David Watt

The self-represented appellant, who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, brought a motion to review a single judge's order refusing his request to adjourn his appeal hearing.

The appellant argued the single judge misapprehended facts and considered irrelevant factors, and claimed he could not prepare his factum due to poisonous gas being injected into his condominium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's decision.

The court noted the statutory obligation to hear such appeals as soon as practicable and that the appellant was not required to file a factum.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several violent offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering that he remain subject to a detention order.

The appellant argued the Board erred by denying his request for a conditional discharge and failing to conduct an individualized assessment of risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant had limited insight into his mental illness, minimized his offences, and required a managed transition into the community.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after a severe rear-end collision on a highway.

At trial, he argued that his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, violating his Charter right to silence, and that the subsequent breath demand was not made 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant volunteered the information freely and that the brief delay in making the breath demand was justified by public safety concerns at the chaotic accident scene.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and making it available, and sentenced to three years in penitentiary.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination on uncharged computer contents, breaching his right to silence, and finding intent to possess despite his deletion of the files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cross-examination proper and the trial judge's assessment of possession and control reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the three-year term was within the appropriate range.

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and failing to comply with probation.

The drugs were found hidden behind a recessed light fixture in a basement closet of a residence where the appellant was sleeping.

The trial judge found the appellant in constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including his wallet and a letter in the bedroom.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence could not reasonably support an inference that the appellant had knowledge of the hidden drugs.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of seven drug charges and sentenced to three years' imprisonment after police found a substantial quantity of drugs hidden in a garage where he was present.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing the circumstantial evidence of possession and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for circumstantial evidence and reasonably inferred the appellant exercised primary control over the drugs for distribution.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the nature and quantity of the drugs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for counselling murder.

While in jail for sexual assault, the appellant solicited a fellow inmate to kill the complainant so she could not testify against him.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the fellow inmate and surreptitiously recorded conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the offence of counselling was complete upon solicitation and the trial judge did not err in relying on the unsavoury witness's evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the nine-year sentence (reduced to five years for pre-trial custody) was proportionate given the aggravating factor that the target was a justice system participant.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after a complainant was stabbed in the eye with a beer bottle during a party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including failing to remedy the Crown's improper reference to inadmissible statements in its opening address, failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of an exculpatory statement, and failing to instruct the jury on the possibility of collusion among key Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors of law cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, as well as his sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W.(D.) instruction regarding defence witnesses, by finding he lacked standing to challenge a search under section 8 of the Charter, and by denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) instruction was required, the appellant was merely a privileged visitor with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched residence, and there was no evidence of adverse effects from the lockdown conditions to warrant enhanced credit.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside his acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the applicant after finding that a 13-month delay in inspecting the Intoxilyzer meant it was 'operated improperly', defeating the statutory presumption of identity.

The summary conviction appeal court found this was an error of law.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, noting that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional, the proposed ground involved well-settled law, and the substantive issue was already controlled by Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for having care or control of a vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal found that the SCAC impermissibly substituted its own factual findings for those of the trial judge regarding whether the accused posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Court of Appeal also held that the SCAC erred by deciding the appeal on the unargued ground of insufficient reasons.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a historical sexual assault that occurred in 1991.

He argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge fairly assessed the credibility of the witnesses using the W.(D.) framework and that there was a clear evidentiary basis for the conviction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over the legal limit, arguing that his statements to police at the accident scene were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and violated his section 7 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the smell of alcohol alone justified the approved screening device demand and the police had established the driver's identity without relying on the appellant's statements.

The proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice beyond the case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering death threats against his former spouse.

At trial, the complainant denied sending a Facebook message that indicated the sexual activity was consensual, and the trial judge barred further cross-examination on the message.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including forensic analysis proving the complainant sent the message, which she subsequently admitted.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence met the prerequisites for admissibility.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, which was stayed at the joint request of counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence against the appellant was very strong, including the presence of nearly 3,000 plants on his farm and his truck equipped to water them.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and driving while disqualified following a fatal snowmobile accident.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's statements, application of the burden of proof, or admission of reply evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's credibility findings were not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's decision to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the defence witness's testimony was reasonable and well-supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after an improper question was asked of the Crown's expert, by admitting a statement he made at the hospital about having swallowed cocaine before, and by refusing an adjournment to call a defence expert on cocaine toxicity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary rulings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The trial judge's remedial instruction cured the improper expert question, the hospital statement was highly probative to the issue of duress, and the need for a defence expert should have been foreseen.

The appellant, a physiotherapy assistant, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by considering the complainant's demure dress in court and her apparent religious beliefs as factors bolstering her credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by treating the complainant's manner of dress and religious beliefs as relevant to her credibility, these factors were given minimal weight and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.