Byrdena M. MacNeil

The Ombudsman of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that held neither the Election Compliance Audit Committee nor the Property Standards Committee of the City of Hamilton constituted "local boards" within the meaning of section 14.1 of the Ombudsman Act.

The Ombudsman sought to investigate whether these committees complied with the public meeting requirement under section 239 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, applying the ejusdem generis principle to conclude that the general language in the definition of "local board" does not extend to investigative/adjudicative bodies that do not carry on the day-to-day operations of the municipality.

Consequently, the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to investigate these committees' compliance with open meeting requirements.

The applicant, a transgender woman, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to goods, services, or facilities.

She requested an order to use initials and to protect identifying information during the proceedings to prevent potential risks to her personal security and to avoid harassment.

The respondents did not oppose the request.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that the applicant's privacy and security interests outweighed the principles of an open justice system, particularly since a full publication ban was not requested.

The applicant, an inmate, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed the applicant's requests for consolidation, amendment, an extension of time, and production of documents.

The Tribunal denied consolidation with previously dismissed applications and denied the amendment request.

The Tribunal granted a brief extension of time for the applicant to file materials for an upcoming preliminary hearing.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant's former criminal counsel and the Ombudsman Ontario to produce specific documents and correspondence that the applicant had previously provided to them or received from them, to assist the applicant in providing particulars of his allegations.

The Tribunal denied the request for broader documentary production from the respondents at this preliminary stage.

The owner of a residential apartment complex defaulted on natural gas payments.

The City of Hamilton intervened under its Vital Services By-law, paid for the gas, registered a lien, and directed tenants to pay rent to the City pursuant to s. 221(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The first mortgagee subsequently sold the property under power of sale to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The City claimed its statutory right to collect rents survived the sale.

The Court of Appeal held that the City's right to direct rent payments is a statutory collection device, not an interest in land, and does not survive the transfer of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value.

The applicant, an unsuccessful municipal election candidate, sought relief from the statutory penalties imposed under s. 80(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996 for failing to file a required campaign financial statement by the prescribed deadline.

The applicant relied on s. 92(6) of the Act and alternatively s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act to request relief from forfeiture and ineligibility consequences.

The court held that s. 92(6) applies only in the context of prosecutions for specific offences under s. 92(5) and that the “presiding judge” referenced in that provision refers to a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice, not the Superior Court.

The court further found that equitable relief under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act was not warranted because the applicant’s failure to file reflected indifference rather than inadvertence or good faith.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in services on the basis of disability and reprisal, stemming from debt collection efforts by the respondents after his non-profit organization cancelled an event.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found no evidence linking the debt collection process or the service of court documents to the applicant's disability or to a reprisal for filing the application.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellant farmer appealed a decision of the Fire Safety Commission that upheld an inspection order imposing conditions on open air burning of brush on his property.

The appellant argued the Commission erred in its interpretation of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act by not requiring proof that a fire 'would seriously endanger' health and safety before imposing conditions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Commission's interpretation of the Act was correct and its factual findings regarding the necessity of the conditions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision made under the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that certiorari is not available to challenge a decision of a Superior Court judge absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The Court also declined to transfer the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that an application for judicial review is distinct from an appeal and the time to appeal had expired.

The applicant filed two applications alleging discrimination and reprisal in the areas of housing, goods, services, and facilities.

A hearing was scheduled to determine preliminary issues, including whether the applications should be heard together and whether the Tribunal had the power to hear the applications.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving proper notice.

Pursuant to Rule 3.13 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal proceeded in the applicant's absence and dismissed the applications as abandoned.

At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised concerns regarding the adjudicator's past volunteer board membership involving a project the applicant was associated with, and the adjudicator's prior presence at a meeting with a scheduled witness for the respondents.

Although no formal recusal request was made and the adjudicator had not predetermined the matters, the adjudicator decided to step down to ensure a fair, just, and expeditious resolution.

The matter was remitted to the Registrar to schedule a new hearing date with a different adjudicator.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of records concerning a student's behaviour to the student's father.

The board argued the records were exempt under s. 13 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming disclosure could reasonably be expected to seriously threaten the safety or health of an individual.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was not unreasonable for the adjudicator to conclude the board failed to discharge its burden of proof, given the lack of evidence of threatening behaviour by the father or psychiatric evidence regarding the son's propensity to carry out past threats.

The applicant school board brought a motion to exclude the public, specifically the requester, from the hearing of an application involving sealed materials.

The applicant argued that the requester's presence would render the application moot by revealing the subject matter and that referring to sealed materials without reading them would inhibit counsel's effectiveness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the normal practice of referring the court to sealed materials without reading them aloud is sufficient and does not inhibit counsel.

The court emphasized that access to the court is a super-ordinate value under s. 135 of the Courts of Justice Act and there was no serious risk of injustice.