Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of various firearm and drug offences, as well as possession of the proceeds of crime, after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found firearms, drugs, and cash.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable as they relied on circumstantial evidence that failed to prove his knowledge and control over the contraband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited device, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge and control.

The conviction for possession of the proceeds of crime was upheld, and the global sentence was reduced to five years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a home invasion robbery where an occupant was shot.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a 'mixed witness' Vetrovec instruction and a W.(D.) instruction regarding a co-perpetrator's testimony, which was exculpatory at trial but inculpatory during a prior guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge adequate when read as a whole.

The sentence appeal was granted only to credit the appellant with 90 days of pre-sentence custody on consent of the Crown.

This is a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings imposed under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a youth matter.

The respondent was 12-13 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The application judge erred by not applying the R. v. Jordan framework, which was subsequently clarified for youth matters by R. v. K.J.M. The Court of Appeal found that the 18-month ceiling from Jordan was not exceeded and there was no basis to maintain the stay.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, former directors of a non-profit daycare centre, appealed the dismissal of their application for leave to commence a derivative action against a former director and administrator for alleged misappropriation of funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the action was bound to fail, noting that the board of directors and the Public Guardian and Trustee had already investigated the allegations and taken no action.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a lower court's decision, challenging the admissibility of a recording and the finding that a joint tenancy had been severed.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding the recording's inadmissibility, finding it relevant and admissible.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the application judge's decision on joint tenancy severance, as it was a fact-specific inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the estate, noting the litigation was necessitated by the deceased's actions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking her statement of claim as an abuse of process and denying leave to amend.

The appellant alleged the respondents orchestrated the wrongful conviction of her father and his company by the Ontario Securities Commission, causing her financial loss as a trust beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the action was an abuse of process and that the appellant lacked standing, as the underlying convictions had already been upheld on appeal.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, discovered a potential professional negligence claim against his deceased wife's insurance agent.

He commenced an action after his discharge, but the cause of action had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.

The motion judge granted an order nunc pro tunc regularizing the proceeding.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge lacked authority to grant a nunc pro tunc order because it was sought after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant appealed the application judge's interpretation of a May 13, 2014 agreement, arguing it was tainted by illegality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error of law in the application judge's interpretation, noting that past litigation had already confirmed the agreement's validity and required specific performance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the complainant's prior consistent statement to a doctor that her injury was caused by 'forced intercourse'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly used the statement to bolster the complainant's credibility rather than for a permissible purpose under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The appellant claimed he knew the person was not a minor and only met them for a 'gotcha' moment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and drew logical inferences from the text messages.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a complainant over whom he held a position of trust.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to reconcile inconsistencies, overemphasizing his demeanour during a police interview, and assigning too much weight to the complainant's youthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and findings were open to him.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, engaging in stereotypical reasoning, and failing to appreciate his motive theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions that the complainant did not consent and was incapable of consenting were sound and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance, as well as his 4.5-year sentence, arising from a home invasion.

He argued the unlawful confinement conviction violated the Kienapple principle as it was not a separate delict from the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence of domination and coercive restraint distinct from the robbery.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4.5-year sentence reflected no error in principle and fell within the fit range, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellants appealed their custodial sentences for production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana.

They sought a suspended sentence or an intermittent custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and held that the sentences were fit.

The appeals from sentence were dismissed, except that the victim surcharges were set aside.

The appellant was convicted of several offences arising out of an armed home invasion and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, and his counsel pursued production of records to advance an alibi and alternate suspect defence.

However, the appellant was subsequently found inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality and deported.

As he was no longer amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abated due to the death of the respondent.

The appellants appealed their convictions for drug and weapons offences based on fresh evidence.

The evidence revealed that an essential police witness was the adoptive brother of one of the appellants, who had previously alleged he sexually assaulted her.

The Crown conceded that the failure to disclose this relationship and the resulting impact on the appellant compromised the fairness of the trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, noting the Crown's undertaking not to re-prosecute.

The appellant was successful on appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motions.

The parties agreed to fix the appeal costs at $75,000.

For the motions, the appellant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $212,500.

The respondents argued this amount was excessive and not within their reasonable contemplation, suggesting a cap of $125,000.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was some overlap in the respondents' work, it was not considerable, and fixed the motion costs at $175,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant, David Aiello, appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment and noting in default.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in principle and made palpable and overriding errors of fact in applying the factors for setting aside default judgment from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen.

Specifically, the motion judge misapplied the first and second factors by considering the entire litigation history, ignored relevant facts regarding the appellant's default, and applied too high a standard for an arguable defence, failing to consider the quantum of damages as a viable defence.

The Court concluded that it would be unjust to prevent the appellant from having his day in court, given the significant prejudice of a multi-million dollar judgment and the overarching principle of determining proceedings on their merits.

The appellant, B.D., appealed the dismissal of her action for sexual battery and negligence against the respondent, D.O. B.D. alleged D.O. anally penetrated her without consent, causing severe injury.

D.O. denied anal penetration at trial, despite a prior admission in his statement of defence.

The trial judge found deficiencies in B.D.'s evidence and was not satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that B.D. had proven her claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's discretion to allow the withdrawal of an admission, the holistic assessment of intertwined claims, and the credibility findings, which were entitled to deference.