John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a Rule 21 motion seeking to strike a condominium corporation’s action arising from alleged construction defects, including sanitary sewer failures and exterior cladding water penetration.

The court held that although Tarion’s warranty denial decisions were judicial and final for issue estoppel purposes, applying issue estoppel would work an injustice given the consumer protection purpose of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, the permissive language of the tribunal appeal provisions, the procedural limits of Tarion proceedings, and the advantage of resolving all claims in one forum.

The court further held that the civil action was not an impermissible collateral attack, that Tarion could be sued for payment from the guarantee fund, that the sanitary sewer allegations were not plainly outside the definition of major structural defect, and that the EIFS limitation argument failed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sued their former solicitors for negligence arising from a real estate transaction after being found liable in an underlying deficiency action.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim as statute-barred and an abuse of process, finding the claim was discoverable when the deficiency action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discoverable until the judgment in the deficiency action was released, given the solicitor's repeated assurances that he had not made an error and the absence of advice to the contrary from litigation counsel.

The Court also found the action was not an abuse of process.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents for allegedly causing it to overpay for surface rights to a parking garage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The Court held that the appellant had all relevant information by August 1, 2008, when a new purchaser took control of the board, but did not commence the action until November 8, 2010.

The Court also rejected the argument that the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, as the claims were framed in tort, contract, and breach of duty.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing an adjournment and denying leave to amend their Statement of Defence on the eve of trial.

The proposed amendments included pleading that the respondent was an employee rather than an independent contractor, adding a counterclaim for damages, and pleading an assignment of copyright.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the adjournment and agreeing that the proposed amendments were either statute-barred, failed to meet the test for withdrawal of an admission, or lacked sufficient factual basis.

The young person appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

The first statement was inadmissible due to non-compliance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the derived confessions rule, as the second statement was tainted by the first and the police failed to advise the young person that the first statement was inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing its application for a determination that the respondent tenant must pay $431,000 for parking lot repaving under its lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the application judge's conclusion that the work significantly extended the life of the parking lot and reduced operating costs, which were factual findings entitled to substantial deference.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $3,000.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's decision and concluding that the constitutional challenge could not succeed.

The Court also denied leave to amend the claim, holding that it was plain and obvious the claim was doomed to fail.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs, and the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs of the appeal in the agreed amount of $12,500, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's approval of a settlement entered into by the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian, as well as the approval of legal fees.

The Court of Appeal found ample basis on the record to support the motion judge's conclusions and noted there was no admissible medical evidence to support an order to continue the proceeding without the litigation guardian.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim against the respondent doctor.

The appellants argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in finding that the cause of the patient's bleeding was an IUD rather than a laceration or perforation caused by the respondent's negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and no reviewable error in her assessment of the evidence or exercise of discretion on costs.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering the Ontario Provincial Police to release the respondent's seized firearms to his brother.

The respondent had been sentenced to probation with a condition to abstain from possessing weapons.

The Crown argued the firearms were automatically forfeited under s. 115 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the probation condition constituted a prohibition order, the respondent was not in possession of the firearms at the commencement of the order because they were in police custody.

Therefore, s. 115 did not apply, and the appeal was dismissed.

Following the successful appeal by the defendant overturning the certification of a proposed class action for unpaid overtime, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $300,000.

The plaintiff and the Law Foundation of Ontario argued that no costs or a maximum of $50,000 should be awarded, citing the novel legal issues and public interest nature of the case.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the novel points of law and access to justice considerations under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, but held that the Act does not insulate representative plaintiffs from adverse costs.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $60,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for offences related to the illegal possession of a loaded handgun.

He argued that the handgun evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that under the Grant framework, the officer acted in good faith, the breach had minimal impact, and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious offences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the appellant's lengthy record and multiple weapons prohibitions.

The appellant appealed an order varying the respondent's child support obligations.

The respondent had suffered a catastrophic injury, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The motions judge retroactively recalculated child support arrears based on actual income rather than the previously imputed income.

The appellant argued the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to retroactively recalculate arrears under s. 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 37(2.1)(a) provides the court with broad discretion to vary an original order retroactively when a change in circumstances is established.

The young person appealed convictions for possession of a dangerous weapon, assault with a weapon, and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's reliance on a witness's testimony to support identification evidence.

However, the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by finding that an imitation firearm could support a conviction for pointing a firearm.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, set aside the conviction for pointing a firearm, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The remaining convictions were upheld.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision ordering her to pay an equalization payment of $117,514.50 and costs to the respondent husband.

The primary issue was the division of the husband's pension, specifically whether the wife was entitled to a share of the pension's growth during their five-and-a-half-year pre-marital cohabitation period based on unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unjust enrichment as the relationship did not constitute a joint family venture and the wife had not suffered a corresponding deprivation.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding the application of new pension valuation legislation, unequal division of net family property, instalment payments, trial fairness, and costs.

The appellant suffered soft tissue injuries in a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

At trial, the jury awarded damages but declined to award compensation for future loss of income.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge's unorthodox charge to the jury deprived her of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was unorthodox, it was fair as a whole and the jury's decision on future income loss was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for his involvement in a conspiracy.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity in relation to the others involved.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had considered the principle of parity and did not err in the sentence imposed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court, which had dismissed an appeal from a conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario denied leave to appeal, finding no clear errors on questions of law warranting consideration.