Karen M. Weiler

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder after a shooting outside a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a single identification witness who refused to answer questions during cross-examination by the defence.

The trial judge admitted the witness's evidence and provided an inadequate warning to the jury regarding the lack of cross-examination.

The trial judge also erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement of another witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence regarding the police manhunt for the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was undermined.

The plaintiff appealed an order striking its claim against the City of Toronto as statute-barred under the 15-year ultimate limitation period of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The alleged negligent act occurred over 27 years ago, but the plaintiff only discovered the claim in May 2004.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the transition provision in s. 24(5) Rule 1, because the claim was discovered after the Act came into force on January 1, 2004, the 15-year ultimate limitation period began running on that effective date.

Therefore, the claim was not statute-barred.

The appellants were convicted of offences under the Safe Streets Act and the Highway Traffic Act for squeegeeing and soliciting money from drivers of stopped vehicles on roadways.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires the province as criminal law, and that it violated their rights under sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power to regulate roadways.

While the provisions infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.

The court also found no violations of sections 7 or 15.

The young person pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death and received a disposition including a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the young person argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on general deterrence and sought a reduction of the prohibition to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disposition fit and supported by the principles of proportionality, meaningful consequences, and protection of the public under section 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for weapons offences and possession of cocaine, as well as his three-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding his arrest and the subsequent search, which yielded a loaded handgun and crack cocaine, to be lawful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the test for lawful arrest by assessing the totality of the circumstances to determine if the police officers' subjective belief was objectively reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court emphasizing the need for deterrence and community safety regarding firearms offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to report a change of address.

The Court of Appeal held that spending weekends at a girlfriend's house while keeping personal effects at his mother's house did not constitute a change of address.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At the police station, the accused's counsel demanded to question the breathalyzer technician about the investigation before advising the accused.

The technician refused, and the accused subsequently argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated.

The summary conviction appeal judge agreed and quashed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the technician was under no obligation to answer counsel's questions before counsel consulted with the accused, and the accused failed to prove he could not exercise his rights meaningfully.

The appellant appealed an order declaring an agreement of purchase and sale valid and granting the purchasers specific performance and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the essential terms of the contract were clear and binding.

The court upheld the application judge's findings that the property was unique, justifying specific performance, and that it was reasonable to calculate damages as of the date of judgment rather than the date of breach to account for the property's enhanced value pending planning approval.

The appellant, a former teacher at a boarding school, appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for eight counts of historical indecent assault involving seven students.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding unreasonable delay, admission of similar fact evidence, application of reasonable doubt, and refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on delay or similar fact evidence, deferring to the credibility findings, and upholding the three-year sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and lack of remorse.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for drug-related offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding a sufficient factual basis including the quantity of marijuana, cash, scales, and bags.

The court also declined to interfere with Count 7 due to trial counsel's concession.

However, the convictions of one appellant on Counts 4 and 5 were quashed because the absence of reasons by the trial judge prevented meaningful appellate review, as guilt was not the only possible verdict on the evidence.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to decline re-opening the case after the appellant had elected not to call evidence and realized a conviction was imminent.

The court also dismissed an identification issue.

However, the Crown conceded that Count 1 was not an included offence, and the court declined to amend the count, quashing the conviction on Count 1.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof when assessing the risk of eventual control in the community under s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the case did not turn on the burden of proof and that the trial judge had carefully weighed all the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of 16 counts of violence and sexual aggression against his former wife and was designated a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

He appealed the designation and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the evidence, including expert testimony that the appellant was at the highest risk to re-offend violently and had no reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, holding that questions of law should not be decided in the abstract and that the record's findings were not sufficiently clear to permit dealing with the legal question posed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering, negligence, and derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claims were properly struck for failing to plead sufficient facts, but found it was not plain and obvious that the pleadings could not be amended.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant the appellants leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and dispensing with his signature to facilitate a prior order.

At the hearing, the appellant sought an adjournment to adduce fresh evidence, which the Court of Appeal refused.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's refusal to stay the prior order or in the exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay a $3.3 million equalization payment, retroactive child support, ongoing child support, and costs including a $150,000 premium.

The core issues involved whether a cottage owned by the husband's numbered company constituted a matrimonial home, the valuation of his business, and the appropriateness of the support and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil regarding the cottage and accepted the business valuation and support orders.

However, applying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $150,000 costs premium.

The respondent wife's cross-appeal seeking higher pre-judgment interest was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada obtained an evidence-gathering order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow a French expert to examine a collection of Rodin plasters held at an art centre.

The collectors appealed, arguing the order amounted to an unauthorized search and seizure.

The application judge made a sending order but attached conditions requiring the Crown to pay storage costs, indemnify the collectors for damage, and pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the collectors' appeal, finding jurisdiction for the evidence-gathering order.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal, striking out the compensation and costs conditions as inconsistent with the general rule that costs are not awarded in criminal matters absent exceptional circumstances.

The appellants appealed a decision declaring their option to purchase a residential parcel of farmland void for contravening section 50 of the Planning Act.

The appellants had sold a 74-acre farm but entered into an option agreement to purchase back the residential portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the option agreement violated section 50(3) because the grantor retained abutting lands not within a registered plan of subdivision.

The Court further found that the agreement lacked an express condition requiring compliance with the Planning Act under section 50(21), and declined to rectify the contract due to a lack of evidence of a prior oral agreement to include such a condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that the combination of identification and confirmatory evidence made the verdict reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.