Jonathon C. George

The appellant tenant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), appealed a motion judge's decision regarding relief from forfeiture under s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act, seeking rent abatement due to COVID-19 impacts.

The respondent landlords (Oxford and affiliates) cross-appealed the deferral of rent payments and reduction of interest rates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed HBC's appeal, affirming that s. 20 does not permit rent abatement or reduction as it would rewrite the lease.

The court allowed the landlords' cross-appeal, finding that deferrals should only be granted to allow the tenant to comply, not to mitigate economic harm, and that the interest rate should not have been varied from the lease terms.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a retrial.

He appealed his conviction on three grounds: the application judge erred by dismissing the application to admit hearsay for a third-party suspect, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s prejudicial closing argument, and the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability without factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's hearsay ruling, the trial judge's handling of the Crown's closing, or the party liability instruction, which was found to have an evidentiary basis and was akin to co-principal liability.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the party liability issue, arguing insufficient evidentiary foundation and inadequate jury instructions.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by not providing a specific corrective instruction to the jury regarding a co-accused's counsel's speculative theory of the case.

The co-accused's counsel had suggested, without evidentiary basis, that the appellant was involved in an illegal marijuana operation and owed money, contradicting the appellant's defence that he was extorted by the deceased.

The Court of Appeal found that while the co-accused's counsel's comments were improper and lacked evidentiary foundation, the trial judge's general cautionary instructions to the jury about avoiding speculation and relying only on evidence were sufficient.

The court emphasized the high degree of deference owed to a trial judge's assessment of the impact of improper remarks and the chosen remedial steps.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court concluded that the comments did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, Joshua Brown, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making available child pornography, and his three-year penitentiary sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds were unreasonable verdict and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The sentence appeal grounds included reliance on an incorrect volume of child pornography and unproven aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and reasons sufficient, and that the inference of guilt was the only reasonable one.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in considering 2,500 files instead of 500, this error did not impact the fitness of the significant sentence warranted by the large quantity of child pornography.

Dr. Thirlwell, a psychiatrist, sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that upheld an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The ICRC's interim order imposed terms on Thirlwell's registration, including a prohibition on issuing vaccine exemptions and a requirement to consent to OHIP inquiries, due to concerns about her providing improper medical exemption letters for cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed Thirlwell's judicial review application, finding the OHIP term reasonable for patient protection.

Thirlwell moved for a stay of the Divisional Court order pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied the stay, finding no serious question to be tried and that the public interest in patient safety and confidence in the College's disciplinary system outweighed Thirlwell's personal interests.

The appellant, Elizabeth Philbert, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal for Ontario to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of her previous motion.

This previous motion sought to review an order by Thorburn J.A. that had dismissed her attempt to extend time to perfect an appeal of a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court order, issued by Steele J., had dismissed her claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The Court of Appeal, through George J.A., denied Philbert's motion, finding that she failed to properly perfect her motion by serving the respondent and that the underlying appeal lacked merit, consistent with prior findings that her claims were vexatious litigation.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, J.A., appealed convictions for second-degree murder of his daughter and attempted murder of his son.

The charges stemmed from an incident where he administered adult medication (Sleep MD, Nytol) and alcohol to his young children (ages 6 and 7), resulting in his daughter's death and his son's survival, as part of a failed murder-suicide attempt.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's "common-sense inference" instructions regarding intent, the failure to relate evidence to essential issues, and other jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the common-sense inference instruction proper as death and serious bodily harm were predictable consequences of the appellant's actions, and the toxicology evidence did not dispel this inference.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on evidence relevance to intent.

The appellant was convicted of possessing and making child pornography and received a conditional sentence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a position of trust and in failing to apply the private use exception to sexting.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the finding of a position of trust and declining to expand the private use exception to include sexting.

While agreeing that the conditional sentence was unfit and a carceral sentence should have been imposed, the court dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal due to the appellant having largely served the conditional sentence, deeming it inappropriate to substitute a carceral term at that stage.

The appellant, found unfit to stand trial by the Ontario Court of Justice, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) subsequent disposition finding him unfit and ordering his detention.

The Court of Appeal confirmed its jurisdiction to hear appeals from ORB findings of unfitness that result in a disposition, distinguishing them from findings of fitness which do not.

On the merits, the court found the ORB's decision to be reasonable, giving appropriate weight to psychiatric assessments and counsel's representations regarding the appellant's ability to instruct counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mikail Moolla, appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial, conducted remotely via Zoom from a correctional institution due to COVID-19 concerns, was fundamentally unfair.

