Brieanne Kathryn Brannagan

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against an emergency room physician following the death of their 27-year-old daughter from a cerebellar stroke.

The patient had presented to the emergency department with nausea, vomiting, and weakness, and was discharged with a diagnosis of intoxication.

The next day, she was found at home with severe trauma and a massive stroke, from which she died.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the physician met the standard of care, as the patient exhibited no focal neurological signs warranting a gait assessment or CT scan.

The court also found that causation was not proven, accepting expert evidence that the stroke likely occurred the following day due to trauma.

The midwife and physician defendants sought costs for a motion to vary and settle the terms of an order requiring the plaintiffs to undergo genetic testing.

The parties had settled most issues, but the defendants were successful on the sole contested issue regarding whether the testing laboratory's reports must comply with Rules 33.06 and 53.03(2.1).

The court awarded costs of $12,500 to each of the moving parties, payable in the cause, reflecting partial success and proportionality.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order allowing a medical negligence claim to proceed in the Superior Court, despite the plaintiff being a professional football player subject to a collective agreement with an arbitration clause.

The appellant, a radiologist, argued the claim fell under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the "essential character" of the dispute was medical negligence by an independent third-party physician, not a dispute arising from the collective agreement.

Furthermore, the arbitration process under the collective agreement would not provide effective redress for a medical malpractice claim, particularly regarding costs and expert fees.

The plaintiffs brought an action against several physicians involved in the treatment of their son, alleging a failure to diagnose Fragile X Syndrome, which led to the birth of a second child with the same genetic disorder.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to provide greater particularity, while the defendant physician moved to strike the claim, arguing he owed no duty of care to the parents of his patient.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion to amend, finding it did not introduce a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding that it was not plain and obvious that a novel duty of care could not be recognized between a physician and the parents of a patient in the context of genetic testing and family planning.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion to dismiss the claim based on an arbitration clause in a collective agreement.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to consider whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The parties agreed the order was final.

The Divisional Court found it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant, a medical student who converted from Islam to Christianity, alleged discrimination on the basis of creed, age, and perceived disability against Queen's University and several faculty members.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed for delay or having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the majority of the allegations were filed outside the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code and did not constitute a series of incidents.

The Tribunal also found that the applicant's delay was not incurred in good faith, as pursuing internal university processes and a speculative fear of reprisal did not justify the delay.

The remaining timely allegations, including a remark by a faculty member and a psychological assessment by a doctor, were dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant provided no evidence of discrimination.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.