John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on unlawful confinement as a basis for first-degree murder, and in relating the evidence of his intoxication and cocaine withdrawal to the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial restraint of the victim was a distinct act from the subsequent killing, and that the trial judge's instructions on intent and the evidence were adequate.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent employee had adequately mitigated his damages following wrongful termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was well supported by the evidence.

The respondent, who was in his fifties with limited education and had worked for the appellant for 19 years, faced diminished re-employment prospects, exacerbated by the lack of a reference letter and accusations of wrongdoing.

The Court held that the respondent made reasonable efforts to find comparable employment and was not obliged to accept non-comparable positions.

The appellant sold his print services business to the respondents, who subsequently stopped making payments on the promissory note, leaving a balance of $94,600.

The appellant brought an application for judgment, which the application judge dismissed upon finding the appellant made a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the value of the business equipment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the evidence fell short of establishing fraudulent misrepresentation, and ordered the matter to proceed to trial due to the numerous factual disputes.

The appellant appealed an order of Crown wardship and, in the alternative, sought an order for access to the child.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against the Crown wardship order, limiting the appeal to the issue of access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Crown wardship order as abandoned so that the child could be immediately placed for adoption.

The Court reserved its decision on the issue of access.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant placing a bag in a car, which was later found to contain drugs after being in a motel room for over two hours.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as there was no evidence regarding who had access to the bag while it was in the motel room.

The trial judge erred by looking for evidence that the contents had changed, rather than requiring the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had not changed.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a physical altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, causing the victim to lose consciousness and hit his head.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions on consent were inadequate and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to appellate delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the law of consent, potentially leading the jury to believe the victim had to consent to every specific act for the defence to apply.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, found NCR in 2007, appealed an Ontario Review Board order transferring him from a general forensic unit to a secure forensic unit.

The hospital recommended the transfer because the appellant's repeated breaches of the anti-smoking policy and drug use resulted in the suspension of his indirectly supervised passes, making his detention on the general unit more restrictive due to staffing limitations.

The secure unit offered better access to necessary substance abuse programming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable as it would enhance the appellant's rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how intoxication relates to planning and deliberation, and unfairly commented on the defence toxicologist's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions contained all essential legal elements and properly directed the jury to consider intoxication separately for intent and for planning and deliberation.

The court also found the trial judge's comments on the expert evidence were supported by the record and not objected to by trial counsel.

The appellants and the respondent insured brought motions to disqualify the law firm appointed by the insurer from continuing to represent the insured on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the jury found the insured solely responsible, primarily for negligent parental supervision (uncovered), but also for an unsuitable choice of unloading area (potentially covered).

The insurer-appointed counsel filed a cross-appeal challenging the only finding that could trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions, finding a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest, and ordered the insurer to pay for independent counsel to represent the insured.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a sawed-off shotgun on a public street.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission for a conditional sentence, finding it woefully inadequate and imposing a custodial sentence instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, agreeing that possession of deadly prohibited firearms requires a denunciatory sentence.

The appeal was allowed only to vary the terms of the s. 109 prohibition order to clarify the lifetime prohibition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and his suspended sentence.

At trial, he admitted punching the complainant but claimed self-defence, alleging she was the aggressor.

The trial judge rejected this defence, relying on neighbours' testimony that the complainant was on the ground in a defensive position while the appellant punched her, concluding the force used was excessive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the conviction appeal.

Leave to appeal the sentence, which was exactly what the appellant had requested at trial, was refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He also argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to credibility and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment fair and balanced, the fresh evidence incapable of affecting the verdict, and trial counsel's performance competent.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to issue the least onerous and restrictive disposition, seeking a transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board applied the correct test and reasonably concluded that continued detention at the secure facility was necessary for public protection given the appellant's recent history of violence and recent medication change.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.

Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic abuse of a child relative, and also appealed a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence consisting of a urologist's report because the proposed evidence merely bolstered unchallenged trial evidence and could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

Although the Crown's cross-examination about abortion risks was inflammatory and inappropriate, it did not render the trial unfair or cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also held that the absence of a limiting instruction on one prior consistent statement was not fatal in light of the way prior statements were used at trial, and upheld the sentence as fit.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the respondent's counsel made improper comments during his closing address, by giving an inadequate correcting instruction, by allowing an expert to testify beyond his report, and by refusing to order an assignment of statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's correcting instruction adequately addressed the improper comments, the evidentiary ruling was fair, and the appellant failed to prove the jury's future care award mirrored the respondent's uncertain accident benefits entitlement.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

Following the release of the court's written endorsement on the appeal, the appellant settled the issue of costs with several respondents.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the remaining respondent, Zanzibar Tavern Inc., costs of the appeal fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.