John I. Laskin

The plaintiff RCI entered into an agreement to manufacture and install assembly lines for TMG in Ontario.

TMG later substituted its subsidiary TMC as the purchaser, allegedly providing assurances alongside its bank, Sparkasse, that they would guarantee payment.

When TMC failed to pay, RCI sued TMG and Sparkasse in Ontario for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding no jurisdiction simpliciter and that Ontario was forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on the tort and contract occurring in Ontario, the forum selection clauses did not apply to the guarantee claims, and the defendants failed to show Germany was clearly a more appropriate forum.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly curtailed defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her previous lies about her age, admitted highly prejudicial hearsay evidence, and failed to adequately instruct the jury on the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of assault and sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his summary conviction on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay, particularly the period associated with the trial judge's delay in providing reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of institutional delay and concluded that the appeal lacked both general significance to the administration of justice and strong merits.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a committal order for extradition and applied for judicial review of a surrender order.

They were sought for prosecution in Pennsylvania for their role in a human trafficking scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, rejecting arguments related to ulterior motives, disclosure of witness names, certification, limitation periods, indirect refoulement, double jeopardy, and the need for assurances against persecution.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, sought a third extension of time to perfect his appeal from a judgment upholding a contingency fee agreement.

The Court of Appeal applied the five-factor test for extending time to appeal.

Finding that the moving party had not satisfactorily explained the lengthy delay, had not shown merit in the proposed appeal, and that the responding parties were prejudiced by the lack of finality, the court dismissed the motion.

In a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal regarding an estate dispute, the respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of $85,000 for the main appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the appellant's conduct was not reprehensible and her appeal raised reasonable questions of law.

The respondents were awarded partial indemnity costs of $30,000 for the main appeal.

The appellant, having been successful on the cross-appeal, was awarded $5,000 in costs.

Following an appeal from summary judgment decisions in two related actions involving fraudulent investment schemes, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the motions and the appeals.

The court upheld the costs and Sanderson order in favour of the successful Mauldin group.

However, because the appellant successfully appealed the summary judgment in the Bruno action, the court set aside the costs and Sanderson order in favour of Bruno, reserving the motion costs to the trial judge and making Bruno liable for the co-defendants' costs.

Costs of the appeals were awarded on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate, failed to assess witness reliability, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly rejected the motive to fabricate by accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court also noted the trial was short, making express reliability analysis unnecessary, and found no uneven scrutiny, highlighting that the appellant's inculpatory statements supported the complainant's credibility.

The appellant, a 20-year-old at the time of the offence, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding a question of law regarding whether the sentencing judge considered if a conditional discharge would serve the public interest.

Noting the appellant's positive post-offence conduct, including compensating the victim, complying with probation, and successfully completing two years of medical school, the Court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to a conditional discharge.

The appellant purchased a property at a tax sale and claimed a prescriptive right or easement to use a well located on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the appellant's use of the well was governed by a time-limited well-sharing agreement registered on the respondent's title, which expired in 2010.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that the non-registration of the agreement on the appellant's title did not render it ineffective and that the express permission in the agreement precluded any prescriptive rights.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that consent was not a defence to the charge, relying on older jurisprudence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury in accordance with R. v. Quashie, which requires a finding that the accused subjectively intended to cause bodily harm before consent is vitiated.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the trial judge erred in removing the defence of consent without instructing the jury to consider the appellant's subjective intent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for a large-scale commercial grow operation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter after applying judicial editing to the search warrant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in concluding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for this type of offence.

The appellant appealed convictions for theft and possession of a truck and its contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the theft convictions, finding overwhelming evidence and a proper basis to infer knowledge of the trailer's contents.

However, the court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the conviction for possession of the truck, as the appellant was already convicted of its theft.

The appeal was allowed to that extent, and the total fine was reduced by $1,250.

The appellant law firm appealed an order refusing to set aside a consent order that referred its account to an assessment officer.

The client had retained the firm under a contingency fee agreement to pursue a long-term disability claim, which settled.

The client later sought an assessment of the account.

A dispute arose over the validity of the contingency fee agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that an assessment officer generally lacks jurisdiction to determine disputes regarding the validity or effect of a retainer agreement, including contingency fee agreements.

Such disputes should be determined by a judge.

The appeal was allowed, the consent order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing his personal injury action for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The action had been ongoing for nearly 10 years with virtually no steps taken, no discoveries held, and the action not set down for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy delay had not been rebutted, as the plaintiff filed no evidence to show the absence of prejudice or to support his contention that he was the only material witness.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The client appealed a motion judge's decision that set aside an assessment officer's award regarding her solicitors' bill of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the assessment officer erred by ignoring the retainer agreement, improperly discounting docketed time, and mischaracterizing the complexity of the matrimonial litigation.

The court also rejected the client's allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias against the motion judge.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their proposed class action claims against a food distributor.

The appellants alleged the distributor was a 'franchisor's associate' under the Arthur Wishart Act in relation to a vending machine program run by a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the distributor did not control the third party and was therefore not a franchisor's associate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a nurse and a hospital, appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for a brain injury suffered by an infant during birth.

The jury found the nurse 75% liable and the hospital 25% liable, while dismissing claims against the delivering physician.

The appellants argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of causation and lack of expert evidence on the hospital's standard of care, and that the trial judge erred in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to determine the hospital's standard of care without expert evidence, that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of causation based on a robust and pragmatic application of the 'but for' test, and that the jury charge contained no reversible errors.

The appellants successfully appealed a motion judge's decision limiting the scope of their class proceedings based on the Limitations Act.

The Divisional Court, however, refused to award the appellants their costs of the appeal, finding success was divided, and remitted the costs issue to the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on costs, holding that the Divisional Court erred in principle by mischaracterizing the appellants' success and by failing to apply the general rule that the costs of a successful appeal should be awarded to the appellant and not depend on the outcome of a rehearing.

The appellants, a nurse and her employer, appealed a trial judge's finding that they were 50 per cent liable in negligence on a crossclaim by a hospital.

The trial judge found that the nurse's delay in diagnosing and treating a patient's vasospasm exacerbated his brain injuries.

The appellants conceded the nurse fell below the standard of care but argued the trial judge's finding on causation was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence, viewed as a whole, supported the trial judge's conclusion that the continuing negligence exacerbated the harm.