John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found the Board's decision to be reasonable and saw no reason to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against his stepdaughter following a jury trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the central issues, the position of the defence, and the evidence of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's instructions were inadequate, failed to address the defence's position that the conduct never occurred, and did not properly separate the multiple counts in the indictment.

Following the release of the main appeal judgment, the respondents CB Richard Ellis Limited, John Lafontaine, Karen Pickernell, and Carl Lavoie requested costs of the appeal.

They had filed a factum but made no oral submissions.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that awarding a full counsel fee would be duplicative, and instead awarded these respondents one half of the costs awarded to the other respondents, fixed at $3,750 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault arising from sexual activity at a house party involving an intoxicated complainant and later DNA confirmation.

The court held that the jury charge was fatally deficient because it failed to properly put the defence position, conflated actual and mistaken belief in consent, misstated the burden of proof by implying the accused had to prove consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and referred to wilful blindness without defining it.

Although the charge also included unnecessary references to vitiating factors unsupported by the evidence, that error alone was not reversible.

Considering the cumulative effect of the charge errors, the court declined to apply the curative proviso, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding intercepted text messages.

The trial judge had ruled that the wiretap authorization required police to be certain the target was using the cellphone before intercepting text messages, finding a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation was unworkable and inconsistent with the authorization as a whole, which specifically exempted non-oral telecommunications from live monitoring requirements.

The Court found no section 8 breach and ordered a new trial.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order sought to be appealed was interlocutory and therefore no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $3,000.

The appellants appealed an order striking their plea of equitable fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that it was not 'plain and obvious' that a claim in equitable fraud could not succeed, citing relevant jurisprudence.

The order striking the plea was set aside, the defendants' motion was dismissed, and the appellants were permitted to amend their statement of claim.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment and refusing an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that sufficient facts were pleaded and admitted by default to establish that the appellants diverted trust funds under the Construction Lien Act.

This conduct fell within the exception to discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The appellant appealed the order of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $2,500.

The appellant appealed a decision of the application judge who denied an adjournment, decided the application on the merits, granted a declaration, and awarded costs to the respondent as trustee.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge exercised his discretion reasonably and made no errors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent doctor met his disclosure obligations before the appellant elected to have heel surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the doctor provided sufficient information for informed consent was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellants, Piro and Montaldi, appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for knowingly assisting an Enbridge employee, Marinaccio, in breaching his fiduciary duty through a fraudulent invoicing scheme.

Over six years, Enbridge paid over $6.5 million for fake invoices submitted by entities controlled by the appellants, who then shared the proceeds with Marinaccio.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that Marinaccio owed a fiduciary duty, the appellants knowingly assisted in his dishonest conduct, and they were liable for bribery and unjust enrichment.

The court also upheld the calculation of damages and the award of compound interest.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to correct an allegation of recent fabrication made by the Crown in closing, and that the Crown's cross-examination improperly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to call a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown's closing and cross-examination were proper, and noting the trial judge gave the standard instruction that the accused had no obligation to call evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within a reasonable range and not tainted by legal error.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence and alternatively sought bail pending an adjournment to await the result of a constitutional challenge to a three-year mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The request for bail was denied because the appellant would receive a penitentiary sentence even if the mandatory minimum were struck down.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to preclude 2:1 credit and in requiring a causal connection between his Aboriginal background and the offence during the Gladue analysis.

The Crown conceded these errors.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing judge would have given 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody but for the statutory error.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant's pre-trial custody credit was increased by 17 months.

The Crown appealed a 19-month sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and disproportionate to the gravity of the harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was lenient, the trial judge had carefully considered all aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentence did not amount to a marked departure from the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000 inclusive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and corrupting morals, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons for treating the complainant's testimony differently across the charges and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge clearly explained his reasoning for acquitting on the sexual assault count while convicting on the others, and that there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant contended that the circumstantial evidence, specifically regarding whether he touched moulding after the break and enter, did not support the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and concluding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have rendered the same verdict based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the existence of a commission agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of a written commission agreement, the interpretation of email correspondence to determine if an agreement existed was a matter for the motion judge.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the appeal was dismissed with costs.