John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing their failure to file defending material was their lawyer's fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the appellants' failure to comply with numerous court orders was due to their own intransigence.

The court agreed with the motion judge that this was one of the rare cases where striking a statement of defence was appropriate.

The appellant appealed a committal order made pursuant to section 49 of the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The applicant sought judicial review of a surrender order made by the Minister of Justice under the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the applicant's bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for judicial review as abandoned.

The appellants appealed their sentences for drug trafficking to avoid deportation resulting from the retrospective application of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal on Crown consent, reducing his sentence to six months less a day as it remained fit.

The Court dismissed the second appellant's appeal, finding that the requested reduction would render his sentence unfit given his criminal record and the aggravating factors, and would circumvent parliamentary intent.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after a sniffer-dog alerted on her at an international airport and a subsequent search revealed four kilograms of cocaine in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that the dog sniff and a subsequent strip search violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge made evidentiary and jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a dog sniff during a routine border crossing does not violate section 8 of the Charter, the appellant was not detained at the time of the alert, and the sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

At trial, the complainant's prior consistent statements were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination on inconsistencies.

The trial judge did not give a limiting instruction warning the jury not to use the prior consistent statements for their truth.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, as there was a real risk the jury would use the statements for an impermissible purpose to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding of adverse possession, arguing the judge failed to consider relevant evidence, make a finding on the ownership of the fence, and find sufficient usage of the disputed strip of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly stated the elements of adverse possession and made findings of fact reasonably supported by the evidence, including that both parties treated the fence line as a boundary.

Costs of $5,600 were awarded to the respondents.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The parties cohabited for over thirteen years and jointly operated motel properties.

Following their separation, the trial judge awarded the respondent a half interest in the properties based on a joint family venture and unjust enrichment, as well as compensation for unaccounted joint account withdrawals.

The appellant appealed, arguing the properties were held on a resulting trust and disputing the financial contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions regarding the joint family venture, equal contributions, and the accounting of joint funds.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughter arising from long-term abuse allegations spanning childhood to late adolescence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing improper speculation about the family’s prior housing arrangements and improper rejection of defence evidence from close family members.

The Court of Appeal held that any error concerning the housing-scam comment was peripheral, given the many unchallenged reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence.

It further held that the trial judge did not reject the younger siblings’ evidence solely because of relationship, but because the evidence supported a finding that they remained under parental influence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for violent offences in 2002, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant her an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered the continuation of her conditional discharge, finding she remained a significant threat to public safety due to her history of medication non-compliance, limited insight into her mental illness, and lack of a concrete follow-up plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not misapply the test for significant threat to public safety and that its conclusion was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his conviction for the sexual exploitation of a student.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to his testimony, and erred in admitting similar act and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were fair, the admission of similar act evidence from another student was reasonable, and the post-offence conduct evidence was properly used to assess credibility and the trajectory of the relationship.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in the care of the children's aid society for over four years and consistently expressed a strong desire not to have contact with the mother, following allegations of physical and sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no triable issue regarding access, as the mother could not establish that an ongoing relationship would be meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's reliance on hearsay evidence from the child's therapists and social workers, which is expressly permitted under the governing child protection legislation.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a lower court judgment on the basis that the judgment was an interlocutory order.

The lower court had ruled that contempt proceedings against the responding party were not stayed by his filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but adjourned the contempt motion to a later date.

The Court of Appeal held that because the lower court's ruling deprived the responding party of a substantive defence that could have resolved the proceedings, the order was final.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after a 26-month delay between his arrest and trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appellant contended that the 15.5-month delay caused by his efforts to retain counsel of choice, exacerbated by Legal Aid Ontario's refusal to transfer his certificate, should be characterized as institutional or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was part of the inherent time requirements of the case and that a s. 11(b) application is not the proper forum to review the reasonableness of Legal Aid Ontario's decisions.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed an order dismissing their motion to quash a Registrar's order for the assessment of 51 accounts rendered to the respondent client.

The appellants argued the accounts were for management services, the retainer was in dispute, and the requisition was untimely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the accounts were for legal services, the retainer was not in dispute, and the overlapping nature of the interim accounts constituted special circumstances justifying the timing of the assessment.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for his participation in a robbery where a co-assailant shot and killed the victim.

The trial judge sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, treating the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor despite the mandatory minimum under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation and held that his failure to cooperate with police was not an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the sentence to six years' imprisonment, balancing the aggravating circumstances of the robbery with the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee and discriminated against her based on family status.

Upon returning from maternity leave, the respondent was demoted, had her hours reduced, and faced reprisals when she objected, culminating in her termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no just cause for dismissal, the 12-month notice period was reasonable, and the $20,000 human rights damages award for family status discrimination was justified.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.