David M. Paciocco

The appellant sought to prove the validity of a holograph codicil executed by the deceased testatrix, purportedly leaving the most valuable estate asset, a home farm worth approximately $20 million, to the appellant alone.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances relating to both the testatrix's knowledge and approval of the codicil's contents and her testamentary capacity, and concluded the appellant failed to discharge her burden on either issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of suspicious circumstances, no misapplication of the legal standard for knowledge and approval, and no improper reliance on the family doctor's clinical notes.

The court also found the reasons for decision were sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Costs of $100,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was convicted of 33 counts of voyeurism based on video recordings found on a USB device seized from a safe in his condominium.

He appealed, challenging the validity of the warrant authorizing the search of the safes.

The application judge had found that the information to obtain disclosed sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuing justice's conclusion that a digital storage device would be found in the safes and would afford evidence of the offences under investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge made no extricable legal error, as his findings were rooted in the evidence and reflected permissible common-sense reasoning rather than speculation or impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for a series of robbery and related offences following a judge-alone trial that turned on the question of identity.

Duty counsel argued the convictions constituted an unreasonable verdict, advancing four arguments relating to the trial judge's findings regarding Facebook Messenger communications, the robber's appearance, clothing, and proximity to the location where the van and drugs were found.

The court held the verdict was based on findings of fact open to the trial judge, to which deference was owed.

Duty counsel's additional argument that electronic messages should have been treated as presumptively inadmissible bad character evidence was rejected, as the trial judge concluded the messages were referable to the offence in question.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal of his appeal from convictions under the Highway Traffic Act after failing to pursue the appeal for many years.

He argued that the delay resulted from the court’s failure to produce a transcript he claimed to have ordered when filing his notice of appeal.

The appellate court accepted for purposes of the appeal that the transcript may have been ordered but held that the appellant nevertheless bore the responsibility to pursue the appeal with due diligence.

A delay of approximately 17 years without steps to follow up on the transcript did not meet the due diligence requirement.

The court found no error in the appeal judge’s decision dismissing the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for firearm and drug-related offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the impact of incarceration on his relationship with his children and resulting family separation.

The appellant requested a modest three‑month reduction from the imposed four‑year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge was aware of the appellant’s parental status and the inevitable interruption to family relationships caused by incarceration.

The court found no error in principle and concluded that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

On a motion concerning appellate jurisdiction, the court held that paragraph one of an order dated June 20, 2025 was interlocutory and did not prevent the respondents from relying on prior findings made in related proceedings.

Because the order was interlocutory, the appeal could not proceed and was quashed.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving parties sought to re-open a dismissed appeal more than three years after this court dismissed their appeal from a summary judgment order enforcing four mortgages.

The court considered the motion under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving parties failed to meet the high threshold for re-opening, having raised unsustainable allegations of fraud and misconduct that were or could have been previously advanced.

The motion to re-open was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual assault.

The application judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, concluding that net delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the adjournment of the first trial to await the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. J.J. constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was not functus officio after the jury's verdict for purposes of a s. 11(b) application, distinguishing prior authorities.

The court further held that adjourning a trial to await guidance from a higher court in a different proceeding does not constitute a discrete exceptional event under the Jordan framework, but rather is a factor in assessing case complexity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside final family law orders and requiring him to obtain leave before bringing further motions until outstanding costs were paid.

He also sought to appeal a $20,000 costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant misread the leave order and failed to identify any errors by the motion judge.

The Court awarded the respondent $10,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the appellant's improper conduct, and directed that the costs order is enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him in civil contempt for breaching a Mareva injunction and sentencing him to 90 days' incarceration, as well as orders for equalization and support.

The appellant argued the contempt proceedings were procedurally unfair and the sentence was disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided adequate assistance to the self-represented appellant, correctly applied the test for civil contempt, and reasonably imposed a custodial sentence given the appellant's chronic non-disclosure, deliberate obfuscation, and flagrant disregard for court orders over 15 years of family litigation.

The moving parties, who were previously declared vexatious litigants, brought multiple motions within an appeal seeking broad procedural and substantive relief.

The motions were brought without obtaining leave from a Superior Court judge, as required by the vexatious litigant order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, holding that while a vexatious litigant order can be appealed without leave, any motions brought within that appeal proceeding still require leave.

The moving party, a former real estate broker whose licence was revoked, sought an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had previously declined to conduct a judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing his appeal of a refusal to reinstate his licence, which occurred after he walked out of the tribunal hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the proposed appeal was entirely without merit and the moving party's explanations for the delay were not credible.

The self-represented moving party sought various forms of relief relating to her appeal of orders directing the partition and sale of two properties and a reference for an accounting.

The motion judge dismissed requests to stay the proceedings, expedite the appeal, and intervene in the ongoing reference, noting that several of the orders appealed likely fell outside the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction.

However, the motion judge granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal, finding that the delay was explained by the moving party's difficulties navigating the rules and that the interests of justice favoured allowing the appeal to proceed.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding their respective appeals of a final family law order.

Both parties sought to dispense with the requirement to order and file trial transcripts due to alleged impecuniosity.

The motion judge dismissed these requests, finding the transcripts were necessary to adjudicate the appeals, which challenged the trial judge's factual findings and procedural fairness.

The applicant also moved for a stay of the child support orders pending appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, who had sole care of the dependent children.

The court ordered the appeals to be grouped and provided directions for sharing the cost of a consolidated transcript record.

The moving parties, whose property was placed in receivership, sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal an approval and vesting order, as well as a stay of that order pending appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the extension request, finding the moving parties failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for their delay, the delay prejudiced the receiver, and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

Consequently, the motion for a stay pending appeal was also dismissed, as there was no active appeal before the court and the balance of convenience favored the receiver.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit and retaining an electronics supervision clause.

The appellant argued the disposition was not the least onerous and restrictive option and that the Board improperly rejected a joint submission to remove the electronics clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the Board's decisions reasonable given the appellant's recent elopements and worsening auditory hallucinations.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to reinstate clauses for indirectly supervised and accompanied privileges, which the Board had mistakenly removed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.