corporation, and withholding knowledge that the corporation could not make the promised loan payments.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pushing the complainant down the stairs, arguing the trial judge erred by determining credibility based solely on demeanour and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge that the trial judge considered all the evidence, recognized inconsistencies, and properly concluded the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

He argued the evidence only showed multiple sales to the same buyer, not an ongoing conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence of a conspiracy, including frequent contact, the pattern of transactions, the quantity of marijuana, and the buyer acting as a broker.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting that while the trial judge may have erred in treating the lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than just a factor against a conditional sentence, the sentence was appropriate given the quantities involved.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and possession of explosives in relation to a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in exchange for his testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, primarily focusing on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the unsavoury Crown witnesses, improperly gave a Vetrovec-like warning regarding a defence witness, and failed to instruct the jury properly on a hearsay statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that had excluded derivative evidence of the victim's severed head, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and police investigation deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's own questioning necessitated the admission of the head evidence to restore trial fairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, concluding the Crown presented an overwhelming circumstantial case.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to quash the respondents' convictions for assault and enter a stay of proceedings.

The respondents, two off-duty police officers, had been convicted at trial of assaulting a teenager during a wrongful arrest for car theft.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to explicitly advert to the dual purposes of character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge's treatment of the character evidence was adequate in the context of his credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal restored the convictions and remitted the sentence appeals to a different summary conviction appeal judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and sexual touching of a ten-year-old boy.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his treatment of a dissatisfied juror, in his instructions on assessing the credibility of a child witness, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the juror or his jury charge regarding the child complainant's credibility, and concluding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal on a charge of first-degree murder.

He conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some circumstantial evidence—including animus, threats, preparation, luring to an ambush, and obtaining a gun—capable of supporting the preliminary justice's conclusion that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 4-year sentence on the basis of an inadequate jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's 9-page charge was a 'skeleton charge' that ignored model jury instructions, failed to relate evidence to the elements of the offence, and failed to put the subjective element of self-defence to the jury.

The Court concluded this non-direction amounted to misdirection, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.