Dr. Ainslie Heasman

The appellant mother sought to stay three temporary orders pending appeal: an order for graduated unsupervised parenting time for the respondent father, a finding of contempt against her for disobeying the parenting time orders, and a penalty order temporarily reversing primary parenting to the father.

The motion judge found that the mother had deliberately and continuously thwarted the father's court-ordered unsupervised parenting time based on unsubstantiated beliefs that the father posed a sexual risk to the child, despite investigations and an expert assessment finding no such risk.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the mother's appeal appeared weak, and that the balance of convenience and the child's best interests favored allowing the father an opportunity to build a relationship with the child.

D.L. pleaded guilty to sexual interference and manufacturing child pornography involving his stepdaughter, A.W., who was 13-15 years old during the prolonged abuse.

The court considered aggravating factors including a profound breach of trust, sexual grooming, the graphic nature of the manufactured child sexual exploitation videos, the variety and prolonged period of sexual activity, and the use of bondage.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and a forensic risk assessment indicating a "below average risk to reoffend sexually," though the offender showed diminished insight.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen regarding upward departure from dated sentencing ranges for child sexual abuse and the non-mitigating nature of victim participation.

Despite the Crown's initial proposed range of 8-10 years, the court imposed a global custodial term of 8 years, comprising 6.5 years for sexual interference and 18 months consecutive for manufacturing child pornography, balancing totality and restraint given the pre-plea Crown position and recent appellate guidance.

The appellant, Kirk Williams, sought leave to appeal his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the statutory pathways for designation were met and in assessing future harm and treatment prospects.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusions regarding the dangerous offender pathways, the consideration of medical treatments, or the assessment of recidivism risk.

The court upheld the indeterminate sentence as necessary for public protection.