John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed convictions for prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter and appealed sentence, seeking to rely on fresh Gladue evidence.

The court held there was no reviewable error in the trial judge’s application of the credibility principles in W.D. and dismissed the conviction appeal.

Although the Crown consented to admission of the fresh Gladue report, the court found the appellant’s claim to Gladue consideration weak, the report speculative on causation, and the offences so serious that Aboriginal background did not materially affect sentence fitness.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged the validity of her mother's two wills and a codicil, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the challenge and upholding the testamentary documents.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment instead of ordering a trial, and by excluding certain expert and lay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had a full appreciation of the evidence and issues, properly excluded unreliable expert voicemail messages and uncorroborated evidence under the Evidence Act, and correctly found that the propounders met their burden of proving knowledge and approval despite suspicious circumstances.

The respondents' cross-appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000, and the certificate of stay was set aside.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding the deduction of a hypothetical tax on deferred compensation received after his retirement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the hypothetical tax applied to income earned during employment and received in retirement.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant insurer appealed an order determining insurance priorities in a tort action involving a rental car.

The Court of Appeal held that under the Ontario Insurance Act, as amended by Bill 118, the appellant's policy was required to respond first, regardless of whether the policies were limited to Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to commence proceedings against the Russian respondents in Ontario and attempted to serve them in Russia under the Hague Convention.

The Russian government refused service citing sovereignty and national security.

The appellants brought a motion in Ontario to dispense with or validate service under rules 16.04 and 16.08.

The Court of Appeal held that rule 17.05(3), which incorporates the Convention, is a complete code for service on foreign defendants in contracting states, and Ontario courts have no discretion to substitute, dispense with, or validate service where the Convention applies.

The appellant company's operations manager and vice-president was severely injured in a workplace accident.

The company had previously opted to remove its executive officers from workers' compensation coverage to save money, purchasing private disability insurance instead.

After the injured officer sued the company and settled for $950,000, the company sought indemnification from its commercial general liability insurer.

The insurer denied coverage based on an 'employee injury exclusion' clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the injured officer was an employee at the time of the accident and that the exclusion clause unambiguously applied to all employees, including executive officers, thereby precluding coverage.

The appellant intended to bring a class action for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act against confidential sources quoted in a newspaper article about a leveraged buyout.

The appellant sought a Norwich order to compel the journalist and newspaper to disclose the sources' identities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant met the threshold for a Norwich order, the respondents satisfied the Wigmore test for journalist-source privilege.

The public interest in protecting the confidential sources outweighed the public interest in the appellant's weak proposed action.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference but acquitted of invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault in relation to a single incident with a young complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supportable based on the trial judge's instructions, which directed the jury to consider each charge separately and distinguished between the 'touch' requirement for sexual interference and the 'force' requirement for sexual assault.

Following a partially successful appeal, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The appellant was awarded $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes for the costs of the appeal.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the trial judge hearing the new trial.

The owner of a residential apartment complex defaulted on natural gas payments.

The City of Hamilton intervened under its Vital Services By-law, paid for the gas, registered a lien, and directed tenants to pay rent to the City pursuant to s. 221(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The first mortgagee subsequently sold the property under power of sale to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The City claimed its statutory right to collect rents survived the sale.

The Court of Appeal held that the City's right to direct rent payments is a statutory collection device, not an interest in land, and does not survive the transfer of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the strangulation of a 54-year-old woman.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying heavily on the testimony of the appellant's girlfriend, who stated he returned home with blood on his clothes and said something terrible had happened to the victim.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his girlfriend recanting her trial testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding the recantation was fabricated and the product of collaboration between the appellant and the witness.

The Court also dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and the trial judge made no reversible errors, and upheld the 13-year period of parole ineligibility.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action appealed a motion judge's decision striking out several claims from their statement of claim against an insurer regarding the sale and administration of universal life insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and deceit and fraud, finding it was not plain and obvious these claims would fail.

The court upheld the striking of allegations concerning releases because the plaintiffs failed to request specific relief for those who signed them.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from two school-based sexual touching allegations involving young complainants and eyewitnesses whose accounts contained significant conflicts and evidence of pre-disclosure discussions among the girls.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not explain how the possibility of collusion affected the admission and use of similar fact evidence, nor how conflicting evidence and reasonable doubt were assessed.

Applying the adequacy-of-reasons framework and the principles governing similar fact evidence and credibility findings, the court found that meaningful appellate review was not possible.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

His insurer denied uninsured automobile coverage because the plaintiff was driving with a suspended licence.

The Minister of Finance, administering the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, brought a cross-claim on behalf of the uninsured defendant seeking a declaration of coverage.

The insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and cross-claim, arguing the cross-claim was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory condition regarding authorized driving did not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly provided in the policy, which it was not.

While the cross-claim was out of time under the Limitations Act, the court stayed the limitation defence in the interest of judicial economy.

The appellant appealed an order approving an additional $395,000 fee for class counsel following the administration of a class action settlement regarding a norovirus outbreak at resorts.

The settlement created a $2.25 million reversionary fund, but only $333,306.79 was claimed by class members.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by valuing the settlement based on the total fund rather than the actual take-up rate.

The Court held that the initial $600,000 fee was fair and reasonable, and the additional fee was grossly disproportionate to the actual results achieved for the class.

The appellant sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a laneway on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The appellant's predecessor in title had used the laneway openly for several years.

In 1987, the predecessor asked the respondent's predecessor to sign a right-of-way agreement, which was refused.

Later, the respondent's predecessor posted 'private driveway' signs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 1987 request for permission amounted to an acknowledgment that the use was not 'as of right', and the subsequent posting of signs constituted an overt act of protest that interrupted the 20-year prescriptive period.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the search of his computer bag and the contents of his computer violated section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the search of the bag was incidental to the computer search and the evidence was duplicative.

Furthermore, the search warrant for the computer was not overly broad as it was anchored in the specific conditions of the appellant's Long-Term Supervision Order, which prohibited internet access.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He provided satisfactory proof that he is a full status Métis.

The Court of Appeal varied his probation order by deleting the condition requiring him to abstain from owning, possessing, or carrying weapons as defined in the Criminal Code.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury and by improperly instructing the jury on how to use his post-offence conduct to infer intent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there was an air of reality to the subjective element of provocation despite the appellant's testimony that he was not angry.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could use the appellant's bizarre post-offence conduct to infer an intent to kill, as such conduct was equally consistent with manslaughter.

A new trial was ordered.