He contended that distractions and inadequate facilities impaired his ability to participate and present his defence, or at least compromised the appearance of fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the less than ideal arrangements, the appellant failed to demonstrate that his ability to present a defence was impaired or that the trial was unfair.

The court noted that counsel had agreed to the remote format and did not raise objections during the trial, and the trial judge had actively worked to mitigate any issues.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order that varied a 2000 judgment concerning a right-of-way and the removal of gates.

The motion judge, applying Rule 59.06, corrected a "slip" in the original judgment and further amended it to exempt an additional gate ("gate located at the lake") from removal, based on the original judge's manifest intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation of the original order and application of Rule 59.06 to be reasonable and within the scope of amendment powers.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that a W.(D.) instruction was required for a defence witness's testimony and that the trial judge inadequately treated her evidence.

The court found that a W.(D.) instruction was not warranted as the witness's evidence, while helpful, did not compel acquittal, and the trial judge's review of her evidence was accurate and even-handed.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two respondents, Kalenda Kalonji and Sam Donaldson, on firearm and drug-related charges.

The trial judge had quashed a search warrant for a residence, finding no reasonable and probable grounds to believe firearms would be found there, and excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her s. 8 Charter analysis by failing to consider reasonable common sense inferences that firearms would be kept at a person's residence, effectively elevating the standard of proof for issuing a warrant.

This error led to the improper exclusion of evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial for both respondents.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order allowing a medical negligence claim to proceed in the Superior Court, despite the plaintiff being a professional football player subject to a collective agreement with an arbitration clause.

The appellant, a radiologist, argued the claim fell under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the "essential character" of the dispute was medical negligence by an independent third-party physician, not a dispute arising from the collective agreement.

Furthermore, the arbitration process under the collective agreement would not provide effective redress for a medical malpractice claim, particularly regarding costs and expert fees.

The appellant, Glassdoor Inc., appealed a motion judge's order denying its anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action.

The action stemmed from an anonymous critical employee review posted on Glassdoor's website about the respondent, Echelon Environmental Inc. The appellant argued the review related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the review, concerning private complaints about a company providing specialized services to a small number of customers, did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was also dismissed.

This grouped appeal concerned four applications seeking declarations that the appellant insurers had a duty to defend the respondent corporations against claims of property damage arising from condominium construction deficiencies.

The application judge found a duty to defend based on the "mere possibility" test and refused ex ante allocation of defence costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurers' appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the "mere possibility" test applies to exclusions and that courts should not conduct a "trial within a trial" on duty to defend applications.

The court also upheld the order for pre-notification defence costs and dismissed a cross-appeal regarding the assessment of past defence costs.

This appeal concerned the validity of an email notice of waiver of a development condition in an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellants argued that the notice had to be hand-delivered, while the respondent contended that email delivery was sufficient given the contract's terms and the parties' communication practices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the email notice was valid.

The court emphasized a holistic interpretation of the agreement, giving precedence to negotiated terms in Schedule A over standard form provisions, and considering the parties' established practice of email communication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a subtenant, appealed a lower court decision that found no rent reduction agreement existed and dismissed its claim for damages after being locked out for non-payment of rent.

The appellant argued the lockout was unlawful and sought damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual finding that no rent reduction agreement was made, noting deference is owed to such findings in the absence of palpable and overriding error.

The court also found the landlord was not liable for damages under the Helping Tenants and Small Businesses Act, 2020, as the lockout occurred before the Act's non-enforcement period began, and the tenant regained possession shortly after the Act came into force.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant, TS Pharmaceuticals Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its motion for damages against the court-appointed Receiver, A. Farber & Partners Inc. TS alleged the Receiver failed to use "best efforts" to maintain a Health Canada cannabis licence, which lapsed, leading to the termination of a Share Purchase Agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the Receiver had no positive obligation or authority to maintain the licence, nor could it have done so in the short timeframe between the SPA execution and licence expiry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Myriam Michail, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her anti-SLAPP motion against the London District Catholic School Board's application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The motion judge found that Michail had not established that the Board's application related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the determination that vexatious proceedings do not relate to a matter of public interest and that the Board's application aimed to prevent vexatious litigation, not to suppress expression.

The Court also upheld the costs award against Michail and declined to consider new constitutional questions raised for the first time on appeal.