David M. Paciocco

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment granting enforcement rights to the respondent mortgagee.

The motion was denied on all four relevant considerations: no intention to appeal within the appeal period, unsatisfactory explanation for delay, prejudice to the responding party given the moving party's repeated violations of court orders and illegal repossession of the property, and lack of merit in the proposed grounds of appeal.

The applicant, convicted of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his adopted daughter and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, sought release pending appeal pursuant to s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous, as there was a serious issue regarding whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the relevance of the complainant's admitted fabrication of a prior criminal allegation against her mother.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the length of the sentence, the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest given the arguable ground of appeal challenged the credibility evaluation central to the conviction.

Public safety concerns were mitigated by the applicant's three-year compliance with his bail plan.

The motion was granted and the applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The applicant, convicted by a jury of historical sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would attend court but argued detention was necessary in the public interest given the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and outstanding breach charges.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding the trial judge's exercise of exclusionary discretion over relevant defence evidence, that the breach allegations had a problematic foundation reducing their weight, and that the applicant's age, health problems, and long history of compliance with release conditions favoured release.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in giving a restrictive corrective instruction.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could not find a key Crown witness fabricated her evidence about the appellant's confession because defence counsel did not explicitly put that suggestion to her in cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no breach of the rule occurred as the tenor of the cross-examination made the defence's position clear.

Furthermore, the corrective instruction erroneously usurped the jury's function by prohibiting them from considering whether the witness fabricated the confession.

The curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from an order setting aside a property transfer and granting a vesting order to the bankruptcy trustee.

The motion judge applied the interests-of-justice test, finding that while the moving party formed an intention to appeal within the appeal period and the initial delay was understandable, the four-month delay in bringing the motion was unexplained and prejudicial to the bankrupt estate.

The proposed grounds of appeal were found to be entirely lacking in merit, as the claims of unfair deprivation of a witness were unsupported and the evidence sought to be relied upon did not qualify as fresh evidence.

The extension of time was denied and costs were awarded to the responding party.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order requiring them to pay $285,000 in damages to the respondents for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The parties had entered into an agreement for the respondents to purchase a parcel of land, conditional on the appellants obtaining municipal approval for a condominium conversion within two years.

When approval was not obtained, the respondents sued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in concluding the appellants breached their duty of good faith.

The Court also held the motion judge erred in applying unjust enrichment where a contract governed the relationship, and failed to provide sufficient reasons for dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 76 months for sexual exploitation, making child pornography, and voyeurism involving a 17-year-old complainant and multiple other victims secretly recorded in his home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for child pornography, treating elements of the offences as aggravating factors, and providing insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the overall sentence fit under the totality principle and noting the trial judge's discretionary decisions were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global sentence of eight years for sexual offences against three adolescent women.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of each complainant as similar fact evidence across counts, specifically regarding the finding that accidental tainting had not occurred.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis, noting that the core allegations differed meaningfully and could not be the product of accidental tainting.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year global sentence was fit given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the victims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal ATV accident.

The appellant was towing the deceased's disabled ATV using a short fabric sling when his vehicle drifted left, causing the tow strap to become caught and the deceased's ATV to flip, resulting in her death.

The trial judge found the appellant was impaired by alcohol, engaged in an inherently dangerous towing operation without proper concentration, and that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert and lay evidence regarding the tow setup, and that causation was properly established for both offences.

The appellant suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury in a cycling accident on a dirt path adjacent to Stone Church Road in Hamilton.

The City brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, which exempts municipalities from liability for damages caused by construction, obstruction, or erection on untravelled portions of highways.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the accident occurred on an untravelled portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.

The correct test requires determining whether the portion of highway was commonly and habitually used by the public for travel, not whether such use was reasonably foreseeable.

The court found the dirt path was commonly and regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists and therefore constituted a travelled portion of the highway, placing it outside the statutory exemption.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with an extensive history of child sexual offences, appealed his sentence of 20 months imposed for breaching a long-term supervision order and prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The breach occurred when he attended a religious service in a church in the presence of numerous children, merely 30 days after being released to a community correctional centre.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) entitlement to sentence credit for the period between suspension of his long-term supervision order and the laying of charges; (2) the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit at a ratio of 1:1.3 instead of 1:1.5 and the denial of a Duncan credit; and (3) that the sentence was imposed to ensure federal detention for treatment purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence fit and imposed without error.

Binance Holdings Limited appealed orders from the Divisional Court and Ontario Securities Commission regarding an investigation into Binance's operations in Ontario.

The Commission had issued a summons demanding production of documents and communications relating to alleged violations of the Securities Act.

Binance challenged the summons as unconstitutionally overbroad under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Divisional Court erred in declining to judicially review the Charter arguments and that the summons was an unreasonable seizure because it lacked a reasonable foundation to believe the demanded documents were relevant to the investigation.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to operation of a vehicle while disqualified and obstruction of an officer, as well as his sentence of 18 months in custody.

The appellant sought to strike his plea on the basis that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for allowing the conviction appeal, noting that the appellant acknowledged understanding the Crown's position and the consequences during the plea inquiry, and provided no fresh evidence to support his claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, given the appellant's twenty prior similar convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal the sentence was allowed but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his stepdaughter beginning when she was 15 years old, with violations occurring over approximately 20 months.

The trial judge relied heavily on an audio recording surreptitiously captured by the complainant in her bedroom on November 3, 2019.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge unfairly amplified the audio recording during deliberations, misapprehended its contents, misapprehended evidence relating to chronology of events, erred in assessing credibility of both the complainant and appellant, and misused a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no trial fairness issues, no misapprehension of evidence, and no credibility errors.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of failing to comply with a release order.

He received a global sentence of two years imprisonment after credit for pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alleged Charter violations relating to searches and access to counsel, and challenged the sentence on grounds of inadequate consideration of systemic discrimination and a procedurally unfair forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches.

The Court admitted fresh evidence on the sentence appeal but dismissed it on the merits, except for setting aside the forfeiture order for the funds seized.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The appellants, Olympia Trust Company and William Loucks, appealed a motion judge's order discharging a second mortgage on property owned by the respondents.

The respondents had borrowed funds from First Swiss Mortgage Corp., which assigned the mortgage to Olympia as bare trustee.

When the respondents refinanced and paid out the mortgage to First Swiss, the discharge was never registered and First Swiss misappropriated the funds.

The motion judge found that First Swiss was acting as Olympia's agent in receiving the payout and discharging the mortgage based on the terms of agreements between First Swiss and Loucks and the course of dealings between the parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants commenced an action against the respondent, a personal injury lawyer, for damages arising from the non-payment of referral fees allegedly owed under an oral contract spanning 1984 to 2018.

The appellants claimed entitlement to 10% of gross settlements or awards on over 130 referred lawsuits.

The respondent denied the existence of any contract and brought a summary judgment motion relying on denial of contract, alleged illegality, and limitation defences.

The motion judge found genuine issues requiring trial regarding contract existence and legality but granted partial summary judgment on limitation grounds, dismissing claims for lawsuits settling before December 10, 2017.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in characterizing the contract and in failing to recognize that the cause of action did not arise until the relationship ended in 2018.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly determined that the cause of action accrued when each referred lawsuit settled and payment was not made, regardless of whether the full extent of damages was known.