John I. Laskin

The self-represented appellants, former doctoral students, sought an extension of time to perfect their appeal from a motion judge's order striking their 187-page statement of claim against the university and its staff without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-factor test for extending time, focusing on the merits of the appeal.

While agreeing that most of the appellants' claims (including Charter, human rights, and intentional torts) were bound to fail, the Court found that claims for negligence and breach of contract regarding the university's handling of accommodation requests and tuition fees were not plainly and obviously doomed.

Concluding the appeal had sufficient merit, the Court granted a 30-day extension to perfect the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation claim against the County of Simcoe and its employee, as well as the substantial indemnity costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence of malice to defeat the respondents' qualified privilege in gathering information for an Ontario Works file.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the appellant's unproven allegations of fraud justified costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering against the defendants.

The motion judge found that the appellant failed to demonstrate a genuine triable issue regarding whether he suffered a 'visible illness' as a result of the defendants' conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the lack of medical evidence, and dismissed the appeal, including the appeal of the costs order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a recusal motion.

The appellant argued that the case management judge should have recused herself due to improper and inaccurate correspondence sent by the respondents' solicitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a reasonable, informed member of the public would not have concerns about the judge's impartiality based on the correspondence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent, Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1352, was awarded costs of $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent Tarion Warranty Corporation was also awarded costs of $11,000, as the appellant was unsuccessful in seeking relief against it.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent, a 17-year employee who failed to lock-out a machine and delayed reporting the safety violation.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial judge erred in relying on a comparator incident involving another employee whose violation was unknown to management at the time.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that dismissal without notice was a disproportionate response given the respondent's long, almost unblemished record and the fact that his mistake did not put others at risk.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its request to set aside a Notice of Disallowance of its claim in a consumer proposal.

The Court of Appeal agreed the motion should have been brought in Saskatchewan, where the proposal was filed, but found the motion judge erred by failing to consider transferring the proceedings under s. 187(10) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the motion transferred to the Court of Queen's Bench of Saskatchewan.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historic sexual offences against his niece and sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle should apply to stay one count, which the Crown conceded.

He also appealed his sentence, requesting that the five-year total be apportioned into consecutive sentences of less than two years each to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that courts cannot impose inadequate or artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's will on immigration matters, and that a sentence of less than two years for prolonged sexual assault of a child would be patently inadequate.

The appellant tenant appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had not validly exercised its lease renewal option.

The motion judge concluded that the parties' conduct did not amount to a waiver of the notice requirement and that post-deadline negotiations were for a new lease, not a renewal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the record supported the motion judge's conclusions and that the landlord did not act in bad faith by considering other tenant options.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving cocaine and a firearm found in a vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in upholding a police search of a black bag and in instructing the jury on constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable grounds to open the bag for officer safety and the jury charge was appropriate given the firearm was in plain view.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record fully supported the lower court's conclusion that the appellant is a vexatious litigant, noting the Federal Court had reached the same conclusion in 2006.

Costs of $6,100 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was injured when the respondent lost control of his vehicle on an icy road, crossed the centre line, and struck the appellant's stopped vehicle.

At trial, the respondent did not testify, and the jury found no negligence on his part, dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that crossing the centre line in breach of the Highway Traffic Act establishes a prima facie case of negligence.

Absent any explanation from the respondent to negate this evidence, the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant pleaded guilty to offences committed before the Truth in Sentencing Act came into force, but was charged after it came into force.

The trial judge applied the Act, limiting pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5 days for each day served.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Act should not apply retrospectively to offences committed before its enactment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 5 of the Act clearly displaces the presumption against retrospectivity by explicitly applying to persons charged after the Act came into force.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the police lacked justifiable grounds to search his house and that an officer exceeded his authority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was amply supported by evidence including a 911 call and plain view observations that justified a telewarrant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the forfeiture order was deemed reasonable and the sentence length was not challenged.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The principal respondents were awarded costs of $50,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent Cushman & Wakefield Ltd. was awarded costs of $10,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for aggravated sexual assault and other offences against a 13-year-old girl.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the age-related decline in recidivism and the potential for a long-term supervision order with mandatory drug treatment conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, given the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and deception of supervisors.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

At trial, the accused advanced an alternate suspect defence and claimed the police investigation was inadequate.

The trial judge excluded the Crown's proposed rebuttal evidence from the alternate suspect, instructed the jury that they must acquit if they could not decide which of the two men committed the murder, and repeatedly warned the jury about wrongful convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the rebuttal evidence, in giving the co-principal instruction where there was evidence of joint participation, and in repeatedly referencing miscarriages of justice in the jury charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences against a child family member and also appealed sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the appellant's statement to police was involuntary, applying the common law confessions rule and holding that he understood the consequences of speaking to police; in any event, any error was harmless given other admissible admissions.

The court also rejected attacks on the complainant's credibility, finding no failure to consider motive, contradictions, or the absence of more serious allegations.

However, the court held that a five-year penitentiary sentence exceeded the appropriate appellate range on the facts and reduced the sentence to four years.

The appellant appealed from convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in his approach to collusion between complainants, failed to address a specific defence submission, and unreasonably admitted a videotaped statement after a two-year delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the potential tainting of evidence, that the omitted defence submission would not have affected the outcome, and that the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion to admit the videotaped statement given the reasons for the delayed disclosure.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a pat-down search conducted by a police officer was unreasonable and that the trial judge's finding that the cocaine belonged to him was speculative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the search was conducted solely for officer safety and that the amount and value of the cocaine justified the inference of ownership